In Re The Dependency Of L.g.

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of Dependency of:

No. 87604-0-I (consolidated with L.G., M.G., S.G. No.s 87605-8-I; 87606-6-I)

Minor Children. DIVISION ONE PUBLISHED OPINION

BUI, J. — Father appeals the juvenile court’s shelter care hearing order placing the children with Mother’s neighbor, and the order denying concurrent jurisdiction between the ongoing dependency case and a civil protection order (PO) action pending in superior court. 1 Because the dependency case was dismissed and the children are no longer placed with Mother’s neighbor, the appeal is moot. However, we review the appeal because this case involves an issue of substantial and continuing interest, that is, whether due process is violated when a parent is deprived of an opportunity to meaningfully participate in proceedings related to the placement of their children. We vacate the juvenile court’s order denying concurrent jurisdiction, and the shelter care order placing the children with the Mother’s neighbor.

FACTS

Father and Mother share three young daughters, S.G., L.G., and M.G

1 To avoid confusion, we refer to the parties as Father and Mother because they have the same initials.

(children). In 2021, the superior court entered a PO restraining Father from having contact, in person or through other means with Mother and their three children, and prohibiting Father from coming within 500 feet of Mother’s residence, workplace, and the school or day care of their three children. There were no restraints prohibiting Father from attending courtroom proceedings, where Mother was also in attendance. Every order to renew the PO adopted the same provisions, and the most recent renewal was entered on February 20, 2024.

In 2024, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) brought a dependency action for all three children. On November 26, 2024, Father agreed to bifurcated shelter care hearings based on the belief the PO restrained contact between Mother and Father at court proceedings, resulting in the parents’ shelter care hearings occurring on different dates. On December 6, 2024, at the father’s shelter care hearing, there was no discussion of the children’s placement.

On December 13, before Mother’s scheduled shelter care hearing, Mother filed two requests: that her visits change from monitored to unsupervised visits and that the children be removed from foster care and “placed with suitable other/fictive kin, Aphrodite Reynolds,” who resided in the same apartment complex as Mother. Father submitted a written response opposing both of Mother’s requests and moved the juvenile court for concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court, so the most recent PO could be modified to permit him to attend and participate in the dependency action.

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At Mother’s shelter care hearing on December 17, Father’s counsel appeared on his behalf, Father did not appear, and Mother appeared via video. Both counsel and a DCYF social worker appeared in person. Mother’s counsel objected to concurrent jurisdiction, arguing that “[Father’s] motion raises huge red flags for me” because counsel contended Father’s reasons for requesting concurrent jurisdiction were veiled attempts to exert control over Mother to perpetrate further domestic violence by appearing in the same courtroom as Mother. Father’s counsel disagreed and responded that Father could appear remotely and meet with counsel in breakout rooms for private attorney-client conversations during dependency proceedings. The juvenile court did not address Father’s suggested alternative courtroom participation procedures.

The juvenile court denied Father’s motion for concurrent jurisdiction adopting language from Mother’s counsel’s argument, “[Father’s] request raises red flags for the Court.” The juvenile court also granted Mother’s motion to immediately place the children with Mother’s neighbor Reynolds, ruling there was “no reason articulated why the suitable other [Reynolds] is not suitable.”

Father filed a motion for discretionary review on the issues of whether the juvenile court violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by prohibiting his participation in his children’s shelter care hearings. We granted discretionary review. 2 ANALYSIS

2 Ruling Granting Discr. Review, In re Dependency of L.G., No. 87604-0-I (Wash. Ct.

App. September 15, 2025).

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At oral argument, appellate counsel told this court the dependency action was dismissed on December 18, 2025. 3 Because the dependency action was dismissed, we cannot provide relief, and Father’s challenge to the juvenile court’s orders is moot. A case is moot when we can no longer provide effective relief. State v. T.J.S.-M., 193 Wn.2d 450, 454, 441 P.3d 1181 (2019).

We do not consider moot issues unless they present “a matter of ‘continuing and substantial public interest.’ ” State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321, 330, 358 P.3d 385 (2015) (citing Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972)). In determining whether a sufficient public interest is involved, we consider “ ‘(1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.’ ” Beaver, 184 Wn.2d at 330-31 (quoting State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d 584 (2012)).

The nature of a parent’s participation in their shelter care hearings involving their children’s placement and visitation is an issue public in nature because it transcends the parties in this proceeding. See Beaver, 184 Wn.2d at 331. An opinion on this issue is desirable to provide future guidance to public officers, and the issue may recur in the absence of appellate vigilance. 4 Thus, we address this issue despite the dismissal of the dependency action.

3 In compliance with this court’s instruction, counsel for the State and DCYF filed the

orders dismissing the dependency, to supplement the appeal record. Order Dismissing Dependency, (King County Super. Ct., December 18, 2025).

4 See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 12 Wn. App. 2d 88, 456 P.3d 1193 (2020); State v. Buck,

34 Wash. App. 2d 188, 194, 567 P.3d 54, review granted, 5 Wn.3d 1001, 574 P.3d 581 (2025), and aff’d, 6 Wn.3d 524, 588 P.3d 1071 (2026).

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As a preliminary matter, it was not necessary for the juvenile court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the parallel PO proceeding for Father to participate in his children’s placement hearings. That is because the PO did not contain any language that prohibited Father’s participation at Mother’s shelter care hearings, or any hearing involving the children’s placement and visitation.

We turn to Father’s contention, that the juvenile court violated his procedural due process rights by not permitting him to hear, respond to, or object to evidence offered in support or against children’s placement during Mother’s shelter care hearing. We agree.

The Washington Constitution provides “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. In the context of a dependency proceeding, parents have the right to “be represented by an attorney . . . , to introduce evidence, to be heard in his or her own behalf, to examine witnesses, to receive a decision based solely on the evidence adduced at the hearing, and to an unbiased fact finder.” RCW 13.34.090(1); see also In re Dependency of H.W., 70 Wn. App. 552, 555-56, 854 P.2d 1100 (1993).

In determining whether a parent received due process, we must balance (1) the parent’s interests, (2) the risk of error created by the procedures used and the likely value of additional safeguards, and (3) the State’s interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)). We review whether a proceeding violates due process de novo. In re Welfare of J.M., 130 Wn. App. 912, 920, 125 P.3d 245 (2005).

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While Father has a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his children, 5 the State and DCYF has an “equally compelling interest in protecting the physical, mental and emotional health of the children.” 6 To balance these two interests, we consider the procedures used to determine the risk that Father’s interest was erroneously deprived.

Father argues the juvenile court created a high risk of error by judging his credibility without hearing live testimony and prohibiting him from providing input into his children’s placement. In support of his contention, Father relies on In re Dependency of R.L., 123 Wn. App. 215, 98 P.3d 75 (2004). In R.L., at a shelter care hearing, the father sought to testify that placement with the children’s maternal grandmother was unsafe because the grandmother lived in a drug house. 123 Wn. App. at 219. The court refused to hear the father’s testimony, stating, “I don’t buy anything you have said.” R.L., 123 Wn. App. at 224. The court placed the children with their maternal grandmother without giving “credence to [the father’s] position.” R.L., 123 Wn. App. at 224. This court concluded the trial court’s judgment of witness credibility without hearing live testimony violated the father’s due process rights. 123 Wn. App.at 224.

Similar to R.L., at the shelter care hearing, the juvenile court not only barred Father from presenting testimony on his own behalf, but also prevented him from hearing Mother’s testimony in-person or remotely. Contrary to DCYF’s contention that witness credibility was not disputed, the juvenile court weighed

5 In re Dependency of K.D.S., 176 Wn.2d 644, 652, 294 P.3d 695 (2013).

6 H.W., 70 Wn. App. at 555.

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witnesses’ credibility in determining whether to place the children with Reynolds. In the court’s rulings, it indicated Father’s request “raise[d] red flags,” 7 and was an attempt to control the dependency proceedings. We first note that we would expect that the judge presiding over the hearing controls the proceedings, including the conduct of all who are in the courtroom. That is true even when the hearing involves highly contentious family law matters. Nothing in the record supports that the anticipated conduct of the Father was such that it would render the hearing uncontrollable for the judge.

The court also stated there was “no reason that was articulated why the suitable other, [Reynolds], is not suitable,” to which Father had no opportunity to respond. However, if the juvenile court gave credence to Father’s belief that Reynolds was not a suitable alternative, it may not have been so quick to dismiss Father’s concerns as a manipulation tactic. Because the juvenile court, like the trial court in R.L., judged Father’s credibility without hearing live testimony, there was an increased risk of error and prejudice. R.L., 123 Wn. App. at 224.

At the time this court issued its opinion in R.L., it issued a companion case, In re Dependency of H.W., 123 Wn. App. 237, 98 P.3d 81 (2004), which is instructive. In H.W., the mother sought to present expert witness testimony concerning whether the mother had the ability to care for her child, to support the mother’s request for reunification with her children. 123 Wn. App. at 239. The trial

7 The juvenile court adopted this language from Mother’s counsel’s argument at the shelter care hearing.

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court denied the request for expert testimony but allowed the mother to submit written declarations from her proposed witnesses. 123 Wn. App. at 240.

The court held that the trial court’s proposed alternative of written declarations was an insufficient safeguard, concluding “[o]ral presentations . . . have more flexibility than written submissions and can be essential to due process[.]” H.W., 123 Wn. App. at 243. The court also rejected the State’s argument that the mother’s appearance through counsel was sufficient, as there was a significant factual dispute rather than a pure legal issue to be resolved. 123 Wn. App. at 242.

In this case, DCYF makes the same arguments rejected in H.W. DCYF contends there were adequate procedural safeguards because the juvenile court heard “extensive argument” from Father’s counsel, that the court noted Father’s placement objection, and that Father received written notice about the proposed placement and was able to respond in writing through pleadings prior to and after the hearing. Although “[t]he ability to defend through counsel reduces the risk of error,” 8 H.W. rejected the proposition that written submissions are a sufficient substitute for a parent’s oral presentation. H.W., 123 Wn. App. at 243. Further, the juvenile court did not even consider Father’s remote appearance as an alternative to in-person appearance, if the trial court had concerns regarding having Mother and Father appear in the same courtroom.

8 In re Welfare of L.R., 180 Wn. App. 717, 725, 324 P.3d 737 (2014); see also In re Dependency of J.W., 90 Wn. App. 417, 428-29, 953 P.2d 104 (1998).

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Thus, we conclude the risk of error created by the procedures used was high, and the procedural safeguards used were insufficient.

On balance, the Mathews factors establish that the juvenile court’s prohibition on Father’s participation in Mother’s shelter care hearing violated his procedural due process rights. Although DCYF has an important interest in protecting children and victims of domestic violence, Father had a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his children. The juvenile court also provided insufficient safeguards to outweigh the risk of error and prejudice of Father being unable to participate in the shelter care proceeding. Thus, the juvenile court violated Father’s due process rights by denying Father the opportunity to meaningfully participate in a hearing where his children’s placement was disputed.

Father also asserts the juvenile court’s prohibition on his participation in the shelter care hearing violated his substantive due process rights. We do not address this contention, given our procedural due process ruling.

Generally, where, as here, a parent’s procedural due process rights were violated, we would reverse the juvenile court’s placement and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. But in this case, no purpose would be served by remand because the dependency action was dismissed, and the children are no longer placed with Reynolds. Thus, we vacate the juvenile court’s order denying concurrent jurisdiction, and the shelter care order placing the children with Reynolds.

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WE CONCUR: