In re the Construction of the Will of Kent

20 Misc. 2d 923, 189 N.Y.S.2d 676, 1959 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3167
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedAugust 13, 1959
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 20 Misc. 2d 923 (In re the Construction of the Will of Kent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Construction of the Will of Kent, 20 Misc. 2d 923, 189 N.Y.S.2d 676, 1959 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3167 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1959).

Opinion

Francis V. V. Leary, S.

This is an application for construction of paragraph Fifteenth of the last will and testament of Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, dated May 4, 1955, and which was admitted to probate in the Surrogate’s Court of Broome County on September 28, 1955.

The office of the court in any proceeding for testamentary construction is twofold, as was pointed out in Matter of Costello (147 Misc. 629). It is a trite truism that the primary object in the construction of a will is to ascertain the intention of testator, and when this has been determined the court must adjudicate the legal effect and consequences of the directions as there interpreted. The testator, not the court, must make a disposition of his property. All the latter can do is, so far as legal rules permit, to effectuate the disposition which the testator has directed. It cannot make a new and valid will for him if he has failed in this respect, nor can it exercise its own judgment as to the justness or fairness of the provisions of the instrument. (Herzog v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 177 N. Y. 86, 92; Central Trust Co. v. Egleston, 185 N. Y. 23, 33; Weeks v. Cornwell, 104 N. Y. 325; Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29; Riker v. Gwynne, 201 N. Y. 143.)

In the performance of the office of adjudicating the legality of testator’s directions for the disposal of his property, precedents are of the utmost importance. On the primary question of what disposition the testator actually intended, in other words, in the judicial act of the interpretation of the meaning of the phraseology used in the testamentary instrument, the citation of authorities is of very little use. No two wills are similarly phrased in all particulars, and since every word employed is potentially important as shedding possible light upon what the testator actually had in mind at the time of the execution of the document, it is fundamentally inconceivable that a decision respecting intent, as disclosed in one instrument could have any proximate bearing on the purpose envisaged in another.

Another frequently encountered stumbling block in this connection is concealed in the phrase “ the intention of the tes[926]*926tator.” This does not refer to what he might have desired to accomplish in the light of the eventualities which have transpired since the execution of the will. The only intent relevant or important is as to the disposition of his property, which the testator had in mind at the precise moment of his signature of the will which is the subject matter of the construction.

It was pointed out by the Court of Appeals (Matter of Bump, 234 N. Y. 60, 63) that little light is cast on the correct interpretation of the language in one will by decisions construing another. (Matter of Quinby, 134 Misc. 296.) In each case resort must, in the final analysis, be had to the familiar primary principles that the aim of the court is to determine the intention of the testator (Matter of Hughes, 225 App. Div. 29; Matter of Phelps, 133 Misc. 450; Matter of Purdy, 133 Misc. 217) and if such intention can be discovered it is paramount (Matter of Buttner, 243 N. Y. 1; Matter of Farkouh, 134 Misc. 285; Matter of Smathers, 133 Misc. 812; Matter of Manning, 133 Misc. 695) and will not he affected by any rule of construction (Matter of Rooker, 248 N. Y. 361); that in determining such intention courts are limited to the words which testator has himself used in the will (Matter of Durand, 250 N. Y. 45; Matter of Dinkel, 133 Misc. 868); but if there is any ambiguity, that construction should be adopted which will best carry testator’s intention into effect. (Matter of Buechner, 226 N. Y. 440; Nicholas v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 224 App. Div. 540; Matter of Kavanagh, 133 Misc. 399; Matter of Quinby, supra.)

At a hearing held in this proceeding on April 3, 1959, an agreed statement of admitted facts was submitted and received in evidence herein. Paragraph “ 5 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts states that said Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, owned 296% shares of common stock of the Endicott Forging & Mfg. Co., Inc. at the time of her death. Paragraph “ 6 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts states that Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, owned 296% shares of the common stock of the Endicott Forging & Mfg. Co., Inc. at the time of the execution of her will. Paragraph “ 9 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts states that said 296% shares of the common stock of Endicottt Forging & Mfg. Co., Inc. owned by Delphia Culver Kent at the time of her death were bequeathed to her under paragraph fifth of the will of her husband, George A. Kent, Jr., deceased.

Paragraph “ 10 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts states that said 296% shares of stock represented a one-fifth interest in the holdings of George A. Kent which had passed to his son, George A. Kent, Jr.

[927]*927Paragraph “ 11 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts ' states that Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, and George A. Kent, Jr., deceased, had no issue of their marriage.

Paragraph “ 18 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts states that the optionees specifically named by said paragraph Fifteenth of the last will and testament of said Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, are all members of the Kent family, being descendants or wives of Orlow A. Kent, Harry F. Kent, Arthur L. Kent and William E. Kent, sons of George A. Kent, with the exception of Thelma C. Kent, who is the former wife of Richard G. Kent, one of the sons of William E. Kent, and the mother of Richard Peter Kent, son of Richard G. Kent and Thelma C. Kent, and one of the beneficiaries named in paragraph Eighth of said last will and testament.

Paragraph “ 22 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts states that the common stock of the Endicott Forging & Mfg. Co., Inc., was split 10 shares for 1, subsequent to the execution of the last will and testament of said Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, dated May 4, 1955, and subsequent to her death on June 4, 1955.

Paragraph “ 27 ” of said agreed statement of admitted facts states that the total number of shares of common stock of said Endicott Forging & Mfg. Co., Inc., held by the estate of Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, subsequent to said stock split was 2,640 shares, exclusive of the 32 unsplit shares which had been transferred pursuant to the provisions of paragraph “eighth” of the last will and testament of said Delphia Culver Kent, deceased, prior to said stock split.

Paragraph eighth of the will at bar provides as follows:

“eighth. I give and bequeath to the following persons each two (2) shares of stock of Endicott Forging & Mfg. Co., Inc:

Michael Kent, son of Orlow A. Kent, Jr.,

Peter Sewell Kent, son of Orlow A. Kent, Jr.,

Nancy Kent, daughter of Orlow A. Kent, Jr.,

Eleanor Kent Waggett, daughter of H. Gordon Kent,

Barbara Kent Hench, daughter of H. Gordon Kent,

Suzanne Elizabeth Kent, daughter of H. Gordon Kent,

Carol Kent Works, daughter of William E. Kent, Jr.,

Kent Moore, son of Natalie Kent Moore,

Robinson Moore, son of Natalie Kent Moore,

Donald J. Kent, son of William E. Kent, Jr.,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Matter of Estate of Carpenter
533 N.W.2d 497 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1995)
Beckmann v. Densmore
533 N.W.2d 497 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1995)
Village of Camillus v. Diamond
76 Misc. 2d 319 (New York Supreme Court, 1973)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
20 Misc. 2d 923, 189 N.Y.S.2d 676, 1959 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-construction-of-the-will-of-kent-nysurct-1959.