In re The City of New York

181 Misc. 1028, 50 N.Y.S.2d 363, 1943 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2886
New York Supreme Court·Decided June 28, 1943·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

McLaughlin, J.

A new trial has been had of this proceeding in accordance with the order of reversal of the Appellate Division. (Matter of City of New York [Sixth Ave. El. R. R.], 265 App. Div. 200.) The trial was divided into two hearings. It was first necessary to determine whether the Sixth Avenue line was capable of profitable operation and if that were found to be the fact then the court was to determine the value of the railroad as a going concern and find the amount of award which should be made. For that purpose a separate hearing was held at which all interested parties were given full opportunity to present proof as to value! Based upon the evidence at that hearing this court made an award in the sum of $12,500,000.

It then became necessary to determine the further question as to the method of distributing the assessments for benefit which would be levied as a result of the award. On that question another separate hearing was had on June 4, 1943. All interested parties were given full opportunity to present evidence as to the method of distributing the assessments.

Pursuant to the provisions of section B15-19.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (L. 1937, ch. 929), which form the basis of determining the assessments for benefit, the court has assessed the various properties in proportion to the amount of the benefits received.

The area to be assessed ran along the route of the Sixth Avenue Elevated Railroad and covered the property 100 feet east and west of the railroad. This area of assessment was determined by the Board of Estimate and is not subject to review by this court. (People ex rel. Schick v. Marvin, 249 [1031] App. Div. 293, 296; Matter of L. I. R. R. Co. v. Hylan, 240 N. Y. 199, 204; Matter of City of New York [Sixth Ave. El. R. R.], 265 App. Div. 200, 207, supra.)

No evidence was presented by the property owners to establish the market value of the various individual parcels in the proceeding. No expert testified to the market value of all the individual parcels affected. Thus there was no proof showing the amount of benefit based upon the market value before the removal of the elevated structure as compared with the market value after its removal. In fact a witness (Wittman) testified that it was too great a task for him to undertake to value all the parcels in the proceeding. Ample opportunity for the presentation of such proof was given all the assessees, but none was produced. The court has determined the benefits in this proceeding based upon a consideration of all the evidence in the proceeding, including documents, maps and other exhibits, together with its viewing of the property both before and after the demolition.

Real estate experts were produced to support the contentions made by the various property owners. These witnesses may be divided into four groups: (1) Those contending that there was no benefit at all; (2) those favoring a distribution of the assessment in proportion to the assessed value of the land; (3) those favoring a zoning method and (4) those advocating the adoption of the front-foot rule.

The position taken by the first group is entirely without merit for the court’s view of the premises together with the testimony in the record supports the view that the area from 53rd Street south to Morris Street has been benefited by the removal of the elevated structure.

The inequality which would result from the adoption of the assessed-value method was demonstrated upon the cross-examination of the only witness produced who favored this method, one Edwin Mayer. He stated: “ I do not concede that the assessed valuation of the land is the true value, but I adopt it for the purposes of this proceeding.”

The witness frankly conceded that the adoption by the court of the land assessed-value method would result in having properties receiving greater benefits paying smaller assessments. Mr. Mayer testified, when examined concerning the demolition of the Second Avenue Elevated at Allen Street, that although the west side of Allen Street received the greater benefit from the removal, the assessments for benefit on that side should be at a lower rate than on the east side because the assessed valuations were lower on the west side. Under the circumstances, it is clear [1032] that the method advocated would violate the statutory requirement that the assessment for benefit be distributed in proportion to the benefits received.

This court has also taken judicial notice of its own decisions and also those of the Appellate Division, First Department, with respect to parcels, along the area of this proceeding and they all show that assessments were not only different from real values but that they invariably differ from one another. That clearly is indicated by the following decisions affecting the assessed valuation on some of the benefit parcels in this proceeding.

(Here follow many examples of cases showing that the assessments were incorrect, which are omitted on account of lack of space.)

It would therefore appear that it would be improper to determine assessments for benefit on the basis of assessed values.

Several owners 'of property favored a method of zoning as testified to by the witness Mr. ICeller. He divided the area into fourteen zones, while the other witness as to zoning, Mr. Wittman, fixed eight zones. They did not agree on anything. For instance, Wittman’s zone of least benefit, West Third Street, was Keller’s zone of greatest benefit. Keller said: “ Those properties in that street [W. 3rd St.] are liable for reimprovement, since the ‘ El ’ has been taken down. You would never build what they have there again. You would put up a Washington Square type of apartment house Conversely, Keller’s zone of least benefit, properties located on Sixth Avenue between 28th and 29th Streets was Wittman’s zone of greatest benefit (Zone 6, at $200 a front foot from 27th to 53rd Street). Clearly, such conflicting testimony could be of no help to the court either in laying out zones or arriving at any proper basis for the fixing of the assessments for benefit.

From an analysis of Keller’s testimony the court is left with the task of establishing assessments for every parcel by relying on indefinite terms such as “ somewhat ”, “ also ”, “ slight ”, “ little ” and “ considerably ”. Such testimony establishes nothing which could possibly aid the court.

Wittman divided the area of assessment into eight zones. The zones were, in effect, according to land values (as determined by Mr. Wittman) with the zone of the least benefit having the lowest land values, the zone of greatest benefit having the highest land values. The witness conceded that he did not try to appraise and allocate a specific amount for every piece of property “ because it would be too large á task”.

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In re The City of New York, 181 Misc. 1028, 50 N.Y.S.2d 363, 1943 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2886 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1943).

181 Misc. 1028 (In re The City of New York) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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