In Re The Detention Of W.s.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: May 31, 2022
• Docket: 82454-6
• Status: Published

Opinion

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 82454-6-I W.S., PUBLISHED OPINION Appellant.

DWYER, J. — W.S. appeals from a King County Superior Court order

committing him to 14 days of involuntary mental health treatment. According to

W.S., (1) the wrong county’s prosecutor represented the petitioner because the

process leading up to his commitment began in Stevens County, and (2) he was

denied his constitutional right to a jury trial. Because W.S. has not established

an entitlement to relief, we affirm.

I

W.S. was charged with malicious mischief after an incident in which he

destroyed a number of items in his mother’s home and wielded a chainsaw and a

crowbar in front of her. Being fearful and concerned that W.S. did not appear

lucid, his mother telephoned for police intervention. A superior court judge,

presiding in Stevens County, requested that W.S. be evaluated by a designated

crisis responder prior to being released from jail. The designated crisis

responder evaluated W.S. at Providence Mount Carmel Hospital emergency

room in Colville. For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/. No. 82454-6-I/2

Based on his conversations with W.S., W.S.’s mother, and W.S.’s

physician, the designated crisis responder petitioned to detain W.S. for an initial

120 hours of involuntary treatment. The initial petition was filed in King County

Superior Court. Upon his release from jail supervision, W.S. was transported

from the Providence Mount Carmel Hospital emergency room to Fairfax Hospital

in King County.

Within 120 hours of his initial detention, W.S.’s treatment providers at

Fairfax Hospital filed a petition for 14 days of involuntary treatment. The petition

was filed in King County Superior Court. A probable cause hearing was held and

the superior court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner

had proved that W.S., as a result of a mental disorder, presented a likelihood of

serious harm to others and to the property of others. Accordingly, the superior

court ordered W.S. to be detained for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment.

The superior court advised W.S. that if the hospital filed another petition to detain

him beyond 14 days, he could demand a jury trial. W.S. responded, “I want a

jury trial right now, please.” The superior court ignored this request.

W.S. appeals.

II

W.S. contends that “the wrong county prosecuted W.S.”1 This is so,

according to W.S., because the proceeding was initiated in Stevens County. We

disagree.

1 Br. of Appellant at 4.

2 For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/. No. 82454-6-I/3

The responsibility for representing the individuals or agencies petitioning

for mental health commitment or detention is designated by statute:

In any judicial proceeding for involuntary commitment or detention except under RCW 71.05.201, or in any proceeding challenging involuntary commitment or detention, the prosecuting attorney for the county in which the proceeding was initiated shall represent the individuals or agencies petitioning for commitment or detention and shall defend all challenges to such commitment or detention, except that the attorney general shall represent and provide legal services and advice to state hospitals or institutions with regard to all provisions of and proceedings under this chapter other than proceedings initiated by such hospitals and institutions seeking fourteen day detention.

RCW 71.05.130 (emphasis added).

W.S. contends that the judicial proceeding for the 14-day involuntary

commitment was initiated when the judge presiding in Stevens County requested

that a designated crisis responder evaluate W.S. prior to his release from jail.

According to W.S., “‘initiated’” is defined as “‘to cause or facilitate the beginning

of’”2 and, but for the judge’s request of the designated crisis responder, W.S.

would not have been initially detained, moved to a hospital in King County, and

evaluated there—all of which resulted in the filing of the petition for a 14-day

period of involuntary commitment and, after a probable cause hearing, the entry

of an order committing W.S. to up to 14 days of involuntary treatment.

However, the relevant statute provides that a probable cause hearing

resulting in a court order for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment can only be

initiated by the filing of a petition seeking an order authorizing the 14-day

detention. RCW 71.05.240 (“If a petition is filed for fourteen day involuntary

2 Br. of Appellant at 6 (quoting MERRIAM-W EBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/initiate#h1 (last visited Aug. 20, 2021)).

3 For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/. No. 82454-6-I/4

treatment or ninety days of less restrictive alternative treatment, the court shall

hold a probable cause hearing within one hundred twenty hours of the initial

detention of such person as determined in RCW 71.05.180, or at a time

determined under RCW 71.05.148.” (emphasis added)). Thus, had the petition

for a 14-day commitment not been filed, W.S. would have been released within

120 hours. RCW 71.05.180. Accordingly, the judicial proceeding at issue was

initiated when the mental health professionals at Fairfax Hospital, in King County,

filed a petition seeking W.S.’s detention for up to 14 days of involuntary

treatment.

At oral argument in this court, W.S.’s counsel asserted that, although W.S.

was detained at Fairfax Hospital in King County when the petition was filed and

when the probable cause hearing was held and although Fairfax Hospital was

the petitioner, the prosecutor for Stevens County could have represented Fairfax

Hospital without significant inconvenience, as the proceeding took place by way

of a video conference. According to W.S., this is evidence that the word

“initiated” in RCW 71.05.130 refers to either the time at which W.S. was referred

for evaluation or when he was first evaluated, both of which occurred in Stevens

County. However, RCW 71.05.130 was last amended in 2015. In 2015,

commitment hearings under the involuntary treatment act required the physical

presence of respondents. In re Det. of J.N., 200 Wn. App. 279, 290, 402 P.3d

380 (2017).3 Video hearings could only be held with the consent of the

3 The legislature has subsequently amended the involuntary treatment act to remove the

requirement that respondents be physically present at the probable cause hearing. RCW 71.05.310.

4 For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/. No. 82454-6-I/5

respondent. This simple fact completely undercuts W.S.’s statutory construction

argument. The prosecutor for King County was properly responsible for

representing the petitioner.

III

W.S. next contends that his state constitutional right to a jury trial was

violated when his request for a jury trial was ignored. As no such right exists at a

probable cause hearing, we disagree.

We review a claim of a constitutional right to a jury trial de novo. In re Det.

of C.B., 9 Wn. App. 2d 179, 182, 443 P.3d 811 (2019). The Washington

Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” W ASH.

CONST. art. I, § 21. To determine whether that provision grants the right to a jury

trial in certain circumstances, we apply a two-part test:

First, we determine the scope of the right to a jury trial as it existed at the time of our founding in 1889; second, we determine if the type of action at issue is similar to one that would include the right to a jury trial at that time.

In re Det. of M.W., 185 Wn.2d 633, 662, 374 P.3d 1123 (2016).

We have previously engaged in a thorough analysis of whether the right to

a jury trial exists in this circumstance and determined that

there was no proceeding in 1889 to which the jury trial right attached akin to the proceeding referenced as a probable cause hearing in RCW 71.05.240. Accordingly, the Washington Constitution does not require that a jury be seated to determine the issues presented in a probable cause hearing commenced pursuant to RCW 71.05.240.

5 For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/. No. 82454-6-I/6

In re Det. of S.E., 199 Wn. App. 609, 627-28, 400 P.3d 1271 (2017); accord In re

Det. of N.G., __ Wn. App. 2d __, 503 P.3d 1, 6 (2022); In re Det. of T.C., 11 Wn.

App. 2d 51, 59-60, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019).

Furthermore, we have previously determined that there is no state

constitutional right to a jury trial applicable to proceedings on a petition for a

longer 90-day period of involuntary treatment. C.B., 9 Wn. App. 2d at 184. Our

Supreme Court has also held that no constitutional right to a jury trial is

applicable to a 180-day recommitment hearing after dismissal of serious felony

charges based on a finding that the defendant was not competent to stand trial.

M.W., 185 Wn.2d at 663.

This question of law is now well-settled. The superior court did not err.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: