In re the Appeal of Lee Memory Gardens, Inc.

430 S.E.2d 451, 110 N.C. App. 541, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 577
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedJune 15, 1993
DocketNo. 9210PTC485
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 430 S.E.2d 451 (In re the Appeal of Lee Memory Gardens, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Appeal of Lee Memory Gardens, Inc., 430 S.E.2d 451, 110 N.C. App. 541, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 577 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

ORR, Judge.

The 14.14 acre tract of land at issue in this case has been irrevocably dedicated for use exclusively as a cemetery under the North Carolina Cemetery Act. Thus, no part of the Tract can be sold, mortgaged or used except for human burial. Of this tract, 7.14 acres are unplotted, undeveloped land, not being offered for sale or use as burial sites. Additionally, as of 1 January 1990, there were 1,216 unsold burial sites plotted and marked off with landscaping and access driveways. In 1989, the Taxpayer added a mausoleum with 288 crypts at a cost of $154,080, of which 126 were pre-sold. As of 1 January 1990, 162 crypts remained unsold.

I.

At the outset, we note that our scope of review in cases that have been appealed from the Commission is determined by [544]*544N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-345.2. “This procedure for review is the same as that under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 150B (formerly Chapter 150A).” In re Appeal of General Tire, 102 N.C. App. 38, 39, 401 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1991). G.S. § 105-345.2 states in pertinent part:

(b) So far as necessary to the decision and where presented, the court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and applicability of the terms of any Commission action. The court may affirm or reverse the decision of the Commission, declare the same null and void, or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the Commission’s findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
Commission; or
(3) Made upon unlawful proceedings; or
(4) Affected by other errors of law; or
(5) Unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
(c) In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The appellant shall not be permitted to rely upon any grounds for relief on appeal which were not set forth specifically in his notice of appeal filed with the Commission.

“An appellate court may not, however, ‘substitute its judgment for that of the agency when two reasonable conflicting results could be reached. . . .’ ” In re Appeal of Foundation Health Sys. Corp., 96 N.C. App. 571, 574, 386 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1989), disc. review allowed, 326 N.C. 800, 393 S.E.2d 897 (1990), review dismissed by, 328 N.C. 322, 401 S.E.2d 358 (1991) (citation omitted). “On appeal, our review is limited to a determination of whether the decision [545]*545is supported by substantial evidence, in view of the ‘entire record’ as submitted.” General Tire, 102 N.C. App. at 40, 401 S.E.2d at 393 (citations omitted).

The Commission’s “findings of fact are conclusive if, upon review of the whole record, they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.” In re Humana Hosp. Corp. v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Resources, 81 N.C. App. 628, 633, 345 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1986) (applying former Chapter 150A which is now recodified as Chapter 150B). We apply a de novo review, however, to our review of the Commission’s statutory interpretation, as “[i]ncorrect statutory interpretation by [the Commission] constitutes an error of law. . . .” Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 459, 464, 372 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1988) (applying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(b)).

II.

In the present case, the Taxpayer has raised three issues for our review. The first issue relates to whether the Commission erred in ruling that the 7.14 acres of undeveloped land was not exempt from taxation as of 1 January 1990, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-278.2. The second issue relates to the valuation method employed by the County Assessor. The third issue relates to whether the County unconstitutionally discriminated against the Taxpayer in its valuation of the undeveloped tract of land. We begin by addressing the. Taxpayer’s arguments under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-278.2.

G.S. § 105-278.2(a) states, “Real property set apart for burial purposes shall be exempted from taxation unless it is owned and held for purposes of (i) sale or rental or (ii) sale of burial rights therein.” The Taxpayer contends that based on this statute the Commission erred by not finding that the 7.14 acres of undeveloped land was exempt from taxation.

In support of its contention, the Taxpayer argues that the distinction in G.S. § 105-278.2(a) between real property “set apart for burial purposes” and property held for purposes of “sale” should be interpreted as distinguishing between the undeveloped property in the cemetery and the property which has been platted and developed for burial purposes. Based on this argument, the Taxpayer contends that the only part of the cemetery property which is “held for purposes of . . . sale” under this statute is that part [546]*546which is platted and developed for burial sites. Further, the Taxpayer argues that the undeveloped property in the cemetery falls under the statutory language, “[r]eal property set apart for burial purposes” that is not held for sale and is therefore exempt from taxation.

We must interpret the language of the statute to determine whether the Taxpayer is correct in its argument. “The words used in the statute must be given their natural or ordinary meaning.” Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Wake County, 251 N.C. 775, 782, 112 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1960). “ ‘Statutes exempting specific property from taxation because of the purposes for which such property is held and used, are and should be construed strictly, when there is room for construction, against exemption and in favor of taxation.’ ” Over-look Cemetery, Inc. v. Rockingham County, 273 N.C. 467, 469, 160 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1968) (citation omitted). This rule does not, however, mean that the statute must “ ‘be stintingly or even narrowly construed.’ ” Id. at 469, 160 S.E.2d at 294-95 (citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court interpreted the language “set apart for burial purposes” and “owned and held for purposes of sale or rental” in Over-look Cemetery, Inc., supra. At the time Over-look was decided, this language appeared in G.S.

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430 S.E.2d 451, 110 N.C. App. 541, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 577, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-appeal-of-lee-memory-gardens-inc-ncctapp-1993.