In Re: The Commitment of Gale Edward Myles v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed October 31, 2024
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00796-CV
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF GALE EDWARD MYLES
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV21-70006
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Nowell This appeal arises out of a civil commitment proceeding finding Gale Edward
Myles is a sexually violent predator. An SVP is defined as a “repeat sexually violent
offender” who “suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely
to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 841.003(a). In a single issue, Myles argues the Texas Supreme Court’s opinions in
In re Commitment of Bohannan, 388 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. 2012) and In re Commitment
of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. 2020), compel the conclusion that when, as here,
the State conclusively establishes the “repeat sexually violent offender” element of
its case as a matter of law, the State is entitled to a directed verdict on that element
and on the “behavioral abnormality” element of its case. Accordingly, he argues, there can be no meritorious issues that can be raised on appeal that would result in
reversible error when personal and subject-matter jurisdiction are also established.
Myles prays for general relief, and he “more explicitly requests that this Court hand
down an opinion deciding that this appeal cannot present reversible error based on
the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Stoddard that Chapter 841’s ‘behavioral
abnormality’ issue requires the State to prove only a ‘likelihood’ of sexually
reoffending.”
This Court recently considered Myles’s issue and rejected it. See In re
Commitment of Green, No. 05-23-00472-CV, 2024 WL 1853378, at *2–3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Apr. 29, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We apply the legal principles
articulated in Green today.
Myles’s brief does not argue there is any reversible error, see TEX. R. APP. P.
44.1(a), and instead he requests we hand down an opinion deciding the appeal cannot
present reversible error. Myles appears to seek an advisory opinion from this Court,
which we may not provide. See Green, 2024 WL 1853378, at *2. “Under the
separation-of-powers doctrine, courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions,
because doing so invades the function of the executive rather than judicial
department.” Id. (quoting Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 700
(Tex. 2021)).
Although Myles does not explicitly assert any violation of his legal rights, his
arguments could be construed to allege that that the supreme court’s Bohannan and
–2– Stoddard opinions have the effect of eliminating one of the two statutory elements
in violation of his right to due process. Id. at *3 (citing In re Commitment of Tryon,
654 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. denied)). “The United States
Supreme Court has held that civil commitment statutes, like the Act, do not violate
a person’s due process rights under the United States Constitution if the challenged
statute requires proof of at least two elements: ‘proof of dangerousness’ and ‘proof
of some additional factor such as a “mental illness” or “mental abnormality.”‘” Id.
(quoting Commitment of Tryon, 654 S.W.3d at 37) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)). However, “[e]ven constitutional claims such as due
process can be waived if not raised in the trial court,” and Myles did not make any
constitutional complaint in the trial court. Id. (quoting Woodrum v. Wal-Mart Stores
Tex., LLC, No. 05-22-00561-CV, 2023 WL 3493318, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May
17, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Therefore, even construing his issue to allege a
violation of his constitutional right to due process, we conclude Myles failed to
preserve the issue for our review. See id.
We overrule Myles’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s February 7, 2023
Final Judgment.
230796f.p05 /Erin A. Nowell// ERIN A. NOWELL JUSTICE
–3– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF On Appeal from the 194th Judicial GALE EDWARD MYLES District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV21-70006. No. 05-23-00796-CV Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. Justices Reichek and Carlyle participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 31st day of October, 2024.
–4–
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