In re the Disbarment of Clarke

212 P. 1037, 46 Nev. 304
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 15, 1923
DocketNo. 2569
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 212 P. 1037 (In re the Disbarment of Clarke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Disbarment of Clarke, 212 P. 1037, 46 Nev. 304 (Neb. 1923).

Opinion

By the Court,

Ducker, C. J.:

The application for the disbarment of John Robb Clarke was made by F. A. Stevens, an attorney at law, in his own behalf, and also for and on behalf of the bar association of the city of Las Vegas, Clark County, State of Nevada. Citation was issued on said application, requiring the accused to appear before this court [305]*305and show -cause, if any he had, why the certificate and license to practice law in the State of Nevada, heretofore granted to him by this court, should not be revoked, and why he should not be disbarred and precluded from practicing law in all the courts of the State of Nevada. The citation was personally served upon him in the county of Clark, State of Nevada, on the 22d day of August, 1922, and thereafter, on November 16, 1922, the matter came on for hearing before this court. At the conclusion of the hearing we were of the opinion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charges made by the informant, and entered an order from the bench dismissing the application.

During the time mentioned in the accusation, John Robb Clarke was an attorney at law, duly licensed by the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada to practice his profession in all the courts of this state, and was engaged in the practice of law in said city of Las Vegas. It is alleged that prior to the filing of the accusation, and since his admission to the practice of law in this state, he has wilfully and maliciously conducted himself in a most ungentlemanly-manner in respect to his said profession, and has been guilty of gross misconduct in office. The first specific allegation of misconduct in the application is substantially as follows:

On or about the month of July, 1921, the informant, F. A. Stevens, was the city attorney of said city of Las Vegas. It is alleged that at that time and place Clarke, acting in his capacity as an attorney at law, approached the informant, and requested him to institute and prosecute a criminal action in the municipal court of said city against a certain person whose true name is not known to informant; that informant, after having been fully advised as to the matter, told Clarke that he could not institute and prosecute -said criminal action, for the reason that it did not appear to him that an offense had been committed; that Clarke then offered to associate himself with informant and assist in the prosecution of the action; that when informant refused this [306]*306request, Clarke said to him, in words to the following effect: “Don’t you ever frame these cases with other attorneys in order to make a little extra change?”

The third specific allegation is substantially as follows: That on the 24th day of May, 1922, one Harold S. Webster, through his attorney, John Robb Clarke, commenced an action for divorce against his wife, Alice Clara Webster, by filing with the clerk of the district court in and for said county of Clark, his verified complaint. That the cause of action as set out therein arose outside of the State of Nevada, and, among other things, the complaint contained the following allegation:

“That plaintiff is now, and for more than six months past and immediately preceding the commencement of this action has been continuously, an actual and bonafide resident of the county of Clark, State of Nevada.”

That said allegation was necessary and material in order to vest the court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter of said action; that said action came on for trial in said court on the 4th day of August, 1922, at 10 o’clock a. m., Clarke appearing as attorney for plaintiff, and Webster, being sworn as a witness in said action, testified in effect that he had been an actual, continuous, and bona-fide resident of said city, county, and state from the 12th day of November, 1921, until the commencement of the action, save and except two or three minor absences not to exceed more than four or five days at any one time, and also that he was living and residing in said city of Las Vegas continuously from the said 12th day of November, up to and including the 28th day of December, 1921, without being absent from said city at all.

It is alleged that his testimony as to his continuous presence in said city during the last-mentioned period of time was false and untrue, in that he did not live and reside in said city of Las Vegas, or in the county of Clark, State of Nevada, during said period of time, or any portion thereof; that he then and there knew that his said testimony was false and untrue, and that Clarke [307]*307did then and there know that the testimony of Webster was false and untrue, and did wilfully and maliciously, with intent to cause Webster to attempt to commit a fraud upon the court, procure, induce, cause, and prevail upon the latter to so testify falsely in this respect; that all of said period of residence as testified to by Webster was necessary in order to vest the court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter of said action, which was then and there well known to John Robb Clarke.

There was a second allegation of misconduct in the accusation, and, as to that, counsel for the informant stated at the beginning of the hearing that he would offer no evidence to support it. This second allegation was therefore, upon motion, stricken from the accusation by order of the court.

Upon the first charge the evidence is in direct conflict. But two witnesses testified concerning it, the' informant, F. A. Stevens, and the accused. The former’s testimony was furnished by deposition, and is substantially as alleged in the information. He testified that after he had declined to institute and prosecute the criminal action at Clarke’s request, the latter said to him: “Don’t you ever frame these cases with other attorneys so as to make a piece of change?” to which he replied, “No; we don’t do that kind of business out here.” No one was present except himself and Clarke. Clarke, who was sworn as a witness, in his own behalf at the hearing, denied that any such conversation ever occurred. If Clarke made the inquiry attributed to him and was serious in making it, we might well find that he, as an attorney at law, had wilfully attempted to induce informant, as city attorney, to use his office for an unlawful purpose. Such action would amount to gross misconduct warranting his disbarment. But in view of the state of the evidence in this regard, we are unable to say that the allegation is proven. The burden of proof was on the informant. On account of the highly penal nature of a judgment of disbarment, affecting so adversely the whole future of an accused, courts will [308]*308not disbar on doubtful evidence, or where there is substantial conflict in it.

The evidence introduced to sustain the third allegation of misconduct was also furnished by deposition. A brief summary of it, and of the evidence introduced by Clarke, will show that this allegation is not sustained. The deposition of Harold S.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Discipline of Drakulich
908 P.2d 709 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1995)
State Bar of Nevada v. Sexton
184 P.2d 357 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1947)
State Bar of Nevada v. Raffetto
183 P.2d 621 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
212 P. 1037, 46 Nev. 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-disbarment-of-clarke-nev-1923.