In re the Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners

5 A.D. 290, 39 N.Y.S. 750
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 15, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 5 A.D. 290 (In re the Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners, 5 A.D. 290, 39 N.Y.S. 750 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1896).

Opinion

Van Brunt, P. J.:

The board of rapid transit commissioners having adopted a route and general plan, and having failed to obtain the consent of the property owners along the line of the proposed railways, made application to the General Term for the appointment of commissioners as- provided for in the Rapid Transit Act (Laws of 1891, chap. 4, and the various acts amendatory thereof), and on the 15th of [292]*292November, 1895, the General Term appointed three commissioners to determine and report, after due hearing, whether the railway determined upon by the said board and mentioned in its petition ought to be constructed and operated. These commissioners having proceeded with the hearing of the matters referred to them, on the 6th of March, 1895, reported to this court that they were of the opinion and thereby determined and reported that the route proposed by the board of rapid transit commissioners ought to be adopted, and that the railway determined upon by said board ought to be constructed and operated.

The commissioners, after spending months in the taking of testimony in regard to the question of the cost and the manner of building and operating the railroad in question, and having frankly stated in their report that any conclusion which they could arrive at in respect to the probable cost would be mere conjecture, seem to have cut the Gordian knot by setting aside entirely the question of cost and looking upon the questions referred to them solely as engineering problems. It is the first time, we think, in the history of any great enterprise that the question of practicability did not include the consideration of cost. More than 1,800 years ago it was said :

For which of you, intending to build a tower sitteth not down first and eounteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it % Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him, saying: This man began to build, and was not able to finish.” (St. Luke, chap. 14, verses 28, 29, 30.)

If the question of cost was not to be considered by these commissioners, it is difficult to see what question was before them. The Legislature and the people had both spoken very emphatically upon the question of the desirability of rapid transit; and it is well known that there is no problem which engineering science cannot solve provided there are dollars enough behind it to meet the expense.

But it is urged upon the part of the movers of this scheme that the property owners cannot raise the objection as to cost, because they have no interest in the determination of that question. It is apparent that this is a fallacy. The only justification which can probably be urged to sustain the interference with the use and access of abutting owners to their property, which the construction of [293]*293this railroad will necessarily involve, is that it can and will be completed within a reasonable time after its commencement. If there is a probability that financial difficulties will be met, and the construction of this road will drag its weary length along for a time which no man can compute, and possibly its construction be absolutely abandoned because of the wreck of the city’s finances and the intervention of constitutional prohibitions, it is manifest that great injury will result to the property of abutting owners, for which they can never be compensated.

In reaching the conclusion arrived at the commissioners appointed by this court seek to justify themselves by reference to the language of the General Term, when a former scheme of rapid transit was before it. In so doing they seem to have lost sight of the fact that the plan now seeking our sanction differs in every feature from the one which was then before the court. In the case formerly before the General Term, all that it was necessary for the commissioners to do to protect the city and the abutting owners, was to take such security as would enable the city to fill up the hole made in the course of the work in case the contractor failed to comply with his contract. The court was of the opinion that the question was simply a financial one, and that it might safely assume that the commissioners would take sufficient security at least to put the street in its then present condition in case of the failure of the contractor to complete the work, and that if capitalists would at their own risk undertake the enterprise, they should be allowed to do so. In the case at bar, however, the problem is absolutely different. It is the city’s money which is to be spent. And it is to be observed that in view of the obligations already incurred by the city for work in progress it is difficult to see how money can be provided to meet even the engineers’ estimates of the cost of this work, in consequence of the constitutional prohibition against the creation of debt, and if this work was commenced it would be impossible for the city to raise funds necessary for its completion, and the work must cease, although incomplete and absolutely useless.

It may be said, and it is said, that it is to be presumed that the commissioners will take sufficient security from the party contracting with the city to construct this railway upon its behalf. But if our commissioners cannot tell whether this railroad can be constructed [294]*294for $50,000,000 or $90,000,000 after spending months in investigating this subject — as they have reported — upon what basis are the rapid transit commissioners to fix the security ? It has been also suggested that the increase in the value of property will give an enlarged opportunity to create a debt, but this increase will be a matter of time, and the contracts for construction must be made now, the obligation must be entered into now, and it cannot be done in sections, consequently the debt limits can only be considered as they now exist.

It is to be observed that the moneys for the enterprise must be furnished by the city, the risk is really that of the city, and it would seem, having in view the other obligations of the city, unless the road can be built for a substantially less amount than the engineers’ estimates that the work must stop, and the city would not have the right to borrow money enough to put the streets in the condition in which they were before it had sunk its fifty odd millions of dollars in a vain attempt to carry out this scheme of rapid transit.

If our commissioners are unable to ascertain within $40,000,000 what this enterprise is to cost, would it not be the height of folly to enter upon this construction, knowing, as we do, that without any exception the cost of every great public work has far exceeded the estimate of the engineers? We have, for example, the Brooklyn bridge — estimated cost, $8,000,000, actual cost, $16,000,000 ; the new aqueduct — estimated cost, $14,000,000, actual cost, $24,000,000, with from $6,000,000 to $8,000,000 more of claims which the aqueduct commissioners had incurred, but which the city escaped the payment of only because of the prohibitory character of the legislation on that subject. We have no reason to assume that the rapid transit commissioners will be more careful of the public interests than were the Croton aqueduct commissioners.

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Related

McDonald v. Grout
39 Misc. 18 (New York Supreme Court, 1902)
In re Board of Rapid Transit
50 N.Y.S. 1124 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1898)
In re Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners
23 A.D. 472 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1897)
In re Board of Rapid-Transit Railroad Com'rs
45 N.Y.S. 1134 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1897)

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Bluebook (online)
5 A.D. 290, 39 N.Y.S. 750, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-board-of-rapid-transit-railroad-commissioners-nyappdiv-1896.