In Re taylor/hilborn/bristow Children, 2008ca00121 (10-6-2008)

2008 Ohio 5240
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 6, 2008
DocketNo. 2008CA00121.
StatusPublished

This text of 2008 Ohio 5240 (In Re taylor/hilborn/bristow Children, 2008ca00121 (10-6-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re taylor/hilborn/bristow Children, 2008ca00121 (10-6-2008), 2008 Ohio 5240 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Appellant Tina Hilborn ("Mother") appeals the May 12, 2008 Judgment Entry, and May 12, 2008 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, which terminated her parental rights, privileges and responsibilities with respect to her minor children, and granted permanent custody of the children to Appellee the Stark County Department of Jobs and Family Services ("the Department").

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶ 2} Mother is the biological mother of Susan Taylor (DOB 4/12/90); Cassandra Taylor (DOB 5/25/92); Samantha Hilborn (DOB 8/23/95); Wesley Hilborn (DOB 8/8/96); Nathan Hilborn (DOB 3/11/99); and Dallas Bristow (DOB 9/21/00).1 Susan Taylor and Dallas Bristow were placed into planned permanent living arrangements and are not subject to this appeal.

{¶ 3} On March 15, 2006, after voluntary case planning failed, the Department filed a Complaint, alleging the children were dependent and neglected. The Complaint requested an order of protected supervision over the children. An initial shelter care hearing was conducted on the same day. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the trial court remained concerned with leaving the children in the home and ordered a family group meeting to occur the following day. The trial court continued the shelter care hearing for further proceedings to commence after the family group meeting. The trial court conducted the shelter care hearing on March 16, 2006, and granted the Department protective supervision. Following an adjudicatory hearing on April 12, 2006, the trial *Page 3 court found the children to be dependent and continued protective supervision with the Department. The trial court approved and adopted a case plan which required Mother to complete various services to assure the safety of the children in the home and to mitigate the concerns which led to the Department's initial involvement. After Mother tested positive for cocaine, the trial court placed the children in the temporary custody of the Department on April 27, 2006.

{¶ 4} The Department filed a Motion for Permanent Custody on February 12, 2008. Although properly served, Mother did not appear at the trial. The Guardian ad Litem filed a written report and was present at the hearing. She made a brief statement to the trial court and rested upon her written report in which she recommended permanent custody be granted to the Department.

{¶ 5} Via Judgment Entry filed May 12, 2008, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights, privileges and responsibilities in regard to Cassandra Taylor, Samantha Hilborn, Wesley Hilborn, and Nathan Hilborn. The trial court found the children could not or should not be placed with Mother; Mother failed to remedy the problems which initially caused the children to be removed from her home; and it would be in the children's best interest to grant permanent custody to the Department.

{¶ 6} It is from this judgment entry as well as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Mother appeals, raising as her sole assignment of error:

{¶ 7} "I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN WOULD BE SERVED BY GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE." *Page 4

I
{¶ 8} In her sole assignment of error, Mother contends the trial court's finding it was in the children's best interest to grant permanent custody was against weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

{¶ 9} As an appellate court, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent and credible evidence upon which the fact finder could base its judgment. Cross Truck v. Jeffries (Feb. 10, 1982), Stark App. No. CA5758. Accordingly, judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279,376 N.E.2d 578.

{¶ 10} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court schedule a hearing, and provide notice, upon filing of a motion for permanent custody of a child by a public children services agency or private child placing agency that has temporary custody of the child or has placed the child in long-term foster care.

{¶ 11} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who *Page 5 are able to take permanent custody; or (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999.

{¶ 12} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody.

{¶ 13} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding the best interest of the child.

{¶ 14} If the child is not abandoned or orphaned, then the focus turns to whether the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination.

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Related

C. E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co.
376 N.E.2d 578 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1978)

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Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 5240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-taylorhilbornbristow-children-2008ca00121-10-6-2008-ohioctapp-2008.