In re the Assignment of Purcell

1 Goebel 47
CourtHamilton County Probate Court
DecidedMay 13, 1886
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Goebel 47 (In re the Assignment of Purcell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Hamilton County Probate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Assignment of Purcell, 1 Goebel 47 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1886).

Opinion

Goebel, J.,

and Robert S. Fulton, Referee.

I. — A preliminary question presented by the record is this : Should the account of John B. Mannix, as assignee of Edward Purcell, be separately stated and distinguished from his account as assignee of John B. Purcell ?

We think the two accounts should be separately [53]*53stated. There were two assignors, two formal assignments, and we think two estates. Edward’s assignment was for the benefit of his creditors, and passed his personal property and choses in action, and the real estate conveyed to him by John. John’s assignment was for the benefit of his creditors, and passed real estate not included in his conveyance to Edward. The indebtedness of these two persons to the same creditors did not merge their estates before the assignments, and the circumstance that both made assignments to the same person was not sufficient to merge them thereafter. Different bonds were given in these assignments, and sureties upon the one are not sureties upon the other. It was the plain duty of the assignee, therefore, to keep these two estates separate and distinct, each from the other. Whether his sureties, who have undertaken for the faithful performance of his duty according to law, can ground an objection to this account on the nonperformance of that duty, it is not necessary now to inquire.

It has seemed to us that a separation of the accounts could injure no party in interest, and should be made as a matter of simple justice and orderly procedure. The difficulty of doing it is an objection to the labor rather than to the duty of the task.

The affirmative determination of this question has [54]*54led the court into an extended and laborious investigation.

The resignation of the assignee, and his precedent violation of the trust, have made it a manifest impropriety that he should be called upon to authoritatively separate and state these accounts. The account and the exceptions to it have been filed and docketed in each case. Both cases are before us upon all the questions presented by those exceptions. On such a hearing it is the province of the court to add to the account any omitted items that properly belong to it, and to take from the account any items that do not properly belong to it. This implies the power and the dut}' to state the accounts. If the result is not as satisfactory as could be wished, perhaps the number, character and variety of the items, neglect on the part of the assignee to properly describe and keep them distinguished, loss of public records, lapse of time, and want of clear testimony,would make any result of such an inquirj/ now necessarily unsatisfactory.

The accounts so taken and. stated dispose of all the questions before us. Some of these it will be convenient to discuss in the order in which they were considered.

II. — i. In attempting to distinguish property of the two estates, the first question to arise is, “ What was the effect of Edward’s deed of assignment?’’ As already intimated, we think it passed the real estate [55]*55conveyed to him by John. The validity of both deeds of March 4th has been directly assailed, and judicially established, in the case of Brannan v. Purcell, 41 O. St., 187. The result of that contest simplifies the inquiry in this. No other facts are now presented front which a different conclusion could be reached. In that case the court in effect held, not that Edward’s assignment to Mannix was an assignment by John, but that because of the relations of Edward and John to the same creditors, the assignment by Edward had the same practical operation as an assignment by John; and hence, was in law a sufficient substitution for an assignment by John. Certainly, upon the face of the instrument Edward did not make the assignment as an agent of John, or for the benefit of the creditors of John. It was the very purpose of the two conveyances to transfer the real estate to Mannix by means of an assignment by Edward rather than by an assignment by John; and-a court of last resort has sustained the validity of what was done. John’s deed transferred all the estate and interest he held in the property to Edward, and Edward’s deed transferred it to Mannix. Mannix received this real estate then by virtue of the assignment made to him by Edward, and as the assignee of Edward he is to account for it.

The realty described in John’s deed to Edward consisted of eight parcels, which may 'be briefly described as the Eighth and Central Avenue property; [56]*56the Third and Plum Street property; the Mount St. Mary’s Seminary property; the Morgan tract; the Considine farm; the Mt. Harrison lot; the Cathedral School property, and the Coleman property. Some of these parcels were incumbered by liens. The net proceeds of sales are chargeable to the assignee on the account of Edward’s estate.

It follows, of course, that the personalty held by Edward on the 4th day of March was transferred to Mannix in the same way. The deed includes both realty and personalty, and if he held the personalty by no better title before, the arrangement entered into between him and John gave him as good a title as that by which he acquired the realty. All the personalty received by Mannix, except some personal and official effects, and several sums of money hereafter specified, has been received by virtue of the assignment made to him by Edward, and as Edward’s assignee he is to account for it. This general line of separation between the two estates is subject to several qualifications.

2. John’s deed of assignment to Mannix conveyed the residue of his estate. In terms it includes all the property of which he was seized at law or in equity, including every species of estate, real or personal, which may by any proceeding at law or in equity be subjected to the payment of his debts.” With the exception already stated, there was no per[57]*57sonalty upon which it could operate. But John held real estate known as No’s. 263 and 265 Third Street, and St. Joseph’s Cemetery, which had not been included in his preceding deed to Edward. In addition to that he held nominally, at least, a fee-simple title in over two hundred parcels of land in the Catholic Diocese of Cincinnati, improved and in use for ecclesiastical purposes. Mannix, as the assignee of John B. Purcell and Edward Purcell, brought suit against John B. Purcell as Archbishop of the diocese, setting out in substance these conveyances from John to Edward, and from Edward and John to himself, and the several parcels of land conveyed by them, alleging that by reason of a claim that John’s tenure of the realty had only been in trust for ecclesiastical purposes, there was a cloud upon the title, preventing him from making sale. In this suit lien-holders were made parties, and by foreclosure proceedings the Eighth and Central Avenue and Third and Plum Street properties were sold to satisfy mortgages, and yielded a surplus.

In the District Court, to which this action was taken, it was in brief held, that John’s title in the realty was such as prima facie to subject it to the payment of his debts; that if in fact he held it in trust, it could not be subjected to the payment of his debts; that the fact of a trust could be established by parol evidence; that the evidence to establish a [58]*58trust must be clear, certain and conclusive, not only as to its existence, but also as to its terms ; and that if the evidence leaves it in doubt whether a trust was intended, the legal title will prevail.

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Bluebook (online)
1 Goebel 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-assignment-of-purcell-ohprobcthamilto-1886.