[Cite as In re T.C., 2025-Ohio-4730.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
In re T. C. Court of Appeals No. L-24-1277
Trial Court No. JC19275871
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: October 14, 2025
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and, Evy M. Jarrett, for appellee.
Lauren Hammersmith, for appellant.
***** ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, T.C., appeals the judgment entry of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas, juvenile division, which declined to declassify and remove his registration requirement as a tier I juvenile sex offender. For the following reasons we
affirm.
II. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In June 2019, appellant was 15 years old and worked in a group home
facility. On or about June 29, 2019, he represented himself as an undercover police
officer to a 59-year-old, physically disabled female patient at the facility, and used a
firearm to commit a sexual assault against the woman.
{¶ 3} A complaint was filed against appellant, alleging rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02 (A)(2), a felony of the first-degree. He was adjudicated delinquent for one count
of rape, and on October 13, 2020, the trial court classified appellant as a tier II juvenile
sex offender, placed him under probation and community control, and ordered him to
register with the court every 180 days for 20 years. Following his sentencing hearing,
appellant complied with his registration requirements, completed court-ordered
treatments for mental health and behavioral issues, remained employed, and refrained
from committing any new offenses.
{¶ 4} The trial court, on its own motion, set a probation hearing for July 26, 2021.
Appellant, his mother, appellant’s counsel, the assisting prosecuting attorney, a
representative of the Allen Jackson group home where he resided, appellant’s probation
officer, and a representative from the Zepf treatment center were all present at the
hearing. Appellant’s probation officer reported that appellant was complying with their
program, and recommended appellant’s probation be terminated. Accordingly, the court
reclassified him as a tier I offender and terminated his community control and probation,
2. effective July 26, 2021. The court kept the registration requirement, although reduced the
20-year time requirement by half.
{¶ 5} On September 3, 2024, after continuing good behavior and compliance with
his court-ordered registration, T.C. petitioned the court to declassify him as a tier I
offender and terminate the registration requirement. On November 1, 2024, the trial court
held a hearing, where appellant presented his case and supported his request for
declassification.
{¶ 6} Appellant presented the following facts as support for declassifying him.
Appellant was employed, working as a night-shift security guard. Additionally, he was a
full-time college student working towards a medical assistant degree. To complete
requirements for his degree, he also worked as an intern in hospitals. An instructor from
his intern program wrote a character letter on his behalf, informing the court that
appellant was doing well in learning skills and remaining professional. Two recovery
specialists from the living community he was residing in also wrote character letters
stating that appellant was working hard on rehabilitation; with one of them stating that it
was their opinion appellant “is going to continue to work hard on being the best version
of himself.” Appellant provided evidence at the hearing that he had fully complied with
timely registration and committed no new criminal offenses. The State did not contest
that he had been meeting his requirements and presented no evidence of concerning
behavior that would undermine reclassification. The State, however, opposed
reclassification, raising concerns about recidivism.
3. {¶ 7} Following the hearing, the trial court entered its judgment, denying his
motion. The trial court noted that appellant, as a registered tier I offender, had reported
only three years out of the 20-year period imposed as part of the original sentence.
Furthermore, the trial court mentioned the change of his status from a tier II to a tier I
juvenile offender. Moreover, the trial court found there was merit in the state’s concern of
recidivism, considering his employment and the nature of the rape he committed. The
court stated, “although [appellant] has made great strides in his life, he has much to
accomplish.” Furthermore, the court noted that “[appellant] did not assert or prove how
registration is negatively impacting his life.”
{¶ 8} Appellant filed a timely appeal.
III. Assignment of Error
{¶ 9} Appellant asserts his assignment of error as follows:
1. The trial court acted unreasonably and arbitrarily when it denied appellant’s motion to be declassified as a juvenile sex offender.
a. The trial court erred because it failed to consider, on the record, the factors listed under R.C. 2152.83 (D). b. The trial court’s reasons for denying the motion were unsupported by facts and evidence.
IV. Law and Analysis
{¶ 10} The trial court exercised discretion when it reviewed and denied appellant’s
request to be declassified. Appellant asserts that the trial court acted unreasonably and
arbitrarily when it denied appellant’s motion. Appellant also asserts that the trial court
failed to consider mandatory factors in its determination.
4. {¶ 11} A trial court reviews and weighs supporting evidence presented by a
petitioner seeking declassification, thereby exercising discretion when deciding on
whether to continue or terminate the offender’s status. See In re Z.M., 2022-Ohio-194, ¶
23 (8th Dist.) ("the juvenile court maintains discretion throughout the course of the
registration period to consider whether to continue, modify, or terminate the juvenile
offender registration"). Therefore, on appeal we review the trial court’s decision under an
abuse of discretion standard.
{¶ 12} An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably,
arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Rochon, 2025-Ohio-1716, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.). Our role
under an abuse of discretion standard is to give deference to the trial court, it is not proper
“to determine that a trial court abused its discretion simply because [we] might not have
reached the same conclusion or is, itself, less persuaded by the trial court's reasoning
process than by the countervailing arguments.” Sortino v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold,
LLP, 2025-Ohio-1949, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 13} In addressing appellant’s argument, we must first address whether the trial
court erred by failing to address, on the record, the factors courts are required to consider
when reviewing a motion for declassification under R.C. 2152.85 (C). Then we must
review whether the trial court, after considering and weighing all relevant factors,
committed an abuse of discretion when it denied appellant’s motion.
5. A. The trial court did not err by failing to consider, on the record, the factors listed under R.C. 2152.83 (D).
{¶ 14} A juvenile sex offender may petition a court to declassify or reclassify their
status pursuant to R.C. 2152.85 (B). Upon reviewing a petition, R.C. 2152.85 (C)
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[Cite as In re T.C., 2025-Ohio-4730.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
In re T. C. Court of Appeals No. L-24-1277
Trial Court No. JC19275871
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: October 14, 2025
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and, Evy M. Jarrett, for appellee.
Lauren Hammersmith, for appellant.
***** ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, T.C., appeals the judgment entry of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas, juvenile division, which declined to declassify and remove his registration requirement as a tier I juvenile sex offender. For the following reasons we
affirm.
II. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In June 2019, appellant was 15 years old and worked in a group home
facility. On or about June 29, 2019, he represented himself as an undercover police
officer to a 59-year-old, physically disabled female patient at the facility, and used a
firearm to commit a sexual assault against the woman.
{¶ 3} A complaint was filed against appellant, alleging rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02 (A)(2), a felony of the first-degree. He was adjudicated delinquent for one count
of rape, and on October 13, 2020, the trial court classified appellant as a tier II juvenile
sex offender, placed him under probation and community control, and ordered him to
register with the court every 180 days for 20 years. Following his sentencing hearing,
appellant complied with his registration requirements, completed court-ordered
treatments for mental health and behavioral issues, remained employed, and refrained
from committing any new offenses.
{¶ 4} The trial court, on its own motion, set a probation hearing for July 26, 2021.
Appellant, his mother, appellant’s counsel, the assisting prosecuting attorney, a
representative of the Allen Jackson group home where he resided, appellant’s probation
officer, and a representative from the Zepf treatment center were all present at the
hearing. Appellant’s probation officer reported that appellant was complying with their
program, and recommended appellant’s probation be terminated. Accordingly, the court
reclassified him as a tier I offender and terminated his community control and probation,
2. effective July 26, 2021. The court kept the registration requirement, although reduced the
20-year time requirement by half.
{¶ 5} On September 3, 2024, after continuing good behavior and compliance with
his court-ordered registration, T.C. petitioned the court to declassify him as a tier I
offender and terminate the registration requirement. On November 1, 2024, the trial court
held a hearing, where appellant presented his case and supported his request for
declassification.
{¶ 6} Appellant presented the following facts as support for declassifying him.
Appellant was employed, working as a night-shift security guard. Additionally, he was a
full-time college student working towards a medical assistant degree. To complete
requirements for his degree, he also worked as an intern in hospitals. An instructor from
his intern program wrote a character letter on his behalf, informing the court that
appellant was doing well in learning skills and remaining professional. Two recovery
specialists from the living community he was residing in also wrote character letters
stating that appellant was working hard on rehabilitation; with one of them stating that it
was their opinion appellant “is going to continue to work hard on being the best version
of himself.” Appellant provided evidence at the hearing that he had fully complied with
timely registration and committed no new criminal offenses. The State did not contest
that he had been meeting his requirements and presented no evidence of concerning
behavior that would undermine reclassification. The State, however, opposed
reclassification, raising concerns about recidivism.
3. {¶ 7} Following the hearing, the trial court entered its judgment, denying his
motion. The trial court noted that appellant, as a registered tier I offender, had reported
only three years out of the 20-year period imposed as part of the original sentence.
Furthermore, the trial court mentioned the change of his status from a tier II to a tier I
juvenile offender. Moreover, the trial court found there was merit in the state’s concern of
recidivism, considering his employment and the nature of the rape he committed. The
court stated, “although [appellant] has made great strides in his life, he has much to
accomplish.” Furthermore, the court noted that “[appellant] did not assert or prove how
registration is negatively impacting his life.”
{¶ 8} Appellant filed a timely appeal.
III. Assignment of Error
{¶ 9} Appellant asserts his assignment of error as follows:
1. The trial court acted unreasonably and arbitrarily when it denied appellant’s motion to be declassified as a juvenile sex offender.
a. The trial court erred because it failed to consider, on the record, the factors listed under R.C. 2152.83 (D). b. The trial court’s reasons for denying the motion were unsupported by facts and evidence.
IV. Law and Analysis
{¶ 10} The trial court exercised discretion when it reviewed and denied appellant’s
request to be declassified. Appellant asserts that the trial court acted unreasonably and
arbitrarily when it denied appellant’s motion. Appellant also asserts that the trial court
failed to consider mandatory factors in its determination.
4. {¶ 11} A trial court reviews and weighs supporting evidence presented by a
petitioner seeking declassification, thereby exercising discretion when deciding on
whether to continue or terminate the offender’s status. See In re Z.M., 2022-Ohio-194, ¶
23 (8th Dist.) ("the juvenile court maintains discretion throughout the course of the
registration period to consider whether to continue, modify, or terminate the juvenile
offender registration"). Therefore, on appeal we review the trial court’s decision under an
abuse of discretion standard.
{¶ 12} An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably,
arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Rochon, 2025-Ohio-1716, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.). Our role
under an abuse of discretion standard is to give deference to the trial court, it is not proper
“to determine that a trial court abused its discretion simply because [we] might not have
reached the same conclusion or is, itself, less persuaded by the trial court's reasoning
process than by the countervailing arguments.” Sortino v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold,
LLP, 2025-Ohio-1949, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 13} In addressing appellant’s argument, we must first address whether the trial
court erred by failing to address, on the record, the factors courts are required to consider
when reviewing a motion for declassification under R.C. 2152.85 (C). Then we must
review whether the trial court, after considering and weighing all relevant factors,
committed an abuse of discretion when it denied appellant’s motion.
5. A. The trial court did not err by failing to consider, on the record, the factors listed under R.C. 2152.83 (D).
{¶ 14} A juvenile sex offender may petition a court to declassify or reclassify their
status pursuant to R.C. 2152.85 (B). Upon reviewing a petition, R.C. 2152.85 (C)
provides that a trial court shall consider all relevant factors and information when
deciding whether to remove or continue a prior registration and classification order. In
addition to any other factors the court finds important, the court is required to consider
the factors under R.C. 2152.83 (D) in its decision. Appellant argues that the trial court
committed error by failing to describe, for our review, its consideration of the factors
listed under R.C. 2152.83 (D). We disagree.
{¶ 15} The plain language of R.C. 2152.85 (C) requires trial courts to consider the
listed factors; however, the statute does not have a provision stating that a trial court must
list its reasoning for each of the factors in the ruling. In State v. Carpenter, we remanded
a case back to the trial court because the trial court was required to make factual findings
on the factors listed in the statute but failed to do so on the record. State v. Carpenter,
2005-Ohio-6133, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.). The statute which the trial court failed to comply with
required the court to do the following:
the court shall specify in the offender's sentence and the judgment of conviction that contains the sentence that the court has determined that the offender is a sexual predator and shall specify that the determination was pursuant to division (B) of this section.1
1 The statute, R.C. 2950.09, has since been repealed. 6. (Emphasis added) Id. at ¶ 17, quoting R.C. 2950.09(B)(4). The findings made by the trial
court in this case are distinguishable from Carpenter because R.C. 2152.85 (C) does not
have language requiring the trial court to specify that its determination was pursuant to
the factors it must consider. The statute requires the court to consider those factors in
forming its opinion, but there is no requirement that those factors must specifically be in
the trial court’s decision.
{¶ 16} The trial court did not err in its written decision because the language of
R.C. 2152.85 (C) includes no mandate to make specific factual findings on each of the
factors. Furthermore, when a trial court’s sentencing is challenged for failing to consider
statutory factors, we may presume that the trial court considered the statutory provisions.
See State v. Bowen, 2025-Ohio-1273, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). Here, the trial court, “after thorough
review of all evidence, hearing notes, case orders, and the applicable law,” found
appellant’s motion not well taken. (Emphasis added). Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that when the trial court reviewed the evidence presented and followed the
applicable law, the court considered the statutory factors that were mandated by R.C.
2152.85 (C) and identified the factors the court found most relevant to its decision. See,
e.g., State v. Rivera, 2021-Ohio-1343, ¶ 19 (“a court will presume that the judge followed
the statutes, absent evidence to the contrary.”).
{¶ 17} As we discuss below, the trial court’s opinion reflected consideration of the
applicable factors under R.C. 2152.83 (D), despite not specifically identifying each one in
detail.
7. B. The trial court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion for declassification was not an abuse of discretion, as it was supported by significant considerations and reasonable concerns.
{¶ 18} Appellant next argues the trial court’s reasons for denying the petition were
unsupported by facts and evidence. Specifically, appellant contests the trial court’s
concern of recidivism. In opposition to the state’s argument, appellant cites research
which indicates that juvenile sex offenders are at a lower risk of recidivism. Additionally,
the appellant contends that the trial court’s consideration of the amount of time appellant
had been registering and the remark that appellant “still [had] much to accomplish,” were
irrelevant. Appellant argues these two considerations are irrelevant to the motion as
registration requirements are meant for punishment not rehabilitation, and the trial court’s
consideration of these factors indicates the court was attempting to use the registration to
“push appellant into action.” Although recognizing that the registry is used for
punishment, appellant argues his case by citing research which identifies how the registry
can harm juvenile offenders. Notwithstanding appellant’s references to research on the
topic, the trial court found appellant did not demonstrate a burden resulting from the
registration.
{¶ 19} The trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion. Its considerations
were not arbitrary, but proven by the judgment entry, where the trial court identified facts
that were related to the factors under R.C. 2152.83 (D), such as the concern for public
safety. Furthermore, the trial court was permitted to take into account any relevant factors
as part of its decision. The trial court noted valid concerns raised by the State about
8. appellant’s future behavior. Additionally, the trial court found that appellant’s failure to
identify hindrances posed by registration was a reason to deny the motion. The trial
court’s decision not only contained relevant considerations but also reflected a reasonable
and conscionable analysis of the facts.
{¶ 20} As required under R.C. 2152.85(C), the court shall, in conjunction with any
other relevant considerations, consider the factors under R.C. 2152.83(D) when
reviewing a petition for declassification:
(1) The nature of the sexually oriented offense or the child-victim oriented offense committed by the child; (2) Whether the child has shown any genuine remorse or compunction for the offense; (3) The public interest and safety; (4) The factors set forth in division (K) of section 2950.11 of the Revised Code . . . (5) The factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of section 2929.12 of the Revised Code . . . (6) The results of any treatment provided to the child and of any follow-up professional assessment of the child.
R.C. 2152.83 (D).
{¶ 21} Sex offender registration requirements exist to keep the public aware and
informed. In re D.R., 2021-Ohio-1797, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.) (“We stated that the purpose of sex-
offender registration is to protect the public . . .”). The length of time appellant had been
registering was a reasonable consideration, in light of its relation to public safety.
Appellant had only been registering as a tier II offender for nine months before he was
reclassified to tier I. He had only been registering as a tier I offender for three years
before petitioning the court. The trial court’s remark that appellant “still [had] much to
accomplish” is consistent with this consideration of public safety, as it arguably showed 9. that the trial court believed appellant still had work to do regarding his rehabilitation and
growth from the mindset that led him to commit the assault. Thus, it was within the trial
court’s discretion to determine whether it was too soon to remove the registration
requirement or that terminating the safety mechanism of registration would pose a risk to
the public.
{¶ 22} The trial court had the discretion to deny appellant’s petition in light of any
relevant factors, not just the mandated ones, pursuant to R.C. 2152.85 (C) which states
that a judge when reviewing a petition for declassification “may review the prior
classification or determination in question and, upon consideration of all relevant factors
and information . . . Enter an order denying the petition.”. Here, the trial court
specifically noted appellant’s failure to demonstrate how the registration requirement has
disrupted his life or opportunities as a reason for denying the petition. To attribute this
finding to the trial court’s misunderstanding of the effects of sex offender registration on
appellant misconstrues the trial court’s consideration of the factors and ignores the trial
court’s discretion to consider any factor it finds relevant. In reviewing this consideration,
we focus only on demonstrated abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
{¶ 23} In the written entry, the trial court found, “the Juvenile Prosecutor has valid
concerns regarding [T.C.]’s current employment choice, given the details of the charge.”
The trial court further considered the nature of the crime as it relates to concerns of
recidivism. Significantly, the nature of appellant’s crime involved using his position of
authority over the victim. Accordingly, the trial court did not act unreasonably when it
found that appellant’s internship in the medical field might present a risk of recidivism,
10. as his place of employment put him in the same position of authority he occupied when
he committed the assault. Additionally, appellant’s employment as a security guard was
noted as a genuine concern, given the fact he committed the assault by impersonating a
police officer, demonstrating the inclination to abuse positions of authority and
potentially a propensity to commit crimes.
{¶ 24} Since we are permitted to assume the trial court formed their opinion in
consideration of the statutory factors under R.C. 2152.83 (D), we may look to the record
for details of appellant’s conviction, as factors in the decision. First, the victim’s age and
disability demonstrated that appellant may have propensity to harm vulnerable people.
Furthermore, the rape was committed by appellant, armed with a firearm and
impersonating a police officer, significant details that supported concerns about
appellant’s access to weapons and propensity to commit violent crimes.
{¶ 25} The record also contains information regarding appellant’s mental health
history such as reports of delusional thinking, anxiety disorders, a schizophrenia
diagnosis, and reports of family members with mental illness. The trial court properly
considered these factors, a history of mental illness and a predisposition to mental health
crises, in reaching its determination regarding a danger of recidivism.
{¶ 26} Appellant’s argument mainly challenges the trial court’s conclusions. We
are not permitted to find an abuse of discretion simply because we may have disagreed on
some findings made by the trial court. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate the
trial court’s reasoning for denying the petition was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
Furthermore, because the trial court was required to consider the relevant factors under
11. R.C. 2152.83 (D), but not required to specify in its opinion a response to each of the
factors, the trial court’s omission of enumerated reasons did not constitute an abuse of
discretion. For these reasons, we find appellant’s assignment of error not well-taken.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 27} Finding substantial justice has been done, we affirm the judgment of the
Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Appellant shall pay the costs
of the appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J. CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
12.