In Re The Detention Of B.m.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 21, 2025
• Docket: 86324-0
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 86324-0-I

B.M. DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FELDMAN, J. — B.M. appeals his 90-day involuntary psychiatric commitment

order, arguing the State failed to show he continued to present a likelihood of

serious harm to others. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and this

opinion will not be published, we recite the facts only as necessary to explain our

reasoning below. Finding no error, we affirm.

Preliminarily, although B.M.’s 90-day involuntary psychiatric commitment

ended in 2024, the State expressly notes that it “is not arguing that this appeal is

moot” and asks the Court to “decide this case on the merits.” Applicable precedent

similarly indicates we should entertain this appeal due to the collateral

consequences of an involuntary commitment order. In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn.

App. 621, 625-26, 279 P.3d 897 (2012) (recognizing significant role that prior civil

commitments play in a subsequent commitment determination). We therefore

decline to dismiss the appeal as moot and address the merits of the commitment

order and B.M.’s arguments. No. 86324-0-I

Under RCW 71.05.280, a person may be confined for additional treatment

after an initial 14-day treatment period if, “Such person was taken into custody as

a result of conduct in which he or she attempted or inflicted physical harm upon

the person of another . . . and continues to present, as a result of a behavioral

health disorder, a likelihood of serious harm.” RCW 71.05.280(2). “Likelihood of

serious harm” means “[a] substantial risk that . . . physical harm will be inflicted by

a person upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or

which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such

harm.” RCW 71.05.020(37)(a)(ii). The State bears the burden of proving someone

requires involuntary commitment by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,

“which means the ultimate fact in issue must be shown by evidence to be ‘highly

probable.’” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 209, 728 P.2d 138 (1986)

(quoting In re Interest of Pawling, 101 Wn.2d 392, 399, 679 P.2d 916 (1984)). “An

appellate court reviewing the trial court’s decision on involuntary commitment

considers whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence and if the court’s findings of fact support the court's conclusions of law

and judgment.” In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021).

Contrary to B.M.’s assertion, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s

conclusion that he continued to present a likelihood of serious harm to others.

Seattle Police arrested B.M. for assault after he struck several passersby walking

in Belltown. He was hospitalized at Harborview Medical Center to be evaluated

following the incident, and then transferred from there to Multicare Navos Inpatient

Hospital (Navos). Hyemin Song, a licensed clinical social worker and court

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evaluator at Navos, testified at the hearing in this matter that B.M. suffers from

schizophrenia and his repeated prior assaults are a “result of him being not able

to process . . . surroundings,” making his behavior “erratic,” “unpredictable,” and

“dangerous.”

Song further testified B.M. was not “able to have . . . coherent or meaningful

conversations with the treatment team to discuss his treatment plan” nor was he

able to discuss the “assaultive behavior that led to this hospitalization.” Song

explained: B.M. “didn’t think that there was anything wrong,” believing he had been

hospitalized for merely “loitering.” Song also testified B.M. did not have outpatient

support in place to reduce the likelihood of serious harm to others were he

released. Song noted, “I do not think that [there are] enough resources for [B.M.]

to maintain stability in the community.” This evidence is sufficient to show, as the

trial court concluded, that B.M. continued to present a likelihood of serious harm

to others as required to detain him for additional treatment after the initial 14-day

treatment period.

Notwithstanding the above, B.M. argues the lack of aggressive or

threatening behavior while receiving treatment at Navos demonstrates he no

longer presented a likelihood of serious harm and, thus, the 90-day involuntary

commitment order should be vacated. While there is evidence that B.M. displayed

no aggressive behavior while hospitalized, our Supreme Court has recognized “the

practical effect of being placed in the hospital will usually eliminate the ‘imminence’

of one’s dangerousness.” In re Det. of Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109

(1982). Accordingly, notwithstanding any asserted improvement while

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hospitalized, “the State has a continuing interest in confining those who present a

substantial risk of serious physical harm to themselves or others.” Id. Here, as

Song testified, while B.M.’s “insight is a little bit improving,” his understanding of

his assaultive behavior remained “limited and poor at this time.” She therefore

recommended continued hospitalization. Thus, on this record, the absence of

aggressive behavior while hospitalized does not invalidate the trial court’s

commitment order.

In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and

conclusion that the State met its burden of showing by “clear, cogent and

convincing evidence” that B.M. continued to pose a likelihood of serious harm to

others. We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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