In Re The Detention Of: J.k.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 9, 2025
• Docket: 86790-3
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I) J.K. DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FELDMAN, J. — J.K. appeals the trial court’s 14-day and 180-day involuntary

treatment orders. He argues there was insufficient evidence to commit him for

involuntary treatment, the trial court abused its discretion in relying on hearsay

evidence, and the 180-day petition should have been dismissed because it was

facially invalid. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and this opinion will

not be published, we recite the facts only as necessary to explain our reasoning

below. Finding no entitlement to relief, we affirm. 1

I

J.K. claims “The trial court abused its discretion by relying on . . . insufficient

evidence when ordering J.K’s involuntary commitment.” We disagree.

A

To commit a minor for involuntary treatment, the State must show the minor

“presents a likelihood of serious harm or is gravely disabled.” RCW

1 Although both J.K.’s 14-day and 180-day treatment periods have ended, this appeal is not moot

as his commitment orders may have collateral consequences in future proceedings. See In re Det. of B.M., 7 Wn. App. 2d 70, 77, 432 P.3d 459 (2019). No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I)

71.34.740(9)(a); RCW 71.34.750(6)(a)(ii). A minor presents a likelihood of serious

harm under RCW 71.34.020(39)(a)(i) if there is a substantial risk that “[p]hysical

harm will be inflicted by a minor upon his or her own person, as evidenced by

threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on oneself.” And a

minor is gravely disabled under RCW 71.34.020(27)(a) if “as a result of a

behavioral health disorder, [the minor] is in danger of serious physical harm

resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health

and safety.” To establish grave disability, the State must present “recent, tangible

evidence of failure or inability to provide for such essential human needs as food,

clothing, shelter, or medical treatment which presents a high probability of serious

physical harm within the near future unless adequate treatment is afforded.” In re

Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 204-05, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). 2

The burden of proof differs depending on the duration of the involuntary

treatment. At the initial 14-day commitment hearing, the State bears the burden

of proving likelihood of serious harm or grave disability by a preponderance of the

evidence. RCW 71.34.740(9). If necessary, the State can petition to extend a

minor’s involuntary treatment by 180 days. At the 180-day hearing, the State must

show that the minor’s involuntary treatment should continue by clear, cogent, and

convincing evidence. RCW 71.34.750(6)(a). This requires that “the ultimate fact

in issue . . . be shown by evidence to be highly probable.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at

209 (internal quotations omitted).

2 We focus in the text above on the asserted grounds for involuntary commitment; the State does

not assert J.K. presents a likelihood of serious harm under RCW 71.34.020(39)(a)(ii) nor does it assert J.K. is gravely disabled under RCW 71.34.020(26)(b).

2 No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I)

Our review of these issues is both limited and deferential. On review, we

must determine “whether substantial evidence supports the [trial court’s] findings

and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court’s conclusions of law

and judgment.” Id. Where the State must prove its case by a preponderance of

the evidence, “[s]ubstantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to

persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise.” In re Det. of

H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 762, 355 P.3d 294 (2015). Where the State must prove

its case by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, “the findings must be supported

by substantial evidence in light of the ‘highly probable’ test.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d

at 209 (quoting In re Interest of Pawling, 101 Wn.2d 392, 399, 679 P.2d 916

(1984)). In either case, “when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Petitioner[],” which here is

the State. In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 330, 487 P.3d 531 (2021).

B

Applying these legal principles to the 14-day commitment order, substantial

evidence supports the trial court’s determination that J.K. presented a likelihood of

serious harm to himself at the time of the 180-day hearing. J.K was hospitalized

at Seattle Children’s Hospital after attempting to overdose on common household

medication. Janise Zayas, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted J.K.’s initial

assessment. She testified that, during this assessment, J.K. shared that he was

actively suicidal, that he had prior overdose attempts, and “that he still had access

to [those] medications at home.” Zayas further testified that J.K. attempted suicide

while in the hospital “by tying a T-Shirt around his neck.” This evidence supports

3 No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I)

the trial court’s determination that J.K. presented a likelihood of serious harm to

himself at the time of the 14-day hearing.

Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s determination that J.K

was gravely disabled at the time of the 14-day hearing. Melissa Jensen, an

advanced practice registered nurse and court evaluator, testified, “Right now,

[J.K.’s] primary diagnosis is anorexia nervosa.” She added that J.K. was

“distressed about gaining weight,” “expressed a desire to discontinue eating

disorder treatment in general,” and “maintain[ed] that . . . if he were to go home,

he would likely [try to] get down to 90 pounds.” Additionally, Jensen testified that

while “[J.K.] ha[d] been eating by mouth and complying with the eating disorder

guideline of care,” he “require[d] consistent observation and insurance [sic] that he

is following the treatment plan.” Because of this, Jensen testified “[J.K.] cannot be

managed at a lower level of care.” Jensen emphasized that without inpatient

treatment, J.K. may “go backwards and become metabolically at risk.” This is

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that J.K. was gravely

disabled at the time of the 14-day hearing.

C

Turning to the 180-day commitment order, substantial evidence again

supports the trial court’s determination that J.K. presented a likelihood of serious

harm to himself at the time of the 180-day hearing. Jensen testified that “J.K. tried

to elope off of the unit and tried to wrap a blanket around his neck as an attempt

to strangle himself.” Additionally, Jensen testified that J.K. displayed self-harming

and aggressive behaviors like “prevent[ing] [s]taff and patients from entering the

4 No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I)

[common] space,” “lung[ing] at doors while banging on them for extended period[s]

of time,” and “kicking and hitting the windows in the community space.” Jensen

also testified that J.K. had to be physically restrained at least once due to his

outbursts. This is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination

that J.K. presented a likelihood of serious harm to himself at the time of the 180-

day hearing.

Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s determination that J.K.

was gravely disabled at the time of the 180-day hearing. Jensen testified, “Our

primary diagnosis is anorexia nervosa. And then the secondary diagnosis is an

anxiety disorder.” She further testified that J.K. “requir[ed] 24/7 supervision in

order to maintain his nutritional intake” while committed, and even with supervision,

J.K. occasionally refused meals outright. Jensen explained that two days before

his commitment hearing “[J.K.] had difficulty during meal support [and] both

breakfast and lunch required 100 percent supplementation, which means that he

did not eat anything.” Additionally, Jensen testified that J.K. “continues to tell me

that if he is not in a highly-restrictive program, he will decompensate, he will go

back to trying to get down to between 80 to 90 pounds.” Jensen explained that

such weight loss would have harmful and long-lasting impacts on J.K.’s health.

This substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that J.K. was

gravely disabled at the time of the 180-day hearing.

II

Next, J.K. claims “The trial court abused its discretion by relying on hearsay

. . . when ordering J.K’s involuntary commitment” and that “[a]ny reliance on Ms.

5 No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I)

Zayas’s testimony about the prior ‘overdose’ and Ms. Jenson’s testimony about

previous hospitalizations was an error.” This, too, is incorrect.

A party’s own out-of-court statements are not considered hearsay and are

admissible as substantive evidence when offered against the party at a hearing.

ER 801(d)(2)(i). Here, J.K. admitted to his prior overdose attempts during his

commitment assessment. Thus, Jensen’s testimony regarding J.K.’s own

statements is not hearsay under ER 801(d)(2)(i) and the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in considering those statements. See In re Welfare of M.R., 200

Wn.2d 363, 376, 518 P.3d 214 (2022) (court reviews decision to admit evidence

“for an abuse of discretion”). 3

Testimony regarding J.K.’s prior hospitalizations was also admissible. The

parties correctly stipulated that the medical charts being offered into evidence

constituted business records exempt from the hearsay rule under RCW 5.45.020.

Moreover, even without considering the evidence of J.K.’s prior hospitalizations,

J.K.’s actively suicidal mindset, attempted suicide at the hospital, and prior

overdose attempts support the trial court’s findings that J.K. “presents a likelihood

of serious harm to himself.” As such, any evidentiary error was harmless. See

M.R., 200 Wn.2d at 376 (“[i]f an abuse of discretion was committed, this court then

reviews the error for prejudice”). J.K.’s hearsay arguments thus fail.

3 “An abuse of discretion occurs if a judge’s decision was ‘manifestly unreasonable,’ meaning no

reasonable person would reach the same conclusion, or if it ‘rests on untenable grounds,’ meaning it relied on facts not supported by the record or on an incorrect legal standard.” Id. (quoting State v. Griffin, 173 Wn.2d 467, 473, 268 P.3d 924 (2012)).

6 No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I)

III

Lastly, J.K. claims “[t]he 180-day petition should have been dismissed

because it was facially invalid.” We decline to address the merits of this argument

because J.K. failed to raise it below.

Under RAP 2.5(a), “The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of

error which was not raised in the trial court.” However, a party may raise an issue

for the first time on appeal if the issue involves a “manifest error affecting a

constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a)(3). “Application of RAP 2.5(a)(3) depends on the

answers to two questions: ‘(1) Has the party claiming error shown the error is truly

of a constitutional magnitude, and if so, (2) has the party demonstrated that the

error is manifest?’” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 267, 458 P.3d 750 (2020)

(quoting State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 583, 355 P.3d 253 (2015)). In

analyzing the asserted constitutional interest, the reviewing court does not assume

the alleged error is of constitutional magnitude. State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91,

98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

In the Matter of the Detention of M.S., 18 Wn. App. 2d 651, 492 P.3d 882

(2021), illustrates how RAP 2.5(a)(3) applies here. In M.S., the appellant argued

that the “trial court’s alleged failure to notify him of his statutory right to a jury trial

violated his right to procedural due process.” Id. at 656. However, the appellant

did not explain his due process argument beyond this mere assertion. The court

held that “M.S. fail[ed] to demonstrate that the trial court’s alleged failure to comply

with [the statute] violated procedural due process.” Id. at 656. The court explained

that “[w]hen determining due process rights, we utilize the balancing test from

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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).” Id. By

raising a procedural due process violation and “fail[ing] to undertake the Mathews

balancing test at all,” M.S. “does not show that the alleged error is of constitutional

magnitude.” Therefore, the court declined to review the alleged error under RAP

2.5(a)(3). Id. at 656-57.

Here, J.K. alleges the State’s 180-day commitment petition was invalid

because one of the signatories failed to indicate they were a “child and adolescent

or family psychiatric advanced nurse practitioner,” as required by RCW

71.34.750(3)(a). J.K. contends this “deprived [him] of [his] liberty and due process”

because “[h]ad the court realized the hospital’s disregard of [RCW

71.34.750(3)(c)], the court would have been compelled to dismiss” the State’s

petition. App. Rep. 13. As in M.S., J.K. suggests the State’s statutory violation is

of constitutional magnitude but fails to explain why that is so; he does not

undertake the Mathews balancing test nor does he support his argument with

relevant case law. “[N]aked castings into the constitutional sea are not sufficient

to command judicial consideration and discussion.” Seven Gables Corp. v.

MGM/UA Entm’t Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 14, 721 P.2d 1 (1986) (quoting United States

v. Phillips, 433 F.2d 1364, 1366 (8th Cir. 1970)). As in M.S., we decline to review

the alleged error under RAP 2.5(a)(3).

IV

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and, in turn, its

conclusions that J.K. presented a likelihood of serious harm to himself and was

8 No. 86790-3-I (consolidated w/86868-3-I)

gravely disabled at the time of his commitment hearings. Because J.K. has not

established an entitlement to relief, we affirm.

WE CONCUR: