In re Tang Tun

168 F. 488, 93 C.C.A. 644, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4457
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 23, 1909
DocketNo. 1,633
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 168 F. 488 (In re Tang Tun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Tang Tun, 168 F. 488, 93 C.C.A. 644, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4457 (9th Cir. 1909).

Opinions

ROSS, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). In the case of the United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040, it was adjudged by ‘the Supreme Court that under the Chinese exclusion and the immigration laws, where a person of Chinese descent asks admission to the United States upon the ground that he is a native-born citizen thereof, and the lawfully designated executive officers find that he is not, such action should be treated by the courts as having been made by a competent tribunal, with due process of law, and as final and conclusive, in the absence of a showing that there was abuse of discretion on the part of such executive officers; and that in habeas corpus proceedings commenced thereafter, and based solely on the ground of the applicant’s alleged citizenship, the court should dismiss the writ, and not direct new and further evidence as to the question of citizenship.

In the subsequent case of Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369, the same court held, as we understand its opinion, that where such a person is given only a semblance of a hearing by the executive officers, and is by them arbitrarily denied an opportunity to prove his right to enter the country, a court should, by writ of habeas corpus, take jurisdiction of the case, in which event the first question to be ■ determined is, whether the petitioner has in [491]*491fact been denied by the executive officers a fair opportunity to present his case; if not, the court can proceed no further. The Supreme Court, in the Chin Yow Case above referred to, further decided that the circumstance that the hearing before the executive officers may have been summary is of no consequence; that a denial of due process of law cannot be established by merely proving that the decision on the hearing that was had before such officers was wrong, and that jurisdiction in the courts can “not be established simply by proving that the Commissioner and the Department of Commerce and Tabor did not accept certain sworn statements as true, even though no contrary or impeaching testimony was adduced.”

Bearing in mind these rules of law by which we are, of course, controlled, we are to consider the statement embodied in the stipulation upon which the present case was submitted. That statement shows that Tang Tun was examined and testified at great length before the inspector at Sumas on the 23d of June, 1906; that he was re-examined and testified at length before the inspector on the 27th of the same month; that on July 2, 1906, two witnesses — S. F. Coombs and William B. Thompson — were called, sworn, and testified on behalf of the applicant, Tang Tun; that on July 5, 1906, the applicant for admission as a native-born citizen was further examined by the inspector, when lie was questioned, and answered as follows:

“Q. Tang Tun, can you explain to me why the records at Port Townsend should show that you were rejected in May, 1897, when you claim that you were; admitted in April, 1897? A. I was examined, and Saunders admitted me, but I don’t know how he put it on the paper. I don’t see how there could he two papers with his signature on, the one admitted and the other rejected. Q. Mr. Coombs and Mr. Thompson have been examined in your case, and their testimony is not satisfactory. Can you furnish any additional testimony as to your nativity? A. I was too small, and only my mother knows it. Q. Don’t you know anybody in the United States besides Mr. Coombs and Mr. Thompson who knows the facts concerning your birth? A. Do you want Chinese or white people? Q. 1 would prefer white people. A. T was too small, and don’t know anybody. I might have known some one, but now it has been so long rhat I don’t remember them now. Q. You told me that you believed you once had a sister. Was that sister born before you or after you? A. 'She was younger. (After a pause) I don’t know how it comes, but I think she was older than me. She was born before I was, but I am not sure. Q. How long did she Jive? A. I don’t know. Some one told me, but I don’t know myself. Q. Who told you? A. I forget.”

It appears that the inspector then rejected the application of Tang Tun, as well as that of his wife, since her claim rested entirely upon that of the husband, in this order:

“The applicant presented at the time of his arrival at this port an identifk*tion paper setting forth that he had been admitted at I’ort Townsend, Washington, on April 20, 1897, as a native-born citizen of the United States. He subsequently secured from Ohin Quong, the manager of the Wah Ohong Co., of Seattle, Washington, a copy of the identification papers on which the said admission was alleged to have been granted — the said copy bearing the following indorsement over the alleged signature of J. C. Saunders, collector: ‘Arrived at Tacoma, Washington, April 10th, ’97, on Str. “Tacoma,” from China, and admitted April 20/97.’ The applicant at first stated that this indorsement had been placed on his paper at the time of his admission, Collector Saunders having written it in his presence and handed the paper back to him. He after-wards testified, however, that he was mistaken in that statement, having re[492]*492called that he did not get the said indorsed paper until some time after his-admission, when it was secured for him and given to him in the Wah Ohong store by Ohin Quong, the manager of the said store, who had arranged for his coming to the United States.'
“The records of the Port Townsend office contain the original of the indorsed paper secured by the applicant from the Wah Chong store, and such original bears the following indorsement: ‘Rejected May 25/97, J. O. Saunders, Collector.’ This indorsement is supported by the other records of the Port Townsend office under case No. 12,343.
“It is a matter of record that another Chinaman and alleged native-born citizen of the United States Who was rejected at the same time by the Port Townsend office, having arrived on the same ship with the applicant herein; was subsequently found in the store of the Wah Chong Co., was arrested, and after due hearing of his case before the courts was ordered deported to China, and was so deported. Further, it is a matter of record that a number of other Chinese were arrested at the same time as the deported Chinaman above mentioned, all having been found in the Wah Chong.store, and all having been in possession of ‘native-born citizen’ papers bearing the alleged indorsement of Collector J. C. Saunders. Each was given due hearing before the proper courts, and each was deported to China by order of the court on a finding that the records of the Port Town send office did not show the landing claimed.
“With a desire to treat the applicant justly, he has been given an opportunity to prove his claim of nativity, but has failed to furnish evidence which under the circumstances would justify his admission as a citizen of the United States.
“There appears in his application intimation that the applicant might make a claim that he had been a domiciled merchant in the United States. His own testimony as to his occupation prior to departure shows that during the three years immediately preceding his departure he was engaged chiefly as the driver of a wagon between the Wah Ohong gardens and the wholesale houses of Seattle, delivering vegetables and making his home at the gardens.

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Related

Quan Toon Jung v. Bonham
119 F.2d 915 (Ninth Circuit, 1941)
Tang Tun v. Edsell
223 U.S. 673 (Supreme Court, 1912)
Lewis v. Frick
189 F. 146 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan, 1911)
De Bruler v. Gallo
184 F. 566 (Ninth Circuit, 1911)
Edsell v. Mark
179 F. 292 (Ninth Circuit, 1910)
United States v. Sprung
187 F. 903 (Fourth Circuit, 1910)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
168 F. 488, 93 C.C.A. 644, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4457, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-tang-tun-ca9-1909.