In re the Accounting of Zuckerman

203 Misc. 993, 120 N.Y.S.2d 63, 1953 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1605
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedApril 21, 1953
StatusPublished

This text of 203 Misc. 993 (In re the Accounting of Zuckerman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Accounting of Zuckerman, 203 Misc. 993, 120 N.Y.S.2d 63, 1953 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1605 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1953).

Opinion

Hofstadter, J.

This is a final accounting of the committee of the person and property of a former incompetent recently adjudged competent. Numerous objections to the account were filed; the parties have, however, by a stipulation providing for the withdrawal of many of these objections, very materially limited the area of controversy. The main problem for determination is the proper method of computing the commissions.

Section 1376 of the Civil Practice Act prescribes that a committee of the property is entitled to the same compensation as an executor or administrator. The compensation of an executor or administrator is governed by section 285 of the Surrogate’s Court Act. The committee here was composed of two members, one of whom by the stipulation already mentioned waived commissions. The allowance of multiple commissions depends on whether ‘ ‘ the gross value of the principal of the estate or fund accounted for amounts to one hundred thousand dollars or more ’ \ If it does, then full commissions may be awarded the remaining member who has not waived, and in that case the court is not restricted to a single commission of which the member not waiving would receive only one half.

The parties are in disagreement on the question whether the principal of the fund being accounted for exceeds $100,000. This difference arises from the circumstance that, while the fund which originally came into the hands of the committee was less than $100,000, at the close of the accounting period it was more than $100,000. This increase is due in part to realized gains on the sale of securities and of subscription rights received [996]*996during the course of the committee’s administration and in part to the appreciation in value of the stock of the Lily Tulip Cup Corporation in the hands of the committee at the end of the accounting period.

The capital stock of Pearlstein Realty Co., Inc., a realty corporation whose entire issued capital stock was owned by the former incompetent, requires special treatment and will be discussed later. Its original inventory value is $20,000 and no increase in this value has been established. The $20,000 valuation is, therefore, adopted.

If the capital stock of Pearlstein Realty Co., Inc., is regarded as part of the fund on which commissions may be computed, the value of the fund at the close of the accounting period, the date as of which it is to be delivered to the former incompetent by the committee, is $103,011.11. To this must be added the amount of schedule c, the realized gains just referred to, aggregating $6,159.58. Thus, the fund exceeds $109,000.

Schedule n-1 is a statement of the property held by the committee on November 12,1952, the closing date of the account, as valued on that date. This value is $103,011.11. Included among the items on schedule n-1 are 940 shares of stock of Lily Tulip Cup Corporation valued at $62,040. This value is now conceded, objection 9(b) thereto having been withdrawn by stipulation. Originally the committee received 737 shares of this stock then worth $29,295.75. During the period of administration the committee sold 200 shares, but also received a stock dividend of 403 shares, so that there were on hand on November 12, 1952, the 940 shares above-mentioned, worth $62,040.

The former incompetent argues that for the purpose of computing the allowable commissions the Lily Tulip Cup Corporation stock may not be valued at its market price on November 12, 1952. This contention must be rejected. It is well settled that realized gains form a proper basis for the computation of commissions and that when realized gains increase a fund, otherwise less than $100,000, to over $100,000, multiple commissions may be awarded (Matter of Armstrong, 197 Misc. 1070, and cases there cited). Increases in capital value, though not realized by sale, may also serve as a base for commissions when the property is actually delivered out of the trust estate by way of distribution (Matter of Mohr, 167 Misc. 523, 525). The reason for this seeming departure from the general rule that an increase in value must be realized before it may support an allowance of commission is obvious. If, instead of distributing in kind, the fiduciary sold the property for its current value at the time [997]*997of distribution and paid over the proceeds to the person entitled to the trust principal, these proceeds would, of course, reflect the enhanced value. When delivery in kind is made, it is thus the equivalent of payment of the proceeds of the property at its then current worth. In this case, the former incompetent receives the 940 shares of Lily Tulip Cup Corporation stock as of November 12, 1952, when they were worth $62,040. For all practical purposes and in legal contemplation she will have received $62,040. In this view, the committee will have received and paid out the increase in value of the stock. Since by this increase the gross value of the estate exceeds $100,000, multiple commissions may be allowed. It follows that the nonwaiving member of the committee should receive a full commission and that, in computing the same, the 940 shares of Lily Tulip Cup Corporation stock are to be valued at $62,040.

Another question for decision concerns the capital stock of Pearlstein Realty Co., Inc., the realty corporation already referred to. It is established that since legal title to the realty of an incompetent remains in him and does not pass to his committee, the committee does not receive, distribute or deliver it, and, therefore, is not entitled to commissions on it (Matter of Merritt, 278 N. Y. 74). Relying on this rule, the former incompetent asserts that the realty corporation was merely a convenient vehicle for her operation of the real estate to which it held title and that she should herself be regarded as the true owner of the realty. If this contention were upheld, then, in computing commissions, the realty corporation stock would have to be excluded as an asset taken over by the committee. The facts, however, compel the rejection of this Anew.

Despite her sole OAvnership of all the capital stock of Pearl-stein Realty Co., Inc., the former incompetent conducted it as a true corporation. Indeed; soon after their qualification the committee obtained an order of the court authorizing them to vote the stock in favor of their election as officers and directors, and pursuant to the order they became and acted as officers and directors. In the circumstances, the court is of opinion that the corporate entity must be recognized, at least to the extent of including the capital stock as an asset on which commissions are allowable.

In strict logic, if the Pearlstein Realty Co., Inc., is treated as a distinct entity, the rents collected from its properties should similarly be regarded as having been received by the corporation and not by the committee. Yet, schedule d-1 of the account is a statement of all income and expenses pertaining to the [998]*998operation ” of the two properties belonging to the corporation, and in schedule p, containing the computation of commissions, we find the item “ D-l — Bents collected— ” with a computation of 5% of the gross rents. No other reference to the rents appears in this commission schedule. In objection 10(f) the former incompetent objected to this item of “ Computation of commissions on rent collections ” as improper because the committee did not collect the rents and manage the real estate. By the stipulation previously mentioned this objection was withdrawn.

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Related

In Re the Accounting of Lyon
15 N.E.2d 404 (New York Court of Appeals, 1938)
In re the Estate of Schlesinger
143 Misc. 275 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1932)
In re the Estate of Mohr
167 Misc. 523 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1938)
In re the Estate of Bernard
177 Misc. 712 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1941)
In re the Accounting of Armstrong
197 Misc. 1070 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1950)

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203 Misc. 993, 120 N.Y.S.2d 63, 1953 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1605, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-accounting-of-zuckerman-nysupct-1953.