In re the Application of Marks

181 Misc. 497, 46 N.Y.S.2d 755
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 14, 1944
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 181 Misc. 497 (In re the Application of Marks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Application of Marks, 181 Misc. 497, 46 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1944).

Opinion

Hooley, J.

This application is made by a newly inducted member of the armed forces of the United States, for an order staying the enforcement of an obligation secured by a certain mortgage on real property for the period of his military service and extending the period of payment thereof upon the ground that the petitioner’s ability to pay the same has been materially affected by his induction into military service.

The application is made under paragraph (a) of subdivision (1) of section 700 of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Belief Act of 1940, added October 6,1942, also designated as paragraph (a) of subdivision (1) of section 590 of-the Appendix to title 50 of the United States Code.

[499]*499The Federal Housing Administration has been joined by order of this court as a party to this proceeding upon motion of the Bowery Savings Bank, the mortgagee respondent, it appearing that the mortgage in question is insured by the Federal Housing Administration under the provisions of the National Housing Act (U. S. Code, tit. 12, § 1707 et seq.).

An answer was interposed by the Bowery Savings Bank and a hearing was held at which testimony was taken.

The petitioner, Seymour Marks, and his wife are the owners, as tenants by the entirety, of certain premises situate at Hemp-stead, Nassau County, New York. In November, 1939, they executed and delivered to the South Shore Trust Company a bond and mortgage in the principal sum of $5,200 which had been reduced by payments at the time of this application to the principal sum of $4,701.65 with interest thereon at 4%% from December 1, 1943. Since that time the January, 1944, payment on the mortgage has been made, which has further reduced the principal balance to $4,690.12. The Bowery Savings Bank is now the owner and holder of this mortgage by virtue of an assignment thereof from the South Shore Trust Company. The obligation is payable in equal monthly installments in an amount sufficient to completely liquidate the indebtedness as to principal and interest over the period of the mortgage which, in this case, is twenty-five years. Besides making monthly payments of principal and interest, the mortgagors are required to make payments for taxes, fire-insurance premiums and mortgage-insurance premiums. These sums are added together and are payable in a lump sum on the first day of each and every month. The monthly payment required to be made is $47.01, made up as follows: $28.18 is for principal and interest; $16.21 is for taxes; $0.69 is for fire insurance ; and $1.93 is for mortgage-insurance premium. It appears further that out of the $28.18 covering principal and interest in the payment made on January 1, 1944, $11.53 was applicable to principal and $16.65 was applicable to interest. As the payments continue, the amount applicable to interest decreases and the amount applicable to principal increases. The total amount to be paid and the amount applicable to taxes are subject to slight variation each year.

The petitioner and his wife are the parents of a child about fourteen months old. The petitioner’s income for the year 1943 amounted to approximately $3,300. By reason of his entry into the armed service of his country, it has become necessary for his wife to obtain employment and she has secured a posi[500]*500tian in which she will earn $2,250 per year. She will also be entitled to the soldier’s allotment of $960, making a total income of $3,210. However, by reason of the tender years of the infant, it will be necessary that a maid be employed to care for the house and child during the time that the wife is engaged in employment. The evidence before the court shows that the cost of such help will be approximately $1,000 annually, that repairs to the house, which normally would be made by the petitioner, will amount to approximately $100 annually, and that repairs to the car, which normally would be made by petitioner and which car is necessary in connection with the wife’s employment, will approximate $50 annually, thus increasing expenses to the approximate total sum of $1,150 annually. This amount subtracted from the total amount of income of $3,210 will leave a net income of approximately $2,060. The petitioner maintains that the ability of himself and his wife to comply with the terms of the mortgage and to make the monthly payments thereunder has been materially affected and he asks that the enforcement of the mortgage obligation be stayed during the period of petitioner’s military service and, from the date of the termination of such period, for a period equal to the remaining life of the mortgage plus a period of time equal to the period of his military service, subject to the payment of the balance of principal and accumulated interest due and unpaid at the date of said termination in equal installments during such combined period at the rate of interest on the unpaid balance prescribed in the mortgage for installments paid when due.

There have been numerous cases involving applications for relief under other provisions of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. (U. S. Code, tit. 50, Appendix, § 501 et seq.) The general construction of these other provisions by the courts is to the effect that the Act was not designed to furnish complete immunity from payment but that it was intended to be liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to take up arms in defense of the nation. In every case the court has recognized that the criterion to be applied is whether the applicant is able to comply with the terms of his obligation or whether such ability has been materially affected by reason of his military service. The interests of all parties are intended to be equitably conserved in these proceedings. (Jamaica Savings Bank v. Bryan, 175 Misc. 978; Nassau Savings and Loan Association v. Ormond, 179 Misc. 447.)

This proceeding differs from the others in that it is an application for relief made by a soldier on the threshold of his [501]*501military service at a time when no action or proceeding with reference to the mortgage is pending and when there has been no default in the payment of taxes, interest, and other charges. Research by counsel has failed to disclose any reported decision involving an application similar to this.

All other- sections of the statute enacted prior to section 700 were intended to afford relief where an action or proceeding had already been commenced. In addition, the relief granted by those sections extended only for a short time beyond the period of military service.

Section 700 enlarged the relief in both of the last mentioned respects. The relief provided for thereby is directed at the obligation rather than at an action or proceeding and, in addition, that section extends the time of payment, in part, for a specified period of time after the present maturity of the obligation equal to the time spent in the military service. This procedure allows the serviceman to arrange his affairs in a businesslike way in advance and prevents any accumulations of arrears from becoming due at one time. This is a normal and constructive evolution from the other provisions of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. The language of section 700 of the statute clearly means that any person may apply to the court for this form of relief if his ability to comply with the terms of his obligation has been materially affected by reason of his military service. No action need be pending. There need be no default in the mortgage.

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Bluebook (online)
181 Misc. 497, 46 N.Y.S.2d 755, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-application-of-marks-nysupct-1944.