In Re the Care & Treatment of Bemboom v. State

326 S.W.3d 857, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 1695
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 14, 2010
DocketWD 71619
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 326 S.W.3d 857 (In Re the Care & Treatment of Bemboom v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re the Care & Treatment of Bemboom v. State, 326 S.W.3d 857, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 1695 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Judge.

Larry Bemboom (“Bemboom”) appeals from a judgment entered by the Boone County probate court committing Bem-boom to the custody of the Director of the Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator following a jury trial. In his sole point on appeal, Bemboom argues that the probate court erred because Dr. Kent Franks’s (“Dr. Franks”) testimony *859 failed to clearly and convincingly establish the presence of a mental abnormality causing Bemboom serious difficulty controlling his behavior. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Bemboom pleaded guilty to first degree sexual assault and deviate sexual assault in 2003. He was sentenced to five years in prison. Prior to his release from incarceration, Dr. Kimberly Weitl filed an end-of-confinement report wherein she opined that Bemboom appeared to meet the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator. Dr. Weitl diagnosed Bemboom with paraphilia, sexually attracted to non-consenting females, nonexclusive type, and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Weitl also opined that Bemboom posed a high risk to re-offend. On August 22, 2008, the State filed a petition to civilly commit Bemboom as a sexually violent predator under section 632.486. 1 Following the probate court’s determination of probable cause to proceed, the Department of Mental Health was ordered to conduct an evaluation of Bemboom.

Dr. Franks conducted the evaluation. He reviewed a number of Bemboom’s records, including: Department of Corrections’ records, Probation and Parole records, medical records, psychological records, treatment records, education records, police and sheriff department records from a number of jurisdictions, and court records from a number of jurisdictions. Dr. Franks opined that Bemboom suffered from two abnormalities: paraphi-lia not otherwise specified and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Franks further opined that these mental abnormalities caused Bemboom serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Dr. Franks based this opinion in part on Bemboom’s frequent contacts with law enforcement and on his repeated engagement in criminal behavior despite detection, supervision, treatment, and incarceration. 2 Dr. Franks opined that Bemboom was at a very high risk to reoffend based on actuarial measures and dynamic risk factors.

Following a three day jury trial where Dr. Franks testified as the State’s expert witness, Bemboom was found to be a sexually violent predator and was committed to the custody of the Director of the Department of Mental Health. Bemboom appealed.

Standard of Review

Our review in a sexually violent predator case is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence admitted from which a reasonable fact finder could find each necessary element under section 632.486. In re Care & Treatment of Barlow v. State, 250 S.W.3d 725, 733 (Mo.App. W.D.2008). Section 632.495.1 requires that each element necessary to establish that one is a sexually violent predator must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. “Matters of credibility and weight of testimony are for the fact finder to determine.” Barlow, 250 S.W.3d at 733. For that reason, the evidence is viewed “in the light most favorable to the judgment, accepting as true all evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment and disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences.” Id.

Analysis

In his sole point on appeal, Bem-boom claims that the probate court erred in having him involuntarily committed as a *860 sexually violent predator because the testimony of Dr. Franks did not clearly and convincingly establish that his mental abnormalities caused him to have serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Bemboom maintains that Dr. Franks’s testimony at best established that he is a typical recidivist who is not subject to civil commitment. We disagree.

Under Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predators Civil Commitment Act, a sexually violent predator is defined at section 632.480(5) as “any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.” A mental abnormality is defined at section 632.480(2) as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.”

The Missouri Supreme Court has determined that in instructing a jury, mental abnormality must be defined as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.” In re Care & Treatment of Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo. banc 2002). The requirement that mental abnormalities cause an offender serious difficulty controlling his behavior was engrafted into the definition of mental abnormality in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), which combine to hold that sexually violent predator statutes are constitutional so long as the definition of mental abnormality distinguishes sexually violent predators from other dangerous persons more properly dealt with via traditional criminal proceedings. As noted in In re Care & Treatment of Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Mo. banc 2007), “to pass constitutional muster the statute must require a finding of future dangerousness and then link that finding to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that causes the individual serious difficulty controlling his behavior.” This standard is necessary to “distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose mental illness, abnormality or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist.” Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 791-92.

Though the State must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that an offender has a mental abnormality causing the offender serious difficulty controlling his behavior, the State is not required to prove that the offender has an absolute inability to control his behavior. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411, 122 S.Ct. 867. “Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control.” Id. “The word ‘difficult’ indicates that the lack of control to which this Court referred [in Hendricks ] was not absolute.” Id.

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326 S.W.3d 857, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 1695, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-care-treatment-of-bemboom-v-state-moctapp-2010.