In re T.C. CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: E086406
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 1/16/26 In re T.C. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re T.C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E086406

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J297438 & J297439) v. OPINION B.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.

Pace, Judge. Affirmed.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 After the juvenile court terminated family reunification services for B.H. (mother)

and set a hearing for selection of a permanent plan for A.C. and T.C. (the children),

mother petitioned the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section

388 to return the children to her custody or to order additional reunification services.

Mother appeals from an order summarily denying the petition. Because mother did not

make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and best interests of the children

to justify returning the children to her custody, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its

discretion and affirm the order.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2023, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services received a

referral about T.C. when he tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Mother told

the social worker she had smoked methamphetamine three days earlier and in December

2022, before she knew she was pregnant. She reported mostly smoking “weed,” but

admitted she first smoked methamphetamine at age 21 or 22 and did so off and on

thereafter. Mother received substance abuse treatment and services to address domestic

violence during a prior dependency regarding A.C.

The children were removed from mother’s custody. The juvenile court

subsequently found them to be dependents of the court pursuant to section 300 and

ordered that mother receive family reunification services.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 During the reporting period for the six-month review hearing, mother participated

in domestic violence classes and other services but missed a total of 12 drug tests because

of transportation issues. The juvenile court found mother had made insufficient progress

in addressing the reasons for the dependency and ordered that she receive additional

family reunification services.

Mother continued to make progress in her case plan, completed an outpatient drug

treatment program, and moved into a sober living home during the reporting period for

the 12-month status review hearing. However, she missed 18 additional drug tests and

tested positively for drugs twice. The juvenile court once more found that mother’s

progress at alleviating the reasons for the dependency was insufficient and ordered that

mother receive additional family reunification services.

During the 18-month status review reporting period, mother was arrested for

receiving stolen goods and for possession of methamphetamine. Mother missed another

18 drug tests and tested positively for drugs once. Mother had been moved into a sober

living facility but was removed from the program two weeks later after her positive drug

test. Moreover, mother was terminated from an outpatient drug treatment program for

failure to attend and failed to enroll in another program despite receiving a referral. She

subsequently enrolled in an inpatient program and had been approved for a higher level

of treatment because of her ongoing struggles with methamphetamine use.

At the 18-month status review hearing conducted December 5, 2024, the juvenile

court found mother had been provided with adequate family reunification services, her

3 progress toward alleviating the reasons for the dependency was insufficient, and there

was no substantial probability the children would be returned to mother within the

statutory time frame. Therefore, the court terminated mother’s services and set a hearing

pursuant to section 366.26 for selection of a permanent plan for the children.

On June 10, 2025, mother petitioned the juvenile court to return the children to her

care and custody. In the alternative, mother asked the court to reinstate her family

reunification services, order unsupervised visits, and vacate the order setting a

permanency hearing under section 366.26 and instead set a permanency planning review

(PPR) hearing. With respect to changed circumstances, mother alleged: (1) she had been

active in her substance abuse treatment program; (2) she had completed a residential

treatment program and attended various groups such as anger management and NA/AA;

(3) she “has been clean and has maintained sobriety”; and (4) she had enrolled in a

pharmacy technician program. Inter alia, mother supported her petition with evidence

that between December 4, 2024 (the day before the 18-month review hearing) and April

25, 2025, she tested negatively during twice-monthly random drug tests.

Mother alleged “[i]t would be in [the] best interest of the children to be raised by

their mother who has worked toward being a better person for them.” According to

mother, a bonding study demonstrated “this is a family who is positively bonded to each

other, and to sever the bond would be detrimental to the children.” The clinical

psychologist who completed the bonding study concluded there is “a substantial, positive

relationship” between mother and the children and severing contact “could be

4 detrimental” to the children. The psychologist recommended the juvenile court consider

the bond between mother and the children when making any determinations regarding the

children’s future.

In its written order summarily denying the petition, the juvenile court found,

“Mother’s circumstances are changing but not changed. Especially with the baby [T.C.],

there is no evidence that granting the request is in the children’s best interest.”

Mother timely appealed.

II.

DISCUSSION

“‘Section 388 allows a person having an interest in a dependent child of the

juvenile court to petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a prior order on the

grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a).)’ [Citation.] ‘A

section 388 petition must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief in order to

trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing on the petition. [Citation.] The petition may be

denied without a hearing “only if the [petition] fails to reveal any change of circumstance

or new evidence which might require a change of order.”’” (In re R.M. (2025) 111

Cal.App.5th 119, 136.)

“‘A “prima facie” showing [under section 388] refers to those facts which will

sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the

petitioner is credited.’” (In re R.M., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 137.) “‘[T]he petitioner

must show changed, not changing, circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘The case law’s

5 references to “changed” and merely “changing” circumstances are another way of

describing the distinction . . . between changes that are material and those that are not.

However expressed, the point is that section 388 requires a change that is relevant and

substantial (rather than irrelevant or de minimis) when considered in light of all of the

circumstances of the case.’” (Ibid.)

The fact circumstances might change or are changing for the better “‘does not

promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] “‘[C]hildhood

does not wait for the parent to become adequate.’”’” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151

Cal.App.4th 184, 206.) “A parent establishes a substantial change of circumstances for

purposes of section 388 by showing that, during the period between termination of

reunification services and the permanency planning hearing, he or she has resolved the

previously unresolved issues supporting juvenile court jurisdiction.” (In re J.M. (2020)

50 Cal.App.5th 833, 846.)

“Although the juvenile court must liberally construe the petition in favor of its

sufficiency (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a)), ‘the allegations must nonetheless

describe specifically how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.’ [Citations.]

‘If a petitioner could get by with general, conclusory allegations, there would be no need

for an initial determination by the juvenile court about whether an evidentiary hearing

was warranted. In such circumstances, the decision to grant a hearing on a section 388

petition would be nothing more than a pointless formality.’” (In re R.M., supra, 111

Cal.App.5th at p. 137.)

6 “In any custody determination, a primary consideration in determining the child’s

best interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity. [Citation.] ‘When custody

continues over a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability assumes

an increasingly important role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that

maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.’” (In

re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) “After the termination of reunification

services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no

longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for

permanency and stability [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that

continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a

motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift

of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the

child.” (Ibid.)

“‘We review a summary denial of a hearing on a modification petition for abuse of

discretion. [Citation.] Under this standard of review, we will not disturb the decision of

the trial court unless the trial court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an

arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.’” (In re R.M., supra, 111

Cal.App.5th at p. 137.) “‘“‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced

from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of

the trial court.’”’ [Citation.] ‘The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as

an abuse of discretion.’” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.)

7 With respect to changed circumstances, mother argues she was not required to

show the circumstances that led to dependency had “completely changed,” and that

evidence of her progress in addressing domestic violence and, in particular, her six-

month2 sobriety at the time she filed her petition, were sufficient to require the juvenile

court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the petition. True, mother was not required to

establish a complete change. However, because her request for a change in custody or, in

the alternative, additional reunification services and unsupervised visits had “the potential

to disrupt an otherwise stable placement for [the] children,” she was required to show

substantial change, meaning “‘the problem that initially brought the child within the

dependency system must be removed or ameliorated.’” (In re D.B. (2013) 217

Cal.App.4th 1080, 1093.)

“In the context of a substance abuse problem that has repeatedly resisted treatment

in the past, a showing of materially changed circumstances requires more than a

relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in yet another program.” (In re N.F.

(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 121; see In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223

[“Appellant’s recent sobriety reflects ‘changing,’ not changed, circumstances.”].) Mother

had a lengthy history of substance abuse and failure to maintain sobriety despite her

participation in drug treatment programs, including those provided to her in earlier

dependency proceedings. Despite making early progress in the current proceeding to

2 Mother calculates the length of her sobriety at the time of the petition from November 8, 2024, the date she entered a residential treatment facility, rather than December 4, 2024, the date of her first negative drug test.

8 address her substance abuse and enrolling in a sober living facility, after two weeks she

was kicked out of the facility for testing positive for use of methamphetamine and was

terminated from an outpatient drug treatment program for nonattendance. And, during

the entire 18 months that mother received reunification services, she missed numerous

drug tests and tested positively three times.

Considering mother’s history of treatment for substance abuse and lapses after

brief periods of sobriety, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding

mother’s most recent period of sobriety for five or six months (see ante, fn. 2) was

merely a changing and not a changed circumstance. (See, e.g., In re Amber M. (2002)

103 Cal.App.4th 681,686-687 [mother’s “substance abuse had begun more than 17 years

earlier and while she had been clean for 372 days, she had previously relapsed twice

during the course of this case, once after more than 300 days of sobriety”]; In re

Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [father’s seven months of sobriety since

his last relapse, “while commendable, was nothing new”].)

As to whether returning the children to mother’s custody would be in the

children’s best interests, the parties address the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in

In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532: “(1) The seriousness of the problem

which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the

strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers;

and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the

degree to which it actually has been.”

9 The very same court that decided In re Kimberly F. subsequently rejected

application of those factors when, as here, the juvenile court has terminated reunification

services and set a section 366.26 hearing for selection of a permanent plan, and the parent

has “made no effort to establish how modification would advance [his or] her child’s

need for permanency and stability as required by the Stephanie M. decision.” (In re I.B.

(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 133, 163.) Under those specific circumstances (see ibid.), the

court “declin[ed] to apply the Kimberly F. factors if for no other reason than they do not

take into account the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stephanie M., applicable after

reunification efforts have been terminated. As stated by one treatise, ‘In such

circumstances, the approach of the court in the case of . . . Kimberly F. . . . may not be

appropriate since it fails to give full consideration to this shift in focus.’ [Citation.] We

instead follow the direction of our Supreme Court, holding that after reunification

services have terminated, a parent’s petition for either an order returning custody or

reopening reunification efforts must establish how such a change will advance the child’s

need for permanency and stability.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.)

Here, the children had been in a stable and loving placement with a prospective

adoptive parent since July 22, 2023. Mother did not allege, let alone make a prima facie

showing, that removing the children from that placement and returning them to her

custody or providing her with an additional period of reunification services would

advance the children’s need for permanence and stability. While mother’s recent efforts

at sobriety were commendable, her ability to maintain long-term sobriety and to provide a

10 safe and stable home was yet unproven. And her general and conclusionary allegations

that it would be in the best interests of the children “to be raised by their mother who has

worked toward being a better person for them,” and of a positive bond between her and

the children as demonstrated during supervised visits, were insufficient to trigger an

evidentiary hearing on the petition. (In re R.M., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 137.)

Therefore, on this record, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion when it

ruled the requested change of order would not be in the best interests of the children.

III.

DISPOSITION

The order summarily denying mother’s section 388 petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS J.

MENETREZ J.