In Re: The Commitment of Kameron Dedan Pearson v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 28, 2023
• Docket: 07-23-00208-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00208-CV

IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF KAMERON DEDAN PEARSON, APPELLANT

On Appeal from the 181st District Court Randall County, Texas Trial Court No. 81562B, Honorable Titiana Frausto, Presiding

November 28, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Kameron Dedan Pearson appeals his civil commitment under the Texas Civil

Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVP Act”).1 His sole issue on appeal

concerns the trial court’s refusal to include a requested instruction in the jury charge. We

affirm.

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.153. BACKGROUND

In 2010, when Pearson was a juvenile, he was adjudicated as a delinquent and

placed on probation for two years after the trial court found that he had committed the

offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. His probation was revoked in 2011 based

on the commission of three counts of sexual assault of a child, to which he pleaded guilty.2

Pearson was placed on deferred adjudication and committed to the Texas Youth

Commission. In 2014, Pearson was convicted of the offense of possession of child

pornography and sentenced to eighteen years’ confinement in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice. His deferred adjudication for the 2011 offenses was revoked and he

was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for each count, with the sentences to run

concurrently.

In June of 2022, the State filed a petition to civilly commit Pearson as a sexually

violent predator, alleging that he is a repeat sexually violent offender who suffers from a

behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual

violence. A jury trial was held. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Pearson

is a sexually violent predator. Pearson timely filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

During the charge conference, Pearson requested a separate instruction reading:

“All persons are presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. No person may be

determined to be a sexually violent predator unless the State proves each element in its

2 The juvenile court certified Pearson to be tried as an adult.

2 cause of action beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court denied the request. In his

sole issue on appeal, Pearson asserts that the trial court’s refusal to include the requested

instruction was reversible error.

We review a trial court’s decision to refuse a particular instruction in the charge for

an abuse of discretion. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012). A trial court

may refuse to give a requested instruction or definition that is not necessary to enable the

jury to render a verdict, even if the instruction or definition is a correct statement of the

law. In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2015, pet. denied). “The omission of an instruction is reversible error only if the omission

probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192

S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

Pearson’s requested instruction was modeled on an instruction concerning the

presumption of innocence applicable in criminal cases. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.

478, 483–86, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 56 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1978); Bennett v. State, 396 S.W.2d 875,

875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (“The presumption of innocence is the most valuable of

defendant’s rights, and a charge upon such subject is essential in every criminal case.”).

However, a civil commitment under the SVP Act is a civil matter, not a criminal trial. In re

Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 653 (Tex. 2005). The instruction requested by

Pearson is not mandated by statute or by caselaw. Nothing in the SVP Act creates a

presumption for either the State or the respondent in such proceedings.

The SVP Act requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person

is a sexually violent predator. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a); In re

3 Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 639–41. Here, the charge of the court correctly

instructed the jury that the burden of proof rested upon the State and never shifted to

Pearson. The charge further provided that the State had the burden of proving Pearson

is a sexually violent predator “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It instructed jurors that, if they

had a reasonable doubt as to whether Pearson is a sexually violent predator, they “will

say by [their] verdict that [Pearson] is not a sexually violent predator.” We conclude that

the jury charge adequately presented the issue of the burden of proof to the jury and that

no separate instruction was necessary. See In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d

at 554 (no abuse of discretion in refusing separate jury instruction on “serious difficulty

controlling behavior” where requested instruction was not statutory law and was not

necessary to enable jury to render verdict).

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that

Pearson was presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. Accordingly, we overrule

Pearson’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice