In re the Estate of Dickerson

165 Misc. 230, 300 N.Y.S. 748, 1937 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1982
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedNovember 18, 1937
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 165 Misc. 230 (In re the Estate of Dickerson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Dickerson, 165 Misc. 230, 300 N.Y.S. 748, 1937 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1982 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1937).

Opinion

Delehanty, S.

Prior to his death on February 24, 1937, deceased was a civil service employee of the United States and was a member of the Civil Service Retirement System under the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act (U. S. Code, tit. 5, chap. 14, § 724, 44 Stat. 911, § 12, as amd.). At his death there was standing to his credit in the retirement fund the sum of $828.46. The issue before the court relates to the ownership of this fund.

Section 724 provides in part as follows:

(c) In case an annuitant shall die without having received in annuities purchased by the employee’s contributions as provided in (2) of section 698 of this title (U. S. Code, tit. 5, § 698) an amount equal to the total amount to his credit at time of retirement, the amount remaining to his credit and any accrued annuity shall be paid, upon the establishment of a valid claim therefor, in the following order of precedence:

“ First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated in writing by such annuitant and recorded on his individual account;

Second, if there be no such beneficiary, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the estate of such annuitant; * * *

“ (d) In case an employee shall die without having attained eligibility for retirement or without having established a valid claim for annuity, the total amount of his deductions with interest thereon shall be paid, upon the establishment of a valid claim therefor, in the following order of precedence:

First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated in writing by such employee and recorded on his individual account;

“ Second, if there be no such beneficiary, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the estate of such employee; * * *

“ (f) Each employee or annuitant to whom this chapter applies may, under regulations prescribed by the Civil Service Commission, designate a beneficiary or beneficiaries to whom shall be paid, upon the death of the employee or annuitant any sum remaining to his credit (including any accrued annuity) under the provisions of this chapter.”

[233]*233Section 729 provides as follows: “ None of the moneys mentioned in this chapter shall be assignable, either in law or equity, or be subject to execution, levy, or attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.”

Section 709 provides: For the purpose of administration, except as otherwise provided herein, the Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized and directed to perform, or cause to be performed, any and all acts and to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying the_ provisions of this chapter into full force and effect.”

Under the authority granted in subdivision (f) of section 724 and in section 709 of the act the civil service commission adopted regulations which were designed to establish the procedure to be followed by an employee who desired to designate a person to receive upon his death the amount standing to his credit. The regulations prescribe the form of designation. They require the designation to be executed before a supervising official of the department in which the employee is employed or in certain circumstances by another employee when authorized by a postmaster. They require that the designation, to have full force and effect, must be filed with the commission in duplicate prior to the employee’s death. The form of designation consists of a first page marked “ original ” and a second page marked duplicate ” which are substantially identical except that the regulations are printed on the back of the duplicate page.

Respondent, who is deceased’s widow and the administratrix of his estate, filed with the commission a claim to the fund asserting that it was the property of the estate. Petitioner here filed with the commission a claim for the fund based on a form of designation dated February 15, 1937, which is said to have been executed by deceased and which purports to name petitioner and deceased’s grandmother as beneficiaries of the fund. This form of designation was not filed with the commission until February 26, 1937, two days after deceased’s death. The commission ruled that because the form was filed after deceased’s death it was without effect and it thereupon and solely for that reason paid the fund to the administratrix of deceased’s estate. This discovery proceeding was instituted by petitioner to recover the fund in the hands of the administratrix.

Petitioner does not claim that the commission was in error in its disposition of the fund. She concedes that the commission is vested with particular and special authority under the retirement act to determine rights under its rules to funds such as that in [234]*234question here. But she asserts that the commission’s authority is confined solely to the retirement act and to its own regulations and that it has no general power to determine ultimately and finally rights accruing under the common or statutory law because it is an administrative and not a judicial body. In effect, the petitioner asserts that the commission has a right under the act and regulations to determine to whom the fund shall be paid in the first instance, but has no power, despite the provisions of the act and the regulations, to determine title to the fund. She asks the court to disregard the regulations in respect of the requirement as to the time of filing the designation, to hold such requirement to be of no effect in the determination of title and to adjudge title to the fund in her on the theory either that the designation upon which she relies is valid or that the deceased made a valid gift of the fund.

The act provides (§ 724, subd. [b]) that separation from the service in certain circumstances will entitle the employee to the return of the total amount of his deductions with interest. Section 724, subdivision (c), refers to the amount remaining to his credit in case of his death without having received the whole amount to his credit at the time of retirement. Section 724, subdivision (d), refers to the total amount of his deductions with interest in case he should die without having attained eligibility for retirement or without having established a valid claim for annuity. These provisions establish an intention on the part of the Congress to have the fund held intact unless the employee separates from the service and is himself paid. There is no provision for payment to any person other than the employee, his properly designated beneficiary or his estate. The prohibition against assignment in section 729 was intended, for the protection of the employee, to prevent him from transferring title to the fund. This prohibition against assignment, together with the provisions for payment to specified persons only, prevents the making of any gift by the employee. The right of petitioner, if any, must rest solely on the validity of the designation under which she claims.

Assuming, without deciding, that the form of designation was properly executed and delivered by the deceased, the questions presented are whether the act itself requires the filing of the designation prior to the death of the employee and whether the regulations adopted by the commission have the force of law. These are purely questions of law The court is of opinion that if the act itself requires the filing of the designation prior to the death of the employee, title to the fund has vested in the administratrix by virtue of the act.

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Bluebook (online)
165 Misc. 230, 300 N.Y.S. 748, 1937 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1982, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-dickerson-nysurct-1937.