In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to K.C.

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0030

FILED 08-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JS521069

The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix By Jamie R. Heller Counsel for Appellant Father

Shelby Rice, Glendale Appellee Mother

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Kurt C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to K.C. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are the biological parents of K.C., who was born in August 2012. Two years following K.C.’s birth, the parents, who were never married, separated. That same year, in 2014, Mother filed a motion to address parenting time and child support. Father was granted parenting time every weekend and ordered to pay $350 per month in child support.

¶3 Father exercised parenting time with K.C. until October 2017, when Mother obtained an order of protection against him, which included K.C. To obtain the order of protection, Mother alleged Father struck K.C. Father denied this and contested the order, which the court upheld. The order of protection was valid for one year and Father was unable to contact Mother or K.C. while the order was in effect.

¶4 After the order of protection expired in October 2018, Father attempted to restart parenting time through the court but never successfully filed the appropriate documents to do so.

¶5 In March 2025, Mother filed a Petition to Terminate Parent- Child Relationship, arguing Father’s parental rights should be terminated based on abandonment and abuse grounds, as well as K.C.’s best interests. Father contested the termination and requested a trial. Following trial in August 2025, the juvenile court issued a ruling terminating Father’s parental rights on the abandonment ground and found that termination was in K.C.’s best interests.

¶6 Father timely appealed, and in February 2026 we issued a memorandum decision vacating the termination order and remanding the

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case “to conduct a new best interests evaluation” because the juvenile court improperly relied on speculation. See In re K.C., No. 1 CA-JV 25-0136, 2026 WL 294844, at *4 (Ariz. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (mem. decision). The juvenile court then issued another termination order that same month, addressing only K.C.’s best interests.

¶7 Father timely appealed the new termination order and we have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Father challenges the court’s order terminating his parental rights by arguing the court failed to comply with Arizona statutes, misapplied Arizona’s best-interests law, and entered a best-interests finding unsupported by the record.

¶9 We will “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). In conducting our review, the juvenile court’s findings “will be accepted ‘if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.’” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023) (quoting Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580 ¶ 10 (2021)). The court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law or when the record is “devoid of competent evidence to support” its decision. Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 531 ¶ 5 (App. 2019) (quoting Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520 ¶ 5 (1999)).

I. Statutory Grounds

¶10 Father contends the court violated his due process rights by failing to include a statutory ground for termination in its February 2026 order.

¶11 To terminate parental rights, the court must follow a two- step, sequential process. See In re B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 129 ¶ 13 (2025). In this two-step process, the juvenile court must first find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one ground for termination under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B). Then, the court must find that termination would be in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 477 ¶ 20. To satisfy the first step, the court must make an express, written finding regarding grounds for termination. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 539 ¶ 20 (App. 2018) (holding juvenile court must make written

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findings as to the ultimate facts supporting its legal conclusion regarding termination). Failure to do so before entering a best-interests finding is error. See In re E.C., 261 Ariz. 1, 7 ¶ 33 (App. 2025) (reversing court’s order denying petition to terminate parental rights where order omitted statutory grounds analysis).

¶12 Here, the court’s most recent order terminating Father’s parental rights did not include a statutory-ground finding. This is presumably because our February 2026 decision concluded reasonable evidence supported the court’s initial finding of abandonment. In re K.C., 2026 WL 294844, at *2–3 ¶¶ 13–18. But despite this conclusion and our direction only for “the superior court to conduct a new best-interests evaluation consistent with [our] decision[,]” we also ordered the termination order be vacated in its entirety. Id. at *4 ¶ 22. Because “[a] vacated judgment lacks force or effect[,]” Nielson v. Patterson, 204 Ariz. 530, 533 ¶ 12 (2003), we cannot rely on the August 2025 order to satisfy the required first step of finding at least one statutory ground proven by clear and convincing evidence, In re E.C., 261 Ariz. at 5 ¶¶ 19–20.

¶13 We acknowledge the imprecision of our previous decision and regret the additional work that is now needed to correct this procedural failing. But because the law requires the superior court to first find that a statutory termination ground is proven by clear and convincing evidence before addressing the child’s best interests, id., we must vacate the court’s February 2026 order and remand for the court to re-enter its finding of abandonment.

II. Best-Interests Finding

¶14 Father also argues the court’s February 2026 termination order was erroneous because it failed to provide sufficient factual findings supporting its best-interests conclusion and relied again on speculation. Specifically, he challenges the court’s finding that “[K.C.] should not have to live in fear that father could return after years of abandonment and abuse.”

¶15 After finding a statutory termination ground proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court must also find that the party seeking termination has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); In re C.R., 256 Ariz. 170, 175 ¶¶ 23–24 (App. 2023). This analysis “is highly fact dependent[,]” In re E.C., 261 Ariz. at 6 ¶ 22, so we will affirm the court’s factual findings if

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supported by reasonable evidence and will not reweigh evidence on appeal, Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶16 “[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during the best-interests inquiry is “protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016) (citing Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286 ¶ 34 (2005)). And because this analysis centers on the child, the court must not consider a parent’s fears or wishes. Contrast Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 7 (1990) (concluding mother’s wish to terminate father’s parental rights “just in case” she remarries was too speculative and mother presented no evidence related to child’s best interests) with In re V.M., 261 Ariz. 198, 202 ¶ 17 (App. 2025) (concluding record showed children had present and harmful fear of returning to father).

¶17 Here, the court found that “[K.C.] is worried that if something happened to mother, he would have to go to his father.” But this finding is not supported by the record. At the termination hearing, Mother testified that K.C. requested Father’s parental rights be terminated. But she also testified that this request came after she told K.C. about an incident involving Father and the mother of K.C.’s half-sibling. Mother further testified that this incident made her concerned “that if something did happen to [her], that [K.C.] would not go to somebody who would be in his best interests.” Thus, at most, the record shows Mother worried that K.C. could be returned to Father, that her worry was based on an incident Mother told K.C. about, and that K.C. then acquiesced to Mother’s concerns and requested Father’s rights be terminated. There is no evidence in the record which shows K.C. himself feared returning to Father or that such a fear was immediately and detrimentally impacting K.C., so the court’s finding of such a worry is unsupported. Additionally, to the extent the court relied on Mother’s fears in its findings, it may not do so because Mother’s fears are too speculative to support a best-interests finding. See JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 7. Therefore, based on this record, we vacate the court’s best- interests finding and remand for the court to conduct a new analysis.

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CONCLUSION

¶18 We vacate and remand for the court to re-enter its statutory-ground finding and to conduct a new best-interests analysis consistent with this decision. We leave to the discretion of the juvenile court whether it chooses to hear additional evidence on remand or to proceed on the current record.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR