In re the Claim of De Witt

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

In re the Claim of De Witt

50 A.D.2d 683, 375 N.Y.S.2d 417, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12524

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 20, 1975

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 50 A.D.2d 683 (In re the Claim of De Witt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In re the Claim of De Witt, 50 A.D.2d 683, 375 N.Y.S.2d 417, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12524 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).

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Opinion

— Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 14, 1975, which reversed the decision of a referee and sustained an initial determination of the Industrial Commissioner disqualifying claimant from receiving benefits upon the ground that she refused employment, for which she was reasonably fitted by training and experience, without good cause. Claimant, an executive secretary, refused a referral for employment because the hours [684]*684were longer and the wages less than in her previous position. She also asserts that her due process rights were violated by the failure of the employment service to provide her with prevailing wage rate information. The question of whether a claimant refuses employment, when reasonably fitted therefor by training and experience, with or without good cause, is a factual one and within the board’s province, and its resolution must not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence (Matter of Hoffman [Cather-wood], 34 AD2d 871). The hours and wages offered claimant here were not substantially less favorable than those she formerly received, nor were they less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the area. In addition, the claimant’s skills as shown in the record and her experience would indicate that she possessed all of the qualifications for the job. Consequently, the board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. As to claimant’s assertion that she was denied due process, we cannot agree: We find no decisional or statutory requirement that a claimant be provided with the prevailing wage schedule for all jobs for which he or she might be qualified, and would also note that, since the claimant here was presumably vigorously pursuing employment as an executive secretary, it is reasonable to conclude that she was aware of the prevailing wage for one of her classification. The board’s decision should be affirmed. Decision affirmed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Koreman, Main, Larkin and Reynolds, JJ., concur.

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— Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 14, 1975, which reversed the decision of a referee and sustained an initial determination of the Industrial Commissioner disqualifying claimant from receiving benefits upon the ground that she refused employment, for which she was reasonably fitted by training and experience, without good cause. Claimant, an executive secretary, refused a referral for employment because the hours [684]*684were longer and the wages less than in her previous position. She also asserts that her due process rights were violated by the failure of the employment service to provide her with prevailing wage rate information. The question of whether a claimant refuses employment, when reasonably fitted therefor by training and experience, with or without good cause, is a factual one and within the board’s province, and its resolution must not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence (Matter of Hoffman [Cather-wood], 34 AD2d 871). The hours and wages offered claimant here were not substantially less favorable than those she formerly received, nor were they less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the area. In addition, the claimant’s skills as shown in the record and her experience would indicate that she possessed all of the qualifications for the job. Consequently, the board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. As to claimant’s assertion that she was denied due process, we cannot agree: We find no decisional or statutory requirement that a claimant be provided with the prevailing wage schedule for all jobs for which he or she might be qualified, and would also note that, since the claimant here was presumably vigorously pursuing employment as an executive secretary, it is reasonable to conclude that she was aware of the prevailing wage for one of her classification. The board’s decision should be affirmed. Decision affirmed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Koreman, Main, Larkin and Reynolds, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

50 A.D.2d 683, 375 N.Y.S.2d 417, 1975 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12524, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-claim-of-de-witt-nyappdiv-1975.

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