IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Dependency of: No. 83171-2-I
S.I.L., DIVISION ONE
A Minor Child. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ANDRUS, C.J. — K.P., the father of 14-year-old S.I.L., appeals the trial
court’s finding that S.I.L. is dependent under RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). He contends
insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings. The father also
argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to submit to a
psychosexual evaluation without expressly excluding polygraph and penile
plethysmograph (PPG) tests, and that ordering such tests violates his substantive
due process rights.
We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the challenged findings,
and those findings support the conclusion that S.I.L. is dependent under RCW
13.34.030(6)(c). We decline to reach the issue of whether the trial court abused
its discretion in ordering K.P. to undergo a polygraph or PPG test or violated K.P.’s
due process rights in ordering him to do so because the trial court did not actually
order K.P. to undergo either test. We affirm.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 83171-2-I/2
FACTS
In January 2021, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (the
Department) received three separate intake reports regarding then 13-year-old
S.I.L., who resided with her mother, A.L. Leanne King, the Child Protective
Services (CPS) social worker who investigated the reports, discovered that A.L.
was experiencing a serious mental health episode involving delusional thoughts
and hallucinations. A.L. believed someone was after her and had gotten inside
her mattress; A.L. began to beat and slash the mattress to find the person hiding
inside and asked S.I.L. to help her. A.L. fled the house with SIL, and, while driving
away, A.L. began driving erratically because she believed that the intruder was
now on top of the car’s roof and she needed to knock the person off. Eventually,
A.L. drove herself and her daughter to the home of A.L.’s father. A.L. was
transported to St. Joseph Hospital for treatment and involuntarily detained for 120
hours.
When King learned of A.L.’s 2021 mental health detention, she contacted
the grandfather and learned S.I.L. was at his home, where S.I.L. remained while
CPS attempted to engage A.L. in services. A.L. continued to exhibit delusional
thoughts after being discharged from the hospital and, after the effort to engage
A.L. in services proved unsuccessful, King determined she needed to remove
S.I.L. from A.L.’s care. When King contacted S.I.L.’s father, K.P., he informed King
that he was not in a position to parent S.I.L., that he had lost his job and was
looking for employment, and that he believed S.I.L. was safe in the care of her
maternal grandfather. K.P. told King that he had not seen S.I.L. in years and had
stopped trying to see her because he did not want to deal with A.L. Because the -2- No. 83171-2-I/3
father did not want to parent S.I.L., CPS began to prepare the paperwork to file a
dependency petition and to obtain court approval for placement with her
grandfather.
The Department filed the dependency petition on February 11, 2021. It
obtained an order authorizing the Department to take S.I.L. into its custody that
same day. The parents did not contest shelter care and agreed that, at that point,
S.I.L. had no parent available to provide supervision and care for the child. They
also stipulated to placement with the maternal grandfather. The court authorized
the parents to have a minimum of two hours of supervised visitation with S.I.L., two
times each week and also approved “liberal phone visits between mother/father
and child” subject to the “child’s willingness to participate.” The court appointed a
guardian ad litem (GAL) for S.I.L., and, at the teen’s request, also appointed
counsel to represent her.
On March 30, 2021, the father answered the petition, asserting he was
capable of adequately caring for S.I.L. The trial court scheduled a fact-finding
hearing on the issue of dependency as to the father, which it conducted on July
27, 28, 29, and August 3, 2021. The mother did not participate in this hearing,
although her attorney appeared via Zoom.
At this hearing, the trial court heard testimony that the mother had a long
history of mental illness. In 2012, A.L. had reported, without evidence, that her
and K.P.’s son, then in his early teens, had raped S.I.L. A.L. began verbally
abusing the boy. This incident led the Department to remove him from A.L.’s care
and to initiate a dependency petition for the protection of A.L.’s son, who was
-3- No. 83171-2-I/4
suicidal as a result of his mother’s belief that he had raped his younger sister and
his mother’s refusal to allow him to remain in her home.
At that point, CPS contacted K.P. to tell him that the Department had
removed the son from A.L.’s custody due to A.L.’s mental state. The Department
supported K.P. in filing a parenting plan for the son. The son lived with K.P. for a
few months and then went to live with his maternal grandfather, with K.P.’s
consent. He remained in his grandfather’s care until he reached the age of 18.
When the son went to live with his grandfather, the Department dismissed its
dependency petition.
K.P. has had an ongoing awareness of A.L.’s mental health issues, both
because of the Department advising him of her condition and his involvement in
their fifteen-year, on-again-off-again relationship. He reported that while they
never married or lived together, up until 2010, he was often at her home after work
to help her with the two children. For the first three years of S.I.L.’s life, K.P.
testified that he took an active role in helping to raise his daughter. He stopped
interacting with A.L., however, because she became violent with him, threw things
at him, and began to demand that he pay money to see his children. When he
refused, K.P. testified that A.L. took S.I.L. and his son to live in a different county.
For approximately a decade, K.P. had no contact with S.I.L., with the exception of
a single visit when she was ten years old. S.I.L. told King that she would not
recognize her father if she passed him on the street.
The Department also learned that K.P. had a fairly extensive criminal
history. In 1995, he was convicted of negligent driving. In 1998, he was convicted
of fourth degree assault and first degree negligent driving. In 2001, he pleaded -4- No. 83171-2-I/5
guilty to indecent exposure and residential burglary. K.P. testified that the 2001
convictions arose out of an incident involving A.L. when he entered A.L.’s
apartment without her knowledge in an attempt to have sexual relations with her.
The court, as a part of this conviction, entered a domestic violence protection order
for the protection of A.L. K.P. was sentenced to nine months in jail for indecent
exposure and 75 days in jail for the burglary conviction.
In 2008, K.P. was convicted of criminal trespass, and in 2010 he was
convicted again of fourth degree assault and second degree unlawful possession
of a firearm.
In 2014, K.P., who was then married, was convicted of domestic violence
voyeurism for taking a naked photo of his 18-year-old stepdaughter while she slept,
a photograph which was backed up on Google. K.P. claimed at the dependency
hearing that the purpose of the photo was not for sexual reasons, but rather to
blackmail his stepdaughter into getting a job and to teach her a lesson. He was
sentenced to 5 months in jail and 12 months of community custody. While in
community custody, he was ordered not to consume any alcohol. The court
entered a sexual assault protection order for the benefit of his victim, prohibiting
him from having any contact with her until January 2018.
As part of the 2014 conviction, K.P. was also ordered to register as a sex
offender, to submit to a sexual deviancy evaluation and comply with any treatment
recommendations, and to submit to a sexual history and “periodic polygraphs
and/or plethysmograph assessments” as directed by the Department of
Corrections. The 2014 judgment and sentence also required K.P. to obtain a
mental health and a chemical dependency evaluation. K.P. had no recollection of -5- No. 83171-2-I/6
ever undergoing a mental health evaluation and was not sure he was required to
complete a chemical dependency evaluation. K.P. testified that he completed a
“sexual evaluation,” that it took about two hours, and that at the end, the evaluator
told him “I passed and I don’t need any more counseling for that.” It was unclear
if this evaluation was actually a sexual deviancy, mental health, or substance
abuse evaluation. Neither the Department nor K.P.’s attorney was able to verify
what evaluations K.P. underwent before the contested dependency hearing.
In 2016, K.P. was convicted for driving under the influence. He was placed
on five years of probation.
In 2021, at the dependency hearing for S.I.L., Department social worker
Joshua Sharon testified that before S.I.L. went to live with her grandfather, she
had experienced suicidal ideation and depression and had begun experimenting
with vaping, alcohol, and cannabis. S.I.L. was reserved, closed off, not doing well
in school, and not engaged in extracurricular activities. Sharon attributed her
mental health and academic difficulties in part to her feeling unsafe living with a
mother experiencing hallucinations. With the stability and predictability S.I.L.
gained with her grandfather, however, she became more conversant, got involved
in volleyball at school, began to improve academically, and began to engage with
a math tutor set up by her grandfather. She is no longer verbalizing suicidality and
has not experimented with substances since entering her grandfather’s care.
Sharon expressed concerns that moving S.I.L. into her father’s care would
jeopardize S.I.L.’s progress because she had no bond with K.P. and had
expressed reluctance in developing a relationship with her father.
-6- No. 83171-2-I/7
S.I.L.’s court-appointed GAL, Kathy Hilmoe, testified that she has serious
concerns about K.P.’s capability to meet S.I.L.’s special mental health and
academic needs given the lack of a bond between father and daughter. K.P. told
Hilmoe he was not interested in parenting classes (possibly because he mistakenly
believed he would have to pay for them). Hilmoe found most concerning K.P.’s
passive stance on parenting—he had not investigated S.I.L.’s medical,
psychological or educational needs. He had instead allowed the grandfather to
play the active parental role and K.P. took the attitude of “whatever [S.I.L.] wants”
would be fine with him. Hilmoe understood S.I.L. had grown less interested in
spending time establishing a relationship with K.P. and believed it was because
there was a lack of predictability in that relationship. Hilmoe described S.I.L. as
needing predictability because of the trauma she experienced in her mother’s care.
This predictability would help her feel mentally healthy and allow her to see her
world as an ordered, rather than disordered, place. She opined that placing S.I.L.
with a parent with whom she has no bond and no assurance of stability would be
detrimental to her development.
K.P. admitted that he had told a Department social worker that he was not
able to care for S.I.L., but testified that he had changed his mind. He pointed to
the fact that he had been involved in S.I.L.’s care until she was three, including
efforts to feed her, clothe her, and change her diapers. He visited A.L. and their
daughter after work many days each week, went to the store to buy whatever S.I.L.
and her mother needed, and mowed their lawn and washed their dishes. And he
noted that he had a room in his current home where S.I.L. could have her own
bedroom. -7- No. 83171-2-I/8
But K.P. was not aware of the extent of S.I.L.’s needs relating to her mental
health or schooling. While he approved of the placement with her maternal
grandfather and wanted to let S.I.L. decide where she wanted to live, he wanted
the opportunity to rebuild a relationship with her. K.P. requested that S.I.L.’s time
with the grandfather be considered a non-dependency placement with a relative.
S.I.L., through her attorney, joined the Department’s request for a finding of
dependency, arguing that the best way to ensure S.I.L.’s safety while trying to
facilitate a bond and relationship between her and K.P. was within the structure,
protection, and services provided by a dependency.
The court found S.I.L. a dependent under RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). The court
ordered K.P. to undergo a psychosexual evaluation, but the court agreed to revisit
that requirement if K.P. was able to subsequently produce a copy of his prior
psychosexual evaluation. There is no evidence in the record of K.P. having
produced this document.
K.P. appeals.
ANALYSIS
Sufficiency of Evidence of Dependency
K.P. first contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding of dependency. In a dependency proceeding, the Department must prove
that a child is dependent by a preponderance of evidence. RCW 13.34.110(1).
We will affirm an order of dependency as long as substantial evidence supports
the trial court's findings of fact and those findings support its conclusions of law.
In re Dependency of M.S.D., 144 Wn. App. 468, 478, 182 P.3d 978 (2008). We
defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of the -8- No. 83171-2-I/9
witnesses, and the weight or persuasiveness of the evidence. In re Welfare of
S.J., 162 Wn. App. 873, 881, 256 P.3d 470 (2011). We view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. In re
Parental Rights to M.J., 187 Wn. App. 399, 407, 348 P.3d 1265 (2015) (citing
Woody v. Stapp, 146 Wn. App. 16, 22, 189 P.3d 807 (2008)).
The court determined that S.I.L. is dependent under RCW 13.34.030(6)(c).
This statute provides that a “[d]ependent child” is any child who “[h]as no parent,
guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for the child, such that the
child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the
child's psychological or physical development.”
K.P. assigned error to several of the trial court’s factual findings that
supported its dependency determination. He first challenges finding of fact 2.2.A,
which states:
In determining that the Department established by a preponderance of the evidence that [K.P.] is incapable of adequately caring for [S.I.L.] and her needs, the Court conducted a fact-specific inquiry and considered the evidence presented under the totality of the circumstances.
K.P. appears to argue that the trial court did not consider the totality of the
evidence, but instead focused exclusively on the fact that “the father and child do
not know each other very well and on the father’s seven-year-old voyeurism
conviction (which did not involve this or any child).” The record does not support
this argument.
In its oral ruling, the trial court made clear that it considered the evidence of
S.I.L.’s special needs including her mental health and academic delays, the current
lack of a bond between S.I.L. and her father, the overall history of their relationship, -9- No. 83171-2-I/10
K.P.’s knowledge of A.L.’s mental health issues, his failure to follow through on a
parenting plan for his son, his lack of intervention on S.I.L.’s behalf after
discovering A.L.’s mental illness and its impact on her parenting, and the entire
context of KP’s criminal history, including a sex offense involving an individual who
was 19 or 20, and his most recent DUI conviction. The court repeatedly stated
that any individual circumstance may not suffice, but the court had to consider all
of these factors in context. This oral ruling provides sufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that it conducted a fact-specific inquiry based on the totality
of the circumstances.
K.P. next challenges finding of fact 2.2.C, which states:
[S.I.L.]’s needs also include the need for a bond with her father. [S.I.L.] lacks a bond with [K.P.]. The facts and context that led up to this lack of bond and how it affects [S.I.L.] is important in determining whether [K.P.] is a capable parent. While [K.P.] was involved in [S.I.L.]’s life when she was young, this was followed by over a decade of little-to-no involvement.
The factual findings in this paragraph are also supported by substantial evidence.
K.P. testified A.L. moved away with S.I.L. when S.I.L. was three years old and he
admitted that “she doesn’t know me . . . but she knows of me.” He stated that he
took A.L. and his daughter out for dinner when S.I.L. was ten years old. But he
admitted he had not seen her any other time.
CPS social worker King testified that “[S.I.L.] has communicated to me at
the beginning stages of this investigation that she would not know her father if she
passed him on the street. So, clearly, there is no bond or attachment there.” King
also testified that a “bond and attachment is important in terms of . . . a parent or
guardian wanting to be [protective], being empathetic and compassionate for the
- 10 - No. 83171-2-I/11
child.” The existence of a bond between parent and child is important, King said,
in ensuring the child feels safe and feels comfortable reporting safety issues to that
parent. King informed the trial court that her investigation revealed that K.P. had
not been involved in parenting S.I.L.
Hilmoe similarly testified that there was no relationship between S.I.L. and
her father. She stated that K.P. told her that they lacked any father-daughter bond.
S.I.L.’s grandfather testified that S.I.L. does not know much about her father.
There was ample evidence that, while K.P. was involved in S.I.L.’s life for the first
three years, he had had no contact with her for a decade and lacked any bond with
her.
K.P. next challenges finding of fact 2.2.D which states:
[K.P.] was involved in petitioning for a parenting plan in 2012 regarding [S.P.], his and [A.L.]’s older child. As evidence in the petition for parenting plan, [K.P.] knew [A.L.] had mental health issues while she was caring for [their children]. [K.P.] was also assaulted by [A.L.] during this time period. At trial, [K.P.] described his relationship with [A.L.] as being difficult. Despite his knowledge of [A.L.]’s unstable mental health and her combative behavior, [K.P.] did not follow-through on entering a final parenting plan or engage in other intervention efforts to ensure the children’s safety in their mother’s care. This evidence provides context for the lack of bond between [S.I.L.] and [K.P.] and demonstrates that there is no parent capable of parenting [S.I.L.] now.
The testimony of K.P. himself supports most of these factual findings. K.P.
admitted that his relationship with A.L. was “not good,” that things at times did “get
violent,” and that A.L. threw items at him “maybe a dozen times.” K.P. testified
that once when A.L. tried to hit him, he restrained her by grabbing her wrist and
that he went to jail for doing so “because she had a bruise.” He also stated that
- 11 - No. 83171-2-I/12
he had not had a physical altercation with A.L. since 2010. This evidence supports
the finding that A.L. had assaulted K.P. and was combative with him.
K.P. further testified that he petitioned for a parenting plan for his son in
2012. In the petition itself, K.P. wrote in handwriting that “On May 10th 2012, I got
a call from Thurston Co. CPS in regards to my son [S.P.] letting me know he was
taken out of mother’s custody case #12-7-00320-9, Thurston County Superior
Court due to her mental state. See attached custody case.” The trial court
reasonably inferred from this statement that K.P. was aware of A.L.’s mental
illness. While K.P. testified that he assumed the court awarded him custody of his
son in 2012, he understood that the parenting plan action was dismissed by the
court. He stated that he “never finished it. . . . It fell, you know, all the way through.”
K.P. also testified that, while he thought about petitioning the court for a
parenting plan for S.I.L., he did not act on it because he did not want her to grow
up in an environment “where the two parent[s] are gabbing at each other.” Again,
from this evidence, the trial court could infer that K.P. took no action to intervene
to ensure that the children were safe in their mother’s care.
K.P. next challenges the factual sufficiency of finding of fact 2.2.E which
states:
While passive parenting can be competent parenting in certain circumstances, it is not in the context of this case given [K.P.]’s lack of intervention while [S.I.L.] resided with [her mother] and [S.I.L.]’s own mental health needs. Passive parenting is a factor that demonstrates that [K.P.] is incapable of meeting [S.I.L.]’s needs.
This finding is supported by the testimony of the CPS social worker King, and GAL
Hilmoe. King explained how traumatic the incident with her mother stabbing the
mattress was for S.I.L. She testified that SIL did not feel safe in her mother’s care. - 12 - No. 83171-2-I/13
Hilmoe testified that S.I.L. had special mental health and educational needs
because of this trauma, her history of suicidality, and the delays in her academic
progress. K.P. told her that he “wanted the best for his daughter but that he wanted
her to make the decisions . . . about where to live.” In her opinion, his attitude of
wanting to do whatever S.I.L. thought was best and consenting to her placement
with her grandfather was inadequate to meet S.I.L.’s special needs. She felt S.I.L.
needed a parent who understood she was a teenager who had had a fairly
tumultuous recent past; S.I.L. needed a parent who would be an active advocate
in addressing her mental health needs and an active advocate regarding S.I.L.’s
Individualized Education Program at school. Hilmoe pointed out that she had
asked K.P. to become more engaged with his daughter and to request supervised
visits with her. But he was deferring to her to make her own day-to-day decisions,
including whether to spend time with him, and was not involved at all in monitoring
her day-to-day activities, like the friends with whom she was spending time. This
evidence is sufficient to support finding of fact 2.2.E.
K.P. next challenges finding of fact 2.2.F and 2.2.G and the court’s ultimate
finding of fact on the statutory basis for dependency under Paragraphs 2.3, 2.4,
3.4, and 4.1. Findings of fact 2.2.F and 2.2.G provide:
2.2.F. The Court considered [K.P.]’s criminal history as a factor in determining that he is incapable of parenting [S.I.L.]. [K.P.]’s criminal convictions of Voyeurism and Indecent Exposure are both sexual in nature and involve female victims in their early 18-20’s. [K.P.] also has a DUI conviction that he is currently on probation for. While the DUI itself is not indicative of whether [K.P.] is able to adequately care for [S.I.L.], the fact that [he] admitted he was also intoxicated during the circumstances that led to the Voyeurism and Indecent Exposure convictions is concerning as it relates to [S.I.L.]’s safety. In context, and given [S.I.L.]’s age and vulnerability, this criminal history is a factor that demonstrates [K.P.] is incapable of caring for [S.I.L.]. - 13 - No. 83171-2-I/14
2.2.G. The evidence at trial regarding [S.I.L.]’s needs, the lack of bond between [S.I.L.] and [K.P.], and [K.P.]’s criminal history, together, demonstrate that [K.P.] is incapable of caring for [S.I.L.] such that she is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to her psychological or physical development.
Paragraphs 2.3, 2.4, 3.4 and 4.1 each make the same finding—that S.I.L. is
dependent under RCW 13.34.030(6) because she lacks a parent capable of
adequately caring for her such that she is in circumstances which constitute a
danger of substantial damage to her psychological or physical development.
Each of these findings is supported by the testimony of Sharon, Hilmoe,
King, and even K.P. himself. Sharon identified S.I.L.’s prior mental health and
academic challenges. He explained that she had achieved stability and
predictability with her grandfather and that moving S.I.L. into her father’s care
would jeopardize these improvements because S.I.L. had no bond with K.P.
Sharon identified very real concerns about K.P.’s criminal history, what appears to
be a pattern of alcohol abuse, and his lack of parental judgment when he engaged
in voyeurism with his teenage stepdaughter.
Hilmoe opined that K.P. lacked the ability to meet S.I.L.’s special mental
health and academic needs. Hilmoe testified that K.P. took no active role in
parenting SIL nor had he investigated her medical, psychological or educational
needs. Because of the trauma she experienced in her mother’s care, S.I.L. needs
predictability in order to feel safe and to succeed. Hilmoe opined that placing S.I.L.
with K.P., a parent with whom she has no bond, would be detrimental to her
development.
- 14 - No. 83171-2-I/15
K.P. admitted his criminal history, including the voyeurism conviction, and
gave a somewhat bizarre explanation for his conduct. Many of the convictions
appear to stem from K.P.’s use of alcohol, for which he has no recollection of ever
undergoing evaluation or treatment, despite a court order requiring that he do so.
This evidence is more than sufficient to support findings of fact 2.2.F and
2.2.G and the finding that S.I.L. is dependent. We therefore reject K.P.’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Psychosexual Evaluation
K.P. next challenges the trial court’s dispositional order to the extent it
requires him to undergo a sexual deviancy evaluation. 1 He argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to make it clear that his evaluation need not
include a polygraph or PPG test. K.P. further contends that imposing a
psychosexual evaluation involving polygraph testing or PPG testing violates his
right to substantive due process. But K.P. did not raise this issue below and, as
the Department points out, the dispositional order does not require that K.P.
undergo such tests.
Paragraph 4.5 of the order provides:
FATHER SHALL:
SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
...
2. Complete a sexual deviancy evaluation with a Department- approved provider and follow any recommendations for further services. Contact the Department to request a referral be made for
1 Both K.P. and the Department interchangeably refer to this evaluation as a sexual deviancy
evaluation or a psychosexual evaluation. The record does not establish that there is a difference between the two. - 15 - No. 83171-2-I/16
the evaluation. The father may file a timely motion to strike this service requirement if a previous sexual deviancy evaluation is produced.
The juvenile court has broad discretion in dealing with child welfare matters,
and we review dispositional orders in dependency cases for abuse of discretion.
In re Dependency of D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. 149, 158, 253 P.3d 112 (2011). The
juvenile court abuses its discretion when a decision is manifestly unreasonable,
based on untenable grounds, or based on untenable reasons. In re Dependency
of T.L.G., 139 Wn. App. 1, 15, 156 P.3d 222 (2007). K.P. contends that the trial
court here abused its discretion, not by ordering a psychosexual evaluation per se,
but by not explicitly excluding any requirement that he undergo either a polygraph
examination or a PPG test. He contends there is no statutory authority to order a
parent to undergo either test in a dependency proceeding.
First, we can find no indication that K.P. raised a statutory argument below.
We will not address an argument for the first time on appeal unless the party can
show the presence of a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP
2.5(a)(3). K.P.’s statutory challenge does not fall within RAP 2.5(a)(3).
Second, the underlying premise of K.P.’s constitutional arguments is that
the trial court ordered him to undergo a polygraph and a PPG test. But the
dispositional order refers to neither, and the Department contends that the trial
court’s order does not include such requirements. There is no evidence in the
record to support the assertion that a polygraph or a PPG test is “always” a
component of a psychosexual evaluation. We will not address on appeal a
- 16 - No. 83171-2-I/17
theoretical constitutional claim when there appears to be no actual dispute
between the parties over the order’s requirements. 2
Finally, this dependency proceeding is ongoing. Dependency proceedings
are remedial, preliminary, and nonadversarial in nature. In re Welfare of Key, 119
Wn.2d 600, 609, 836 P.2d 200 (1992). In the event the Department or an evaluator
subsequently recommends that K.P. undergo either a polygraph or a PPG test,
and what is now hypothetical becomes a reality, K.P. has the opportunity to raise
the statutory and constitutional arguments with the trial court.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
2 K.P. relies on Division Two’s decision in D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. 149, for his request that the case
be remanded to the trial court to make a record as to the basis for ordering a polygraph and PPG test. In that case, the mother explicitly objected to the trial court’s order requiring she undergo these tests as a part of any psychosexual evaluation because the evaluation was to investigate the factual basis for her children’s allegations of sexual abuse. Id. at 156. Although unclear, it appears the Department sought these very tests, and the trial court overruled the mother’s objections to them. D.C.-M. is clearly distinguishable because K.P. did not raise this issue below and the Department is not asking that K.P. undergo such tests. The trial court here did not make a record to support ordering these two tests because it did not do so. - 17 -