In re the Claim of Gleason

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re the Claim of Gleason

23 A.D.2d 922, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1965 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4286

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 6, 1965

StatusPublished

This text of 23 A.D.2d 922 (In re the Claim of Gleason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In re the Claim of Gleason, 23 A.D.2d 922, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1965 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4286 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1965).

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Opinion

Auusi, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board which determined that claimant Was disqualified from receiving benefits on the ground that claimant left his employment voluntarily and without good cause. Upon this record, it cannot be said that there was no substantial evidence to support the finding of the administrative agency that appellant’s resignation of his office as financial secretary of a labor union was not coerced but entirely voluntary, and hence that he left the employment voluntarily and without good cause and was properly disqualified from benefits. A determination of voluntariness and good cause are questions of fact (Matter of Tenenbaum [Catherwood], 18 A D 2d 742; Matter of Lipsahitz [Lubin], 7 AD 2d 777). We cannot say as a matter of law that its determination is in error (Matter of Marsh [Catherwood], 13 N Y 2d 235; see, also, Matter of Knox [Catherwood], 18 A D 2d 1123). Decision affirmed, without costs. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds and Hamm, JJ., concur.

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Auusi, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board which determined that claimant Was disqualified from receiving benefits on the ground that claimant left his employment voluntarily and without good cause. Upon this record, it cannot be said that there was no substantial evidence to support the finding of the administrative agency that appellant’s resignation of his office as financial secretary of a labor union was not coerced but entirely voluntary, and hence that he left the employment voluntarily and without good cause and was properly disqualified from benefits. A determination of voluntariness and good cause are questions of fact (Matter of Tenenbaum [Catherwood], 18 A D 2d 742; Matter of Lipsahitz [Lubin], 7 AD 2d 777). We cannot say as a matter of law that its determination is in error (Matter of Marsh [Catherwood], 13 N Y 2d 235; see, also, Matter of Knox [Catherwood], 18 A D 2d 1123). Decision affirmed, without costs. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds and Hamm, JJ., concur.

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23 A.D.2d 922, 258 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1965 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-claim-of-gleason-nyappdiv-1965.

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