In re Taylor

136 F.2d 246, 30 C.C.P.A. 1033, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 50
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 3, 1943
DocketNo. 4701
StatusPublished

This text of 136 F.2d 246 (In re Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Taylor, 136 F.2d 246, 30 C.C.P.A. 1033, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 50 (ccpa 1943).

Opinion

Garrett, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United .States Patent Office affirming that of the examiner rejecting all the claims of appellant’s application for patent relating to a dust bag for suction cleaners.

‘ The status of the case as it is presented to the court is somewhat unusual.

The first Patent Office action upon the application appearing of record is stated in “Letter of Examiner, March 20,1940.” It appears from this that the application then embraced 8 claims, numbered 1 to 8, inclusive. It is surmised from a statement in the letter, “Additional references cited,” that there had been some previous action. In the action of March 20,1940, all the claims were rejected upon, or in view of. prior art, and the concluding paragraph of the letter stated:

The claims are all rejected and, iu view of the state of the art and the simplicity of applicant’s alleged-invention, the number of claims is deemed to be excessive and should be radically reduced.

The second office action appearing in the record certified to us is stated in “Letter of Examiner, January 29,1941.” Therein it is stated “Claim 5 has been canceled” and, in substance, that the other claims had been reconsidered and again rejected, the rejection being made final.

Appeal to the board was taken July 28, 1941, as to claims 1 to 4, inclusive, and 6, Y, and 8.

In his statement following the appeal to the board, the examiner [1034]*1034quoted all the appealed claims (nothing being said concerning the matter of multiplicity) and cited the following references:

Willis, 1,753,458, April 8, 1930.
White, 1,952,900, March 27, 1934.
White, 1,787,224, December 30, 1930.
Orr, 1,953,189, April 3, 1934. -
Mills, 1,251,404, December 25,1917.

The examiner discussed claim 1 separately, stated his reasons for rejecting it, and then grouped the other claims and stated that they are “deemed to present nothing patentable over the reference as applied ’ to claim 1, especially, in view of either of the patents to White * * * .” '

In its decision the board quoted claim 3 as illustrative, described the device to which the claims relate and the disclosures of the features of the references which it regarded as pertinent. No one of the claims was analyzed or specifically discussed by the board but, after the recital of the features of the references, its decision states:

We find no error In the examiner’s conclusions and application of the citations to the respective claims as set forth in the examiner’s answer.

The petition of appeal to us included all the claims which were before the board and the reasons of appeal referred to each of them by number, but the second paragraph of appellant’s brief filed before us reads:

In order to facilitate consideration of the appeal by the Cotirt, only Claims 6, 7 and 8 will be urged, and the appeal as to Claims 1 to 4 may be dismissed.

In the brief filed by the Solicitor for the Patent Office before us subsequent to the filing of appellant’s brief there was no reference to the dismissal so made, and the discussion in the solicitor’s brief applies, in a general way, to all the claims. So, the only claims now before us for consideration are claims which have not been discussed by the tribunals or representatives of the Patent Office, except such notice as the examiner gave them when grouped- with other claims not now before us for consideration.

Ordinarily, when an appellant dismisses his appeal as to a claim included in his petition of appeal to us we have no occasion to give such claim any attention, but in the instant case, by reason of the record showing above stated, it does not appear possible intelligently to discuss claims 6, 7, and 8 (the only ones before us) without some consideration of claim 1, even though (the appeal to it being dismissed) we could not allow claim 1 should we find ourselves in disagreement with the decision rejecting it. Also, the only reason of appeal applicable to claims 6, 7, and 8 necessitates reference to claim 1. That reason of appeal reads:

[1035]*1035(5) The Board of .Appeals erred in holding that the subject matter of Claims 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 does not constitute invention over the aforesaid patents [Mills, Orr and Willis referred to in reasons of appeal 3 and 4] applied to Claim 1 in view of either Patent No. 1,787,224 or Patent No. 1,952,900 of W'hite.

We, therefore, quote claim 1, not for the purpose of passing upon its patentability, but for the purpose of comparison made necessary for the reasons stated. It reads:

1. A dust bag for a suction cleaner, said bag including an opening for discharging the collected litter and- defined by end portions of the sides of the bag which are foldable to close the opening, a clip for maintaining the sides folded and first and second tabs disposed on opposed sides of the bag for substantially shrouding the clip in the closed position of the bag and for supporting an end of the bag during operation of the cleaner.

The invention claimed by appellant is stated in its brief to be set forth in claim 8 which reads:

8. A dust bag for a suction cleaner, said dust bag being made of a suitable air filtering material having an opening for discharge of material collected in the hag, the edge portions adjacent said opening being adapted to be folde'd. against each other to close the opening, means providing a substantially dirst-tight closure comprising a metal clip for holding said edge portions against each other in such folded position, tabs attached to said bag on opposite sides of said opening, said tabs being adapted to be extended over and sufficiently cover said clip to protect against scratching of furniture by said clip, said tabs also being adápted to be extended laterally from said bag when the latter is positioned for emptying, whereby the operator by standing on the tabs maintains said edge portions in sealed relation with the surface upon which the bag is emptied.

After quoting the claim his brief states, in substance, that the tabs referred to in the claim may also be used for the purpose of supporting the bag upon the handle of the vacuum cleaner when provided with eyelets (as described in claim 6 and by implication included in claim 7) engaged by a hook carried by the handle.

Comparison of claim 8 (and the limitations so described with respect to claims 6 and 7) with claim 1 discloses that there is no-substantial difference. In considering claims 6, 7, and 8, therefore, we take into account the reasons given for rejecting claim 1.

The device involved is tersely, but sufficiently, described in the brief of the Solicitor for the Patent Office as follows:

The application here involved * * * relates to a dust bag for a vacuum cleaner, and especially to the construction of the upper end thereof. The side walls of this open upper end are adapted to be folded fiat, to close the opening, and a tab is provided on each of the two sides which remain flat during this folding.

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136 F.2d 246, 30 C.C.P.A. 1033, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 50, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-taylor-ccpa-1943.