In Re The Detention Of M.c.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedJuly 15, 2024
Docket85678-2
StatusUnpublished

This text of In Re The Detention Of M.c. (In Re The Detention Of M.c.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re The Detention Of M.c., (Wash. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 85678-2-I M.C. DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DÍAZ, J. — M.C. appeals a trial court order committing him to 90 days of

involuntary treatment under two separate subsections of the Involuntary Treatment

Act (ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. M.C. argues that the State presented insufficient

evidence to support its findings on one of those subsections. Because M.C. is no

longer detained as a result of the challenged order and granting M.C.’s requested

relief on appeal would not affect the validity of the civil commitment order, M.C.’s

appeal is moot and we dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2023, a designated crisis responder filed a petition for M.C.’s initial

detention under the ITA, after he was booked in jail on multiple occasions during No. 85678-2-I/2

a two-week period and appeared to be “decompensating further” on each

occasion. M.C. was detained and evaluated at Telecare North Sound Evaluation

and Treatment Center (Telecare). On July 19, 2023, the superior court granted a

petition filed by Telecare to detain M.C. for 14 days of involuntary treatment.

On July 28, 2023, Telecare filed a second petition, seeking an additional 90

days of involuntary treatment to continue to address M.C.’s medication and

treatment needs. According to the declarations of Telecare’s professional staff,

M.C. had made “minimal progress” toward stabilization, continued to refuse

medication, was too “disorganized” to engage in any discharge planning, and

required further inpatient hospitalization. The court held a hearing on the petition

and considered the testimony of a clinical social worker employed by Telecare. On

August 2, 2023, the court again found there was sufficient evidence to detain M.C.,

and determined that he suffered from a mental disorder and met the criteria for

grave disability under both subsections (a) and (b) of RCW 71.05.020(25). The

court ordered 90 days of involuntary treatment.

M.C. appeals. 1

II. ANALYSIS

Once an individual has been committed for 14 days, the State may seek

an additional 90-day period of involuntary commitment based on grave disability.

1 M.C.’s notice of appeal refers to a 14-day detention, but the order designated for

review is the August 2, 2023 90-day order and it is clear from the briefing that it is the 90-day order M.C. challenges. 2 No. 85678-2-I/3

RCW 71.05.280(4), RCW 71.05.320(1)(a). The statute provides two definitions

of “gravely disabled,” which is a condition:

in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety; or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety

RCW 71.05.020(25)(a), (b).

M.C. recognizes that the court concluded that he was gravely disabled

under both subsections of the statute, but expressly declines to challenge the trial

court’s finding that he met the criteria for grave disability under RCW

71.05.020(25)(b). M.C. asks this court to reverse the finding under RCW

71.05.020(25)(a) and to strike that finding from the commitment order.

Because M.C. does not challenge the commitment order in its entirety, the

State argues that M.C.’s appeal is moot. We agree. “As a general rule, this court

will not review a moot case.” In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93

P.3d 124 (2004). “An appeal is moot where it presents merely academic questions

and where this court can no longer provide effective relief.” In re Det. of M.K., 168

Wn. App. 621, 625, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). Here, as is often the case because

periods of detention authorized by the ITA are relatively short, the detention which

is the subject of the appeal has ended. See, e.g., In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 377,

662 P.2d 828 (1983). Therefore, we are unable to provide “the most basic relief

originally sought”—release. Id.

3 No. 85678-2-I/4

Yet, many appeals of civil commitment orders are not moot because of

potential adverse collateral consequences stemming from the determinations that

authorize involuntary treatment. See, e.g., id., at 377; see also M.K., 168 Wn. App.

at 626; In re Involuntary Treatment of L.T.S., 197 Wn. App. 230, 234, 389 P.3d

660 (2016). When making a civil commitment determination, courts may consider

prior involuntary treatment. RCW 71.05.245. Thus, “each commitment order has

a collateral consequence in subsequent petitions and hearings.” M.K., 168 Wn.

App. at 626. So, despite release of the previously-detained individual, we are able

to “render relief if we hold that the detention under a civil commitment order was

not warranted.” Id.

But in this case, because M.C. challenges only one of the two legal bases

supporting the involuntary treatment order, a decision in M.C.’s favor would only

result in that finding being stricken from the order, even if we were to agree that

the evidence does not support the determination of grave disability under RCW

71.05.020(25)(a). Such a decision would not invalidate the commitment order,

since the unchallenged determination under RCW 71.05.020(25)(b) equally

supports the detention. And M.C. fails to explain why a decision striking one basis

for commitment will provide “future relief.” M.C. cites no authority, and we are

aware of none, supporting the position that, where a commitment order is founded

on multiple grounds, reversal of one ground eliminates potential future

consequences of the civil commitment.

4 No. 85678-2-I/5

III. CONCLUSION

Because the challenged detention order has expired and reversal of one

legal basis supporting the civil commitment order would not invalidate the order,

M.C.’s appeal is dismissed as moot.

WE CONCUR:

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Related

In Re Marriage of Horner
93 P.3d 124 (Washington Supreme Court, 2004)
Diamond v. Cross
662 P.2d 828 (Washington Supreme Court, 1983)
In re the Involuntary Treatment of: L.T.S.
197 Wash. App. 230 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2016)
In re the Marriage of Horner
93 P.3d 124 (Washington Supreme Court, 2004)
In re the Detention of M.K.
279 P.3d 897 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2012)

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