In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.C. and M.C.

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C. and M.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0010

FILED 09-03-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JS521530

The Honorable Lori Bustamante, Judge The Honorable Thomas Marquoit, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm PLLC, Queen Creek By Steven Czop Counsel for Appellant

Kendra M., Phoenix Appellee

John L. Popilek PC, Scottsdale By John L. Popilek Counsel for Appellee Children

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.C. and M.C.

Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Spencer C.-O. (“Father”) appeals the denial of his motion to set aside the termination of his parental rights as to L.C.-O. and M.C.-O. (together, “the Children”). Father argues Kendra M. (“Mother”) did not properly serve him by publication. We conclude otherwise and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On August 18, 2025, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights as to the Children because of abandonment. She alleged Father did not contact the Children, including by phone or letter, for several years. The court set an initial hearing for October 8, 2025.

¶3 On October 1, 2025, Mother requested leave to serve Father by publication. In addition to not having contact with Father, she asserted she unsuccessfully attempted to serve him in a family law case. On June 20, 2025, in that separate case, she had run a skip trace to find Father’s address. She attached the results from that skip trace, which listed multiple addresses starting in 2006 and stated that “no databases show [Father] as incarcerated.” The skip trace recommended trying to serve Father at his most recent address, but Mother said that address was where she and Father lived in 2017 and had since sold. Instead, Mother instructed the process server to try a different address on the list she recognized as Father’s mother’s address.

¶4 The process server twice visited that address in June of 2025. The process server attested that during the second visit, Father’s mother answered and said Father did not live there and that “she only sees him ‘once in a blue moon.’” On that basis, the family division let Mother serve Father by publication in late August 2025. Mother requested that the juvenile court again allow her to serve Father by publication because she was “unaware of another address for Father and has no other information regarding Father’s whereabouts.” On October 7, 2025, the juvenile court

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granted Mother’s request and rescheduled the termination hearing for December 3, 2025.

¶5 On November 13, 2025, Mother filed an affidavit of publication, explaining that she published the notice of hearing for four consecutive weeks, from October 22, 2025, to November 12, 2025, in a newspaper circulated in Maricopa and Pima counties. At the hearing on December 3, 2025, the court found Mother properly served Father by publication and Father had not appeared. The court proceeded with the hearing. Mother testified that Father had no contact with the Children for over seven years. Mother also testified her current husband wanted to adopt the Children, and the Children call him “Dad.” The court found Father abandoned Children and that terminating his parental rights was in their best interests.

¶6 Two weeks later, Father appealed. Later, this court granted Father’s motion to stay the appeal and revested jurisdiction in the juvenile court, so Father could move to set aside the order terminating his rights.

¶7 Father moved to set aside that order, arguing it was void for lack of service, thereby violating his due process rights. Father included a screenshot from an inmate search website reflecting that he was booked into Maricopa County jail on September 19, 2025. Following a hearing, the court denied Father’s motion. The court took judicial notice of the docket from Father’s criminal case showing he was not incarcerated without bond until October 3, 2025. The court found Mother sufficiently served Father by publication. The court further found Mother made “diligent” and “constitutionally adequate” efforts to locate Father and complied with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1.

¶8 Father timely filed a new notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father argues the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to set aside the termination order because that order was void for improper service. While we typically review a motion to set aside for an abuse of discretion, service of process is a legal question we review de novo. Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 Ariz. 165, 168 ¶ 9 (App. 2018). But we defer to the juvenile court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Id.

¶10 A party must comply with both the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and due process when effecting process. Master Fin., Inc. v.

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Woodburn, 208 Ariz. 70, 73 ¶ 15 (App. 2004). The juvenile court may grant a motion to set aside an order if it is void. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 318(c); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). “If service is not proper, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the party and any resulting judgment is void.” In re D.S., 262 Ariz. 91, __ ¶ 10 (App. 2026) (citation modified). A party responsible for service satisfies due process by demonstrating “due diligence to personally serve a [parent] at a last known address within the state[,] . . . compli[ance] with the publication procedures,” and publication “is the best means of notice under the circumstances[.]” See Master Fin., Inc., at 73– 74 ¶ 15. “Service of process can be impeached only by clear and convincing evidence.” Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Osterkamp, 172 Ariz. 191, 194 (App. 1992).

¶11 A party petitioning for termination must serve the impacted parent according to the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 351(d)(1)(A)–(B). With one exception inapplicable here, a party may complete service by serving a parent personally, serving someone who resides at a parent’s “dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there,” or serving an agent “authorized by appointment[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d). But if a party shows service, including by alternative means, is “impracticable,” the court may permit service by publication. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l)(1). The court may allow a party to serve a parent by publication when, “despite reasonably diligent efforts,” the serving party cannot find the parent’s current address, publication is the “best means practicable in the circumstances,” and “the motion is supported by affidavit.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l)(1)(A)–(C).

¶12 A party serving by publication must publish notice for four successive weeks “in a newspaper published in the county where the action is pending.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l)(2)(A)(i). “Service is complete 30 days after the summons and statement is first published[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l)(2)(D).

¶13 Father argues Mother could not rely on attempts to serve him in their family law matter to justify publication here. Father maintains that, because Mother filed a new action, she needed to serve him anew in this case. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(3) (“No service is required on a party who is in default for failing to appear. . . But a pleading that asserts a new claim for relief against such a party must be served on that party under Rule 4 [or] Rule 4.1[.]”).

¶14 Father’s argument fails because Mother separately served him by publication in this case. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l)(2)(D) (service includes service by publication). And nothing in the Rule about serving by

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publication limits a party from using unsuccessful efforts to serve in a different action when seeking publication. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l). Instead, the Rule requires that the serving party demonstrate in an affidavit that she made “reasonably diligent efforts” to serve the other parent and that publication is the “best means practicable in the circumstances[.]” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l)(1)(A)–(C). A diligent effort to locate an opposing party includes “examination of telephone company records, utility company records, and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder” or by electronic means. Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165 Ariz. 257, 261 (App. 1990); see Ruffino, 245 Ariz. at 169 ¶ 14.

¶15 We agree with the juvenile court that Mother demonstrated that service by publication in this case was necessary, even if she relied on efforts made in the separate family law case. Mother explained she had no contact with Father for years and unsuccessfully attempted to serve Father in their family law case after running a skip trace on June 20, 2025. As an exhibit, Mother included the skip trace results listing Father’s addresses dating back to 2006. Those results stated that “no databases show [Father] as incarcerated” and recommended only one address at which to attempt service. Mother identified that address as a house the couple previously shared and sold, so she instructed the process server to try a different address where she knew Father’s mother resided. The process server complied, but Father’s mother explained that Father did not reside there. That unsuccessful visit occurred less than two months before Mother petitioned for termination.

¶16 Given Mother’s efforts to locate Father after no contact with him for years and the short time between attempting to serve him and requesting publication in this case, Mother’s efforts to locate Father were sufficient. Father, however, contends that by failing to “start anew,” Mother failed to discover that he was incarcerated starting September 19, 2025.

¶17 Although it appears Father was arrested on September 18 and booked into jail on September 19, the docket in Father’s criminal case supports that he was then released. Father was later indicted and incarcerated without bond, but that did not occur until October 3. Although Father says “he became incarcerated in September 2025,” he does not dispute the juvenile court’s more-nuanced finding that he was not incarcerated without bond until early October. So the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Father was not incarcerated in a relevant sense until October 3. See Ruffino, 245 Ariz. at 168 ¶ 9.

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¶18 Mother moved for publication on October 1, two days before Father was incarcerated. So requiring Mother to run a new skip trace before moving to serve by publication would not have uncovered that Father was incarcerated. In sum, there is no evidence that Mother knew or should have known Father’s address, or that she could have used any other method to locate him before he became incarcerated. Father has not established that service by publication was improper. See Glen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 172 Ariz. at 194.

¶19 Finally, Father contends he was denied due process. But Mother demonstrated due diligence justifying service by publication and later filed an affidavit attesting that she published the notice of hearing in a newspaper for four consecutive weeks. In so doing, Mother complied with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1(l)(2). And without any other option for contacting Father, service by publication was the best means practicable to notify him of the termination proceedings. So the court honored Father’s due process rights, Mother properly served him, and the court did not err by denying his motion to set aside termination.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR