In re the Accounting of Public Administrator

9 Misc. 2d 800, 166 N.Y.S.2d 648, 1957 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2400
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedOctober 9, 1957
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 9 Misc. 2d 800 (In re the Accounting of Public Administrator) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Accounting of Public Administrator, 9 Misc. 2d 800, 166 N.Y.S.2d 648, 1957 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2400 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1957).

Opinion

Nathae Sweedler, Bef.

On October 24, 1951, Harry Chapin Smith, the decedent herein, died intestate, a resident of Kings County. On December 29, 1954, the Public Administrator of the County of Kings, as administrator of the estate of Harry Chapin Smith, the decedent, filed a petition and account of his proceedings. The Public Administrator alleged that the decedent’s distributees were unknown, and listed the names of 329 persons who claimed to be distributees of the decedent. Objections to the account were filed. Likewise, individuals from different parts of the country and abroad claimed status as distributees in various degrees of kinship.

On January 16, 1956, the Honorable Maximilliae Moss, Surrogate of Kings County, appointed me ‘ ‘ as Special Beferee, to hear, determine and report on all questions arising upon the settlement of said account ” and “ the determination of the identities of the distributees of this estate, if any.” The order also provided: ‘ ‘ That the said Beferee shall determine the place or places and the time or times and the method of procedure for the taking of any testimony herein and to take all testimony and to make rulings as to its competency, [802]*802relevancy and admissibility and to submit his findings of facts, conclusions of law, and recommendations to this Court upon the completion of all such testimony.”

As Referee, I took the statutory oath and duly qualified. Thereafter, as authorized by the order herein, I conducted hearings and considered various motions made from time to time, and now respectfully submit my determinations and recommendations in compliance with the order of my appointment.

The issue before me is the determination of the persons legally entitled to share in the estate of the decedent. The distribution of the decedent’s property must be determined pursuant to section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law, the relevant statute of descent and distribution of the State of New York, which governs intestate distribution.

The testimony disclosed that the decedent, Harry Chapin Smith, was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, the son of Norman and Julia Chapin Smith. Although not wealthy, he completed his education at Harvard College in 1901; after-wards, he became a newspaperman. The evidence indicates that in the latter years of his life, Smith was an eccentric, leading a pauper’s life, roaming the streets in search of junk to sell. He lived as a recluse, in a sparsely furnished hall bedroom in a dilapidated building on Cumberland Street in Brooklyn. He died in Kings County Hospital at the age of 84, and was sent to Potter’s Feld.

The testimony of Joseph R. Thompson, a New York banker, revealed a dramatic antithesis. For, in contrast to the shabby rags which Smith bore on his back, he carried a brilliant mind, and through his extraordinary knowledge of finance, he amassed great wealth.

In proceedings of this kind involving the death of a recluse leaving a large fortune and no known close relatives, there invariably arises the filing of countless claims of person contending that they are relatives of the decedent; of those whose sole claim is based on similarity of name; of those who are honestly mistaken as to the identity of the decedent; and of those believing they can dip into and partake of a large inheritance. In the shadow of fortune, there is thus waged the battle of the heirs and the would-be heirs.

. All claimants were given an opportunity to prove their real or putative relationship to Harry Chapin Smith. The evidence offered ranged from mere guesses to valid facts.

The objectives were to eliminate those not entitled to share in the distribution of the estate, and to ascertain the next of [803]*803kin entitled to participate in accordance with the provisions of section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law.

Extensive evidence, both oral and documentary, was submitted to me, from the commencement of the hearings on January 30, 1956, until May 9, 1957, when the hearings were closed. In addition to many motions made in the course of the trial, there were other motions brought on for special consideration and hearing.

The record consisting of over 4,000 pages is enlivened with dramatic, sensational and sometimes fantastic stories. My duties and functions are to consider all of the evidence offered by the witnesses, to weigh the credibility thereof, and to make the necessary and proper findings of fact emanating therefrom and from an inspection of the numerous documents and exhibits offered in evidence.

Among the many witnesses who appeared before me were Joseph R. Thompson (referred to above), and George Sumner Small, general manager of the Pioneer Warehouses, both representative and outstanding citizens whose disinterested, unbiased testimony has illuminated the path along which the verities of this tangled maze really lie.

The first and most important claimant to consider is Jean Mackdon, who alleges herself to be the lawful widow of Harry Chapin Smith by reason of her alleged common-law marriage to him. The precept laid down in Boyd v. Boyd (252 N. Y. 422, 428) is controlling: “ The validity of any alleged common-law marriage is always open to suspicion. Especially is doubt justified when one of the parties is dead. Clear, consistent and convincing evidence is required to establish the fact.” (Emphasis mine.)

The testimony adduced by the claimant, Jean Mackdon, has failed to sustain the burden of producing such probative evidence. Her proof in furtherance of establishing a common-law marriage is inadmissible under section 347 of the Civil Practice Act. Her claim that the door to such testimony had been opened by the previous statement of Joseph R. Thompson to the effect that he knew the decedent had never been married, is not warranted. The latter was not interested in the event, nor did he testify as an agent or servant of any person having an interest in the case. He was brought in as a totally disinterested witness, and therefore, there is no supportable inference to be drawn that his appearance and testimony altered the otherwise rigid implications of section 347 of the Civil Practice Act.

[804]*804Even if the evidence of the claimant, Jean Mackdon, were admissible, it would be entirely incredible as a matter of law, and would not conform to ordinary concepts of behavior. It is also to be noted that no testimony was adduced by any witness wherein the decedent acknowledged to any acquaintances of his that Jean Mackdon was his wife.

The following basic rule governing proof of a common-law marriage is set forth in Matter of Burdak (173 Misc. 839, 842, affd. 262 App. Div. 1000, affd. 290 N. Y. 555): “ It is an essential element of a common-law marriage that there must be an agreement between the parties to take each other as husband and wife in a permanent union. (Matter of Pratt, 233 App. Div. 200; Matter of Haffner, 254 N. Y. 238; Sprague v. Sprague, 255 App. Div. 699; Graham v. Graham, 211 id. 580; Smith v. Smith, 194 id. 543; Matter of Auerbach, 208 id. 163; Dom. Rel. Law, § 10.) The agreement must be a mutual agreement per verba de praesenti. If there is no such agreement, there can be no valid marriage. If consent is lacking, nothing can take the place of it. ‘ This consent is of itself sufficient, but for it there is no substitute or equivalent.’ (Per Kelly, P. J., in Graham v. Graham, 211 App. Div. 580, 583.) ”

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Bluebook (online)
9 Misc. 2d 800, 166 N.Y.S.2d 648, 1957 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2400, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-accounting-of-public-administrator-nysurct-1957.