In re the Accounting of Tart

284 A.D. 266, 131 N.Y.S.2d 831, 1954 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3382

This text of 284 A.D. 266 (In re the Accounting of Tart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In re the Accounting of Tart, 284 A.D. 266, 131 N.Y.S.2d 831, 1954 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3382 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1954).

Opinion

Bergan, J.

In his lifetime the deceased Wladimir Berenson held for the account of the objectant Vladimir Vicas about $8,000 ”. Berenson was related to Vicas and referred to him as “ my cousin ”. The indebtedness of decedent to Vicas was expressed in a cryptic written form. A letter was addressed to Vicas, dated June 27, 1942, which said, merely: By this letter I affirm that I have at your disposition about $8,000 ”. [268]*268The letter was written in Russian which both men understood. We are not otherwise advised about the nature of the obligation.

In the three months before he died on May 31, 1943, Berenson paid Vicas $7,988 which quite literally fulfills the sum of ‘ ‘ about $8,000 ’ ’ which decedent had at his ‘ ‘ disposition ’ \ T.t would be taken quite as a matter of course that this payment to objectant by the decedent just before he died of the money he had stated he held for him would have requited the decedent’s obligation in full.

But objectant seeks to avoid the effect of this conceded payment to him by a curiously disingenuous assertion that the money he received from Berenson was for something quite different; and he argues that the estate still owes him $8,000. The claim was not presented until October 21, 1948, between five and six years after decedent’s death. The Surrogate after a trial held, however, that the claim of objectant is good. He also denied a motion made by the coexecutor for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Payment of the $7,988 was made by the decedent to Vicas in three separate cheeks in 1943. One was March 8th for $2,280; one March 19th for $2,208 and one April 19th for $3,500. The claim of Vicas was that he was dealing in diamonds; that he had just come from Europe and “ was frozen ” and for some reason, not made entirely clear to us, he could not have a bank account; that in order to do the kind of business in diamonds Vicas wanted to do, a business described as dealing in “ little diamonds ”, it was required that checks be used for payments and that cash was quite unacceptable in the market among the dealers in these transactions.

The witness who testified to all these details was Roman S. Tumarkin, who had known Vicas his whole life ” and was a joint adventurer in the diamond transactions with him. I proposed ” he said to Vicas buying little diamonds ”. He testified further that when Vicas suggested putting in cash for the venture, ‘ ‘ I told him that it is impossible but in our business it is possible only checks. He answered me, he said, he is frozen; he is coming only a few months from France and he cannot give a check.” Tumarkin testified that Vicas then said that perhaps Berenson can help us ”.

Vicas then made an arrangement, according to Tumarkin’s testimony, by which he would give the decedent Berenson cash and Berenson would give Vicas the equivalent of the cash in checks so Vicas could have ready at hand the medium which would satisfy the diamond dealers.

[269]*269It is argued by Vicas here that in each of these three transactions in which Vicas was given a check the consideration was an exchange of cash given by Vicas to Berenson; and that it was intended by Vicas to use the checks thus obtained in diamond transactions. This is the sole theory upon which it is sought to avoid the inference of payment of decedent’s obligation to Vicas of about $8,000. The objectant’s version of these transactions seems quite incredible.

The device becomes more transparent when the record is closely examined. The first check for $2,280 of March 8, 1943, was drawn by the decedent on the Chase Bank. It was made out to cash, but it was indorsed by objectant Vicas. It did not go to a diamond dealer. The indorsement after that of Vicas is the bank indorsement of the Central Savings Bank. This sequence of indorsement suggests two things: (a) that Vicas did not get the check in order to have a medium to deal with in the diamond market; and (b) that Vicas not only could have had, but actually did have a bank account, since there is a direct savings bank indorsement following his indorsement which would not ordinarily be made unless the payee has an account. There is written on the check a notation indicating a savings bank account number.

The other two checks were drawn by decedent on the National City Bank on an account of his wife for whom decedent had power of attorney. Both are drawn to the order of the witness Tumarkin but Vicas concedes he received the proceeds.

Both the check dated March 19, 1943, for $2,208 and the check dated April 19,1943, for $3,500 were cashed. On April 19th the decedent deposited $3,600 in the National City Bank account and the deposit slip was in the handwriting of Vicas. Tumarkin testified Vicas deposited the money in decedent’s presence. Tumarkin also testified the decedent was at that time very sick

On the trial Vicas offered a transcript of the Berenson National City account in evidence. This transcript discloses that the check for $2,208 dated March 19th was paid on the same day by the bank. The transcript does not show a contemporaneous deposit on that day of an equivalent amount. Such a contemporaneous deposit, if made, might have tended to support Vicas’ contention that he bought the decedent’s check with his own cash. It shows, on the contrary, a deposit of $2,411.20 three days before, the significance of which will be treated on that part of the appeal dealing with the motion for a new trial. [270]*270The check for $2,208 which Yicas received would not have been good without this deposit of $2,411.20.

Moreover, the check of March 19th for $2,208 was paid in cash immediately to Tumarkin, the joint adventurer with Yicas, as it shows on its face and by its indorsement, and this, of course, is entirely inconsistent with the theory of Yicas that he was buying the decedent’s check because the diamond market in which he dealt required checks as a business medium.

It may well have been that the money with which the decedent repaid Yicas was used by him in the venture with Tumarkin and the fact that two of the three checks were issued to Tumarkin suggests this; but the odd amount of the deposit of $2,411.20 made, not on the date of the second check was issued, but two days before; and not in the same amount but for $203.20 more, strongly suggest that the source of that deposit was not cash given by Yicas to buy the check, but from some other and different resource of decedent.

It is patent from an examination of the photostat of the check that it was not used in the diamond market at all but immediately converted into cash by the joint adventurer himself. The heavy reflection on credibility of the testimony in support of Yicas ’ theory cast by the manifest inconsistency between the testimony in support of the diamond transactions and the actual and undisputed check and bank records of the first two transactions thus has its own adverse impact on the third check transaction.

The National City Bank account shows that on April 19th a deposit of $3,600 was made. The bank deposit slip offered by objectant showed that this deposit was in cash, and the slip was in the handwriting of the objectant Yicas. On the same day the check for $3,500 was drawn by decedent to the witness Tumarkin. It was cashed on the same day at the Fifth Avenue Branch of the Empire Trust Company.

The only indorsements it bears, other than Tumarkin’s, are bank indorsements.

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284 A.D. 266, 131 N.Y.S.2d 831, 1954 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3382, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-accounting-of-tart-nyappdiv-1954.