In re the Estate of Beebe
Opinion
Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Chemung County (Buckley, S.), entered June 15, 1999, which denied respondent’s objections to the petition on the issue of apportionment of estate taxes.
Frances C. Beebe (hereinafter decedent) died in February 1996 leaving an estate valued at approximately $1 million. After making certain specific bequests to friends, relatives and the retirement home in which she resided prior to her death, decedent directed, pursuant to paragraph 21 of her last will and testament, that her residuary estate be distributed as follows: one third to respondent, one third to Elmira College and one third, to be shared equally, to three relatives, including petitioner Raymond S. Perry, Jr., the coexecutor of her estate.
Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, paragraph 22 of decedent’s will directed that the payment of any estate tax due be handled in the following manner: “twenty second: I direct that all inheritance taxes, estate and succession taxes, be paid by my Executor or Trustee, as the case may be, and be charged against my residuary estate, and not against the person or party receiving or in possession of the property taxes or receiving the benefit thereof. I further direct that there shall be no proration or apportionment of said taxes.” Pursuant to the foregoing provision, petitioners allocated the State estate tax due ($16,779.65) among all residuary beneficiaries, including respondent.1 Respondent thereafter filed objections2 to petitioners’ account contending, inter alla, that the estate tax should be apportioned solely among the noncharitable residuary beneficiaries, i.e., the three relatives of decedent named as residuary beneficiaries, pursuant to EPTL 2-1.8 (c) (2). Surrogate’s Court denied respondent’s objections, prompting this appeal.
[944]*944We affirm. Unless a testator otherwise provides in his or her will, any estate tax due must “be apportioned among the persons benefited in the proportion that the value of the property or interest received by such person benefited bears to the total value of the property and interest received by all persons benefited” (EPTL 2-1.8 [c] [1]), taking into account any marital, charitable or insurance deduction that may apply (see, EPTL 2-1.8 [c] [2]). Case law interpreting EPTL 2-1.8 and its predecessor, former Decedent Estate Law § 124, makes clear that “in the absence of a clear, unambiguous direction to the contrary in the will, apportionment pursuant to statute will be directed” (Matter of Shubert, 10 NY2d 461, 471; see, Matter of Atkinson, 148 AD2d 839, 840). Thus, once the statutory scheme is triggered, each beneficiary pays his, her or its fair share of estate tax, subject to any applicable deductions.
To that end, it is well settled that “a general direction that all estate or inheritance taxes be paid out of the residue is not the equivalent of a direction against proration within the residue itself nor a command that taxes be treated as [an] administration expense” (Matter of Shubert, supra, at 471). Thus, had decedent’s will merely provided that “all inheritance taxes, estate and succession taxes * * * be charged against [her] residuary estate”, such language indeed would have been insufficient to avoid statutory apportionment (see, id.);
Cardona, P. J., Peters, Spain and Graffeo, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
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268 A.D.2d 943 (In re the Estate of Beebe) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.