In re Terrence K.

138 Misc. 2d 611, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1988 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 45
CourtNew York City Family Court
DecidedJanuary 27, 1988
StatusPublished

This text of 138 Misc. 2d 611 (In re Terrence K.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York City Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Terrence K., 138 Misc. 2d 611, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1988 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 45 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1988).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Barry A. Cozier, J.

On December 22, 1987, the court rendered an oral decision and order after a hearing in the above-entitled child protective proceeding. In view of the novel issue of diplomatic immunity as pertains to child protective proceedings under article 10 of the Family Court Act, and the ramifications of such issue in the context of the foreign affairs of the United States, the court has determined to issue this written opinion.

[612]*612Upon application of the United States Government by its Assistant United States Attorney and the consent of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Social Services, and after oral argument by all parties before the court: (1) the court recognizes the claim asserted by the United States of America of diplomatic immunity pursuant to the Vienna Convention, on behalf of the named respondent parents and the three subject children, to be legitimate; (2) the petitions are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the named respondents and the three children based upon diplomatic immunity; (3) the Commissioner of Social Services is directed to return the children "Terrence and Sandra K.” to the representatives of the United States United Nations Permanent Mission, based upon the assurances placed on the record by the United States of America on behalf of the United States State Department and the Republic of Zimbabwe concerning the continued arrangements for the safety and protection of the three children; and (4) the court stays the return of the children until 5:00 p.m. on December 23, 1987, to afford the Law Guardian an opportunity to pursue its remedies in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court or the Federal courts.

BACKGROUND

This child protective proceeding pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act was commenced on December 11, 1987, when the petitioner Commissioner of Social Services filed petitions before this court alleging that the eldest of three children of respondents Floyd and Lydia K. had been physically abused by them. The petitions alleged, inter alia, that Floyd K. had on several occasions bound nine-year-old Terrence hand and foot with wire and beaten him with an electrical extension cord; the child was alleged to have numerous bruises and linear marks about his body, particularly on his chest, legs, forearms and forehead. The petitions were subsequently amended to allege that his younger siblings had been beaten with a belt. Mrs. K. was alleged to have knowledge of said beatings and failed to intercede to protect the children. Terrence and his seven-year-old sister had been removed from school earlier that day by the Special Services for Children Agency of the New York City Human Resources Administration (SSC), pursuant to an emergency removal notice. At the time the petitions were filed, three-year-old Wendy K. remained in respondents’ custody.

On December 11, 1987 petitioner appeared by the Special [613]*613Assistant Corporation Counsel and the court assigned the Legal Aid Society as Law Guardian for the three children. A hearing was held pursuant to Family Court Act § 1027 to determine whether the children’s interests required protection pending a final order of disposition. Based upon the evidence adduced, including petitioner’s introduction of the “Report of Suspected Child Abuse or Maltreatment” (form DSS 2221), the court found that removal of the three children was necessary to avoid imminent risk to their lives or health. The children were remanded to the Commissioner of Social Services for foster care; the child Wendy was ordered removed from her parents’ custody forthwith. Further, the court issued a summons to be personally served upon the respondents for their appearance on December 15, 1987.

On December 15, petitioner reported to the court that no service of process had been effected upon the respondents, who were allegedly asserting a claim of diplomatic immunity. It was noted that respondent Floyd K. was a diplomat attached to the Republic of Zimbabwe’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Petitioner further represented that the United States State Department was willing to receive process issued by the court for delivery to the Zimbabwean Ambassador to the United Nations, on behalf of respondents without any waiver of respondents’ claim of diplomatic immunity.

With respect to the court’s remand order, the child Wendy was reported to be residing with a representative of the Zimbabwe Embassy, while the two older children remained in foster care. Pursuant to Family Court Act § 1022 (d) and § 1028, respondents had been served by petitioner with a notice of their right to a hearing to determine whether the children should be returned to their custody. Finally, the court issued a new summons for the respondents, returnable on December 22, 1987.

On December 22, attorneys for petitioner, the Law Guardian, the United States State Department, the United States United Nations Mission, as well as representatives from Special Services for Children, and St. Christopher Ottilie Home (the foster care agency), appeared before the court. Respondent parents did not appear personally or by representative and no service of process had been effected upon respondents.

The United States, by Andrew J. Maloney, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Igou M. Allbray and Varuni Nelson, Assistant United States Attor[614]*614neys of counsel, presented the court with a written "Motion For Release of Children Temporarily Removed From Home”. In said motion, the United States certified the diplomatic immunity from the jurisdiction of this court of respondent parents and the three subject children. The Government asserted that pursuant to article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (23 UST 3227, 3240) Mr. K., an administrative attaché to the Republic of Zimbabwe’s Permanent Mission to the United States, was entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunity from the jurisdiction of United States civil, administrative and criminal tribunals.

In support of its motion, the United States State Department introduced a certificate of diplomatic immunity issued by the Department’s Associate Chief of Protocol, who maintains the official register listing diplomatic personnel entitled to immunity. Said certificate confirms that Floyd K. is now, and has been since September 1986, entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities. It further certifies that, pursuant to article 37 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (op. cit.), as members of Mr. K.’s household, Lydia K. and the three K. children also enjoy the same privileges and immunities.

In its motion papers and upon oral argument, the United States State Department requested that the court dismiss the pending child protective petitions for lack of jurisdiction. It further requested that the court order the release of the children to the custody of the United States United Nations Mission, a component of the State Department, which would assume responsibility for the children’s care until firm arrangements were made with the Republic of Zimbabwe assuring the safety of the children in the United States and upon their return to Zimbabwe. The State Department emphasized that only upon completion of such arrangements would the children be released to the permanent representative of the Republic of Zimbabwe at the United Nations.

The court was advised by the State Department’s representative that respondent Floyd K.

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Related

In re Terrence K.
135 A.D.2d 857 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
138 Misc. 2d 611, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1988 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 45, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-terrence-k-nycfamct-1988.