In re T.A.

2024 IL App (5th) 230625-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 9, 2024
• Docket: 5-23-0625
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (5th) 230625-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 01/09/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0625 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

In re T.A., M.A., M.J., and K.A., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Champaign County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) No. 21-JA-19 v. ) ) Pearl J., ) Honorable ) Brett N. Olmstead, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in finding respondent an unfit parent and terminating her parental rights in light of testimony that she was unable to control her children or provide a safe environment for them, viewed them primarily as a means of easing her anxiety, and evidence that all four children were doing well in their foster placements. As any argument to the contrary would lack merit, we grant defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶2 Respondent, Pearl J., appeals the circuit court’s orders finding her an unfit parent to her

children, M.J., T.A., M.A., and K.A., and terminating her parental rights. Her appointed appellate

counsel concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the court erred in doing

so. Accordingly, he has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel together with a supporting

memorandum. He has notified respondent of his motion, and this court has provided her ample

1 opportunity to respond, but she has not done so. Having reviewed the record on appeal and

counsel’s motion and memorandum, we agree that this case presents no reasonably meritorious

issues. Thus, we grant counsel leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On March 4, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that M.J.

had been abused and all four minors were neglected. The court placed the children in the temporary

custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), which had taken protective

custody of them.

¶5 Following adjudicatory hearings on May 21 and May 28, 2021, the court found that the

State had proved the petition’s allegations. In its adjudicatory orders entered on those dates the

court noted that a doctor who examined M.J. found healed “loop marks” on his back and opined

that they were the result of being hit with a cord or wire, and that a child-protection specialist who

visited the family home found it to be “very messy and unsafe[,] including trash covering the floor

and dog feces on the floor.”

¶6 Following a July 2, 2021, dispositional hearing, the court found all four children neglected

and M.J. abused and neglected. The court found Pearl and Trevon A., the putative father of three

of the children, unfit and unable to care for them and placed them in DCFS custody. The court

subsequently found Jason B., the putative father of M.J., in default and entered adjudicatory and

dispositional orders finding him unfit and unable to care for M.J. and placing M.J. in DCFS

custody.

¶7 On May 19, 2022, the State filed a motion to find the parents unfit and to terminate their

parental rights. In its motion, the State alleged in count I that respondent was unfit because she

was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to long-term mental impairment, mental

2 illness, or intellectual or developmental disability and in count III that she failed to make

reasonable progress toward the children’s return between August 18, 2021, and May 18, 2022. 1

¶8 A termination hearing commenced on July 13, 2022. Respondent did not attend. Jessica

Jones testified she had been respondent’s caseworker since March 2021. During the relevant nine-

month period, she had observed respondent’s home to be persistently unclean, with trash on the

floor, overflowing garbage bins, empty food containers in the restroom and bedroom, writing on

the walls, and “unsafe” items on the floor. Jones had spoken with respondent the week before the

hearing, which respondent said she planned to attend.

¶9 Jones testified that respondent completed an integrated assessment. As a result of this

process, she was referred for parenting education, which she completed. Respondent also

completed a mental health assessment, which did not recommend further treatment, a substance

abuse assessment, which also did not recommend further treatment, and habilitation services.

Later, she was also referred to Dr. Michelle Iyamah, for psychological and parenting capacity

assessments.

¶ 10 In April 2022, Jones referred respondent to the Center for Youth and Family Services for

counseling, because “she seemed to be having a hard time digesting the case as *** time went on.”

Respondent was receptive to the idea but was put on a waiting list.

¶ 11 As of August 2021, visitation was scheduled for two hours, twice weekly, in the parents’

apartment, where it remained until early 2022, when it was returned to DCFS’s office because of

ongoing concerns about the unsafe environment. By May 2022, by which time the parents had

separate homes, Jones became concerned that respondent could not safely parent all the children

1 Count II was directed at Trevon A. and count IV was directed at Jason B. Neither are parties to this appeal. 3 at any given time. She observed two visits in September 2021 and April 2022. At the first,

respondent interacted more with K.A., the youngest child, who “require[d] less running around.”

Jones never saw respondent provide for all the children of her own accord. She required constant

coaching. For example, she had to be prompted to run after T.A. when he ran off and had to be

prompted to take the children to the bathroom and to change their diapers. Respondent appeared

to be bonded with K.A. but not the other children.

¶ 12 At the April 2022 visit, respondent struggled to control the children, who were running

away from her, amid much chaos. Jones was concerned because K.A. was small, the other children

had developmental delays, and it did not seem as though respondent knew how to care for them

properly. The older children had ADHD, and T.A., M.J., and M.A. could be aggressive, placing

K.A. in danger because respondent seemed unable to stop the aggression. Respondent would

sometimes try to discipline the children by putting them in a corner, but they would not stay.

¶ 13 By May 2022, respondent’s visits remained supervised. During her time on the case, Jones

never considered allowing respondent to have unsupervised contact with the children, let alone

placing them with her, because of ongoing concern about her ability to keep them all safe and to

care for them at the same time by herself.

¶ 14 Respondent was cooperative with the psychological and parenting capacity assessments

and, generally, cooperated with services throughout the relevant period. She remained in contact

with DCFS and regularly attended visits. However, despite respondent’s completion of services,

Jones had seen no consistent improvement of respondent’s parenting ability.

¶ 15 During the relevant period, respondent did not maintain consistent employment but held

multiple jobs. She explained that her employers would not work around her visitation schedule.

Consequently, she also had trouble maintaining a stable home. DCFS did not help her with rental

4 payments because, in late 2021, Jones completed a budgeting form with respondent, “and the home

that she had was too high for her to afford, so she would have continued [to be unable] to pay her

monthly bills.” Respondent did not seem to understand that she needed to move to a home she

could afford, and she has been unable to better budget her money to meet basic needs. The

termination hearing was continued until September 22, 2022.

¶ 16 On September 22, 2022, Tawnya Fairchild, a visitation supervisor, confirmed that

respondent’s visits with the children were frequently chaotic, characterized by “a lot of yelling”

by respondent at the children, and the children being unruly to the point that Fairchild had to

intervene for their safety. The children were “runners,” so it was a full-time job to keep them safe.

Respondent was unable to secure all the children at any given time. In fact, there was never, in the

history of the case, a visit when respondent did not require Fairchild’s assistance handling the

children. She also never took the initiative to transport the children to or from visitation. She was

not prepared for visits, frequently lacking necessary items with which to care for the children, such

as diapers or wipes, and was often late for visits because she had to buy snacks on the way. The

hearing was continued until November 3, 2022.

¶ 17 On November 2, 2022, Iyamah testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation and

parenting capacity assessment of respondent. Iyamah found respondent’s intellectual level to be

“in the average range,” and her intellectual and academic functioning “adequate for parenting.”

However, Iyamah noted “a fair amount of anxiety.” She could not provide a more specific

diagnosis given that respondent claimed to have symptoms of anxiety but was not “real

forthcoming” as far as its severity and inception. Respondent was “guarded and not *** wholly

participatory in the assessment,” and thus did not provide Iyamah enough information to assess

her personality.

5 ¶ 18 One statement by respondent that Iyamah recalled was that the children “were meant to

protect her; they were her protectors, because she had fears and anxieties.” Thus, there was “role

reversal, that she was using her children *** as shields for her emotional deficits rather than being

there for them[ ] and taking care of their needs.” In observing the children with respondent, Iyamah

found they did not listen to her, and the atmosphere was chaotic. They frequently asked for their

father. Often, “there was open defiance.” Respondent was unable to handle the children, yelling at

and threatening them rather than showing positive parenting.

¶ 19 Iyamah’s conclusion, regarding respondent’s ability to safely parent her children, was that

“she would struggle a lot, as she did in the brief observation I had with her. She wasn’t able to take

charge of the kids. She wasn’t really affectionate, she wasn’t appropriate. She wasn’t able to really

discuss their needs, and their developmental issues to any *** degree.” Iyamah concluded that the

children would not be safe in respondent’s care.

¶ 20 Iyamah’s psychological and parenting capacity assessment of respondent noted that

respondent’s impairments in social and emotional functioning significantly impacted her insight,

judgment, and decision-making abilities. She “did not show significantly positive coping skills

and *** sleeps when she is stressed.” She required individual therapy to “address her

unexamined/unresolved trauma history” and “requires continued parent coaching.” Respondent

did not show affection toward her children and did “not appear to be able to meet minimum

parenting needs.” Iyamah found it “very unlikely [she] will be capable of parenting her young

children, especially given the need to care for a newborn, as well,” and she did not “appear to have

the capacity to care for the safety and security of her children.”

¶ 21 After considering this evidence, the court found respondent unfit based on counts I and III

of the petition.

6 ¶ 22 At the subsequent best-interests hearing, the court considered several best-interests reports.

A report filed by Camelot Care Centers and pertaining specifically to M.J. noted that he had since

March 2022 been placed with his grandparents, who were “supportive and understanding of the

issues [he] faces[ ] and have been diligent with tending to his needs.” Respondent had not

personally visited with M.J. since January 2022. However, she phoned monthly. She had recently

revealed that she had been living in Michigan, where she recently gave birth to a daughter. The

report quoted respondent as saying that she would be willing to give up her rights to her other

children in the hopes of starting a new family in Michigan and concluded that it would be in M.J.’s

best interest to be adopted by his grandmother and her husband.

¶ 23 A report filed by DCFS regarding M.A. and K.A. noted that respondent moved to Chicago

in June 2022 but had never provided an address. Shortly thereafter, she “disengaged from this case

and her residence was unknown.” A diligent search found that respondent was living in Flint,

Michigan, although DCFS remained unaware of her exact address. She was reportedly living with

another man, with whom she had a child. DCFS recommended terminating respondent’s parental

rights.

¶ 24 A Champaign County Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) report similarly

recommended terminating respondent’s rights to all four children. Another report by One Hope

United recommended terminating respondent’s rights to T.A.

¶ 25 Respondent testified that she lived in Michigan, with her two-month-old daughter, K.S.,

and her daughter’s father. For the past year, she had been a supervisor for a company called

Northgate. She had had a stable, rented home for the past 10 months. Michigan Protective Services

was aware of her involvement with DCFS but, following an investigation, allowed her to retain

7 custody of K.S. She believed she could still be “a positive presence in the lives of her children” in

Illinois.

¶ 26 The court found it in the best interests of all four minors to terminate respondent’s parental

rights. Respondent timely appealed.

¶ 27 ANALYSIS

¶ 28 Respondent’s appointed counsel first concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious

argument that the circuit court erred in finding respondent an unfit parent. The Juvenile Court Act

of 1987 delineates a two-step process to terminate parental rights involuntarily. 705 ILCS 405/2-

29(1) (West 2022). The State must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent

is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption

Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2005). The State need

prove only one ground of unfitness to find a parent unfit. In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564

(2000). A finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21.

¶ 29 Here, the court found respondent unfit on two separate grounds: that she was unable to

discharge her parental responsibilities due to a “mental impairment, mental illness or an

intellectual disability” (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 2022)) and that she failed to make reasonable

progress toward the children’s return within the relevant period (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). Taking the

second ground first, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the court’s finding that respondent

failed to make reasonable progress within the relevant nine-month period.

¶ 30 “Reasonable progress relates to progress towards the broadly defined goal of the return of

the child to the natural parent. [Citation.] The standard by which progress is to be measured is

parental compliance with the court’s directives, the DCFS service plan, or both.” J.A., 316 Ill. App.

8 3d at 564. “At a minimum, reasonable progress requires measurable or demonstrable movement

toward the goal of reunification.” In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d 792, 798 (1990). Despite the

importance of the service plan, a court, in measuring a parent’s progress toward the return of the

child, should not focus solely on the parent’s compliance with service plans. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d

181, 214 (2001). Instead, the central focus in evaluating a parent’s progress toward the return of

the child remains, at all times, on the fitness of the parent in relation to the child’s needs. Id. at

216.

¶ 31 Here, despite evidence that respondent complied with basic service plan directives, such as

obtaining evaluations and attending visitations, the evidence showed no substantial progress

toward the goal of returning the children to her care. Visits continued to be chaotic, with respondent

unable to control the children’s often aggressive behavior and often forgetting to bring essential

items. Jones testified about respondent’s difficulties in maintaining a clean, stable home and stable

employment. Both Jones and Iyamah were concerned that she would be unable to keep the children

safe. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court’s finding that respondent failed to make reasonable

progress was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 32 The court also found that respondent was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities

due to a mental impairment, mental illness, or an intellectual disability. As counsel notes, the

evidence of this ground was somewhat closer. Iyamah found that respondent’s intellectual capacity

was in the normal range. She suffered from self-reported anxiety symptoms, but Iyamah was

unable to make a more specific diagnosis given that respondent was less than forthcoming about

the reasons for her anxiety or specific symptoms. Nevertheless, respondent seemed unable to form

a bond with the children, except perhaps for the youngest, and believed that their purpose was to

help her relieve her anxiety, rather than viewing herself as providing for their needs.

9 ¶ 33 As counsel further notes, however, reversing the circuit court on this point would require

us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001).

Moreover, even if we did so to respondent’s benefit, we still would not disturb the circuit court’s

finding. The State need prove only one ground of unfitness (J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 564) and the

State clearly proved a lack of progress.

¶ 34 Counsel next concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the court’s

finding that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Once the

court determines that a parent is an unfit person, the court must decide whether it is in the best

interests of the minor to terminate parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022). At this

stage, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s

interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). The State must prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the minor’s best interests justify termination of the

parent’s rights. Id. We will not reverse a finding that termination of parental rights is in the child’s

best interests unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.F., 326 Ill. App.

3d 1110, 1116 (2002).

¶ 35 Here, the evidence supported the court’s finding that the children’s best interests required

terminating respondent’s parental rights. Respondent’s testimony at the hearing showed that she

had made significant changes in her life, moving to Michigan, and starting a new family. She had

maintained stable housing and employment. However, at this stage of the proceedings, the court

was required to focus on the children’s best interests rather than respondent’s progress or lack

thereof.

¶ 36 Evidence directly related to the children’s bests interest uniformly favored termination of

respondent’s parental rights. Camelot’s report concluded that M.J. was in a loving placement with

10 his grandparents, who were willing to adopt him. The report noted that respondent had only

recently been located in Michigan and had played no role in M.J.’s life in recent months.

¶ 37 In its report on M.A. and K.A., DCFS noted that, “although [respondent] was engaged and

showed effort initially, she left and went to Chicago *** leaving her children behind and starting

over. *** [She] has failed to show consistency and progress in her parenting.” Meanwhile, both

children were flourishing in their foster placements. Champaign CASA similarly lauded the foster

care of the children and noted respondent’s detachment from them. Finally, One Hope United

reported positively on T.A.’s placement and his future prospects with his foster family.

¶ 38 CONCLUSION

¶ 39 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant counsel leave to withdraw and

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 40 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.