In re the Accounting of Dobo

204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441, 1953 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2446
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedDecember 7, 1953
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 204 Misc. 975 (In re the Accounting of Dobo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Accounting of Dobo, 204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441, 1953 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2446 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1953).

Opinion

Collins, S.

The principal question in this contested accounting proceeding is whether funds should be transmitted to beneficiaries residing in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, or should be retained under the jurisdiction of this court for their benefit.

The testator, a resident and citizen of this State, died on November 6, 1946. His will was admitted to probate in this court on January 6, 1947. The existence of certain nonliquid assets requires that the administration of the estate be kept open. However, substantial distributions of assets have been made to all beneficiaries, except Istvan Szekac, residing in Czechoslovakia, and Erzsi Schmiedl, residing in Hungary. These two beneficiaries received only small payments very early in the administration, and have not received any further payments on account of their legacies.

The foreign beneficiaries are given legacies in the will and, as statutory distributees, they share in property not effectively disposed of by the will. (See Matter of Wells, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 24, 1949, p. 958, col. 6.) The will makes provision for subtracting from some legacies a part of certain debts owed the testator and for the addition of such amounts to other shares. Under the [977]*977will as construed by the court, the Czechoslovakian national is entitled to a one-fifth share of the residuary estate and to 8% as an intestate distributee, less debts deducted pursuant to the prior decree herein. His share, after deduction of estate taxes, will exceed $90,000. The Hungarian beneficiary is entitled to a cash legacy of $2,500 and 8% of the net estate as a distributee, plus a proportionate share of the debts deducted from other shares. Her share will amount to more than $33,000.

In this accounting proceeding the executors allege that Istvan Szekac and Erzsi Schmiedl would not have the benefit, use or control of any further payments made to them, and they ask that, for the protection of the beneficiaries, they be permitted to withhold further payment to them at this time. The Chief of the Consular Section of the Legation of the Hungarian People’s Eepublic has appeared on behalf of Erzsi Schmiedl and the Charge d’Affaires in charge of Consular functions of the Czechoslavak Embassy claims to represent Istvan Szekac. Both officers appear by the same counsel. They deny the material allegations of the petition relating to enjoyment of the benefit, use and control of the property, and they demand that the shares of their nationals be forwarded to the beneficiaries through their respective consular representatives. The court directed a hearing of the issue of fact so created.

Since the administration of the estate must continue for some time, the executors ask that they be permitted to hold the funds rather than to deposit them in court as directed in section 269 of the Surrogate’s Court Act. All parties recognize that in other respects section 269 applies and that it prescribes the conditions under which moneys or property may be retained by the accounting parties or paid into court.

Section 269, insofar as material, reads: ' ' Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee or beneficiary of a trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the money or other property due him, or where other special circumstances make it appear desirable that such payment should be withheld, the decree may direct that such money or other property be paid into the surrogate’s court for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, beneficiary of a trust or such person or persons who may thereafter appear to be entitled thereto.” This is not a punitive statute nor a retaliatory measure. It does not divest the beneficiary of any part of his inheritance or deprive him of its use or enjoyment. On the contrary, its aim is to protect the interests of the beneficiary, to guard and preserve his inheritance until he is able freely and fully to enjoy and use [978]*978it, and to defend it against the efforts of foreign governments either to seize it forcibly or to drain it off gradually through a variety of devices and practices. Protection of the beneficiary is emphasized both in the legislative documents relating to the enactment of the statute and in the judicial decisions construing it.

Remedial legislation became necessary when the courts supervising estate administrations found that inheritances transmitted to certain countries in Europe were withheld from the beneficiaries or confiscated in whole or in part. The devices used to deprive beneficiaries of the funds were numerous and varied even in the beginning (see Matter of Bold, 173 Misc. 545, 547), and they continue to assume ever differing forms. The Legislature acted to prevent not only overt seizure of entire legacies but every kind of confiscation of an inheritance in whole or part, no matter how such efforts are disguised. The explanatory note printed in the legislative bill states that the purpose of the amendment is to authorize the deposit of monies or property in the Surrogate’s Court in cases where transmission or payment to a beneficiary, legatee, or other person resident in a foreign country might be circumvented by confiscation in whole or in part. The amendment authorizes the impounding of the fund by the Surrogate to await the time when payment can be made to the beneficiary for his own benefit, use and control. ’ ’

There is no provision in the statute for the escheat of these funds to the State of New York or for their distribution to other persons. “ Prom a selfish consideration, the State of New York might, under its inherent constitutional power, have enacted a statute which would escheat the moneys in such situations to its own government under its recognized right to regulate or even withhold the privilege of inheritance. To the contrary, the amendment to section 269 of the Surrogate’s Court Act made in 1939 was extremely beneficial in its purpose. It contemplated no forfeiture to our State of the legacy or distributive share of the foreign beneficiary. It was intended to safeguard his rights by permitting the moneys to be held until the time when it might be shown that the beneficiary, and he alone, would receive the funds.” (Matter of Bold, 173 Misc. 545, 551; see, also, Matter of Weidberg, 172 Misc. 524, 528.) The moneys when deposited in court remain the property of the beneficiary. The statute takes nothing from the beneficiary because the suspension of transmission is temporary, not permanent. “ This deprives him of no right, since the money is [979]*979always available to him and is his for the asking at any time that reasonable assurance is forthcoming that he, and he alone, will get it. This statute, far from constituting an impairment of his rights, was designed as and in fact is, a potent protector thereof.” (Matter of Weidberg, supra, 531; Matter of Braier, 305 N. Y. 148, 158.)

The consular representatives argue that the proof offered by the executors deals mainly with past events rather than with the use and enjoyment of property in these countries in the present and in the future. They contend that the quality of the proof is insufficient to justify withholding the funds and that unless the executors clearly establish that the beneficiaries cannot enjoy and use the funds, the decree must direct transmission.

If this court had available to it any means of supervising the payment of funds to nationals of these countries and for assuring itself of the beneficiary’s ability to hold and enjoy it, the issue would be capable of ready solution.

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Bluebook (online)
204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441, 1953 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-accounting-of-dobo-nysurct-1953.