In Re Synergy Global Outsourcing, LLC v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided February 3, 2025·No. 15-25-00002-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00002-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 2/3/2025 3:38 PM No. 15-25-00002-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS In the Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS for the Fifteenth District of Texas 2/3/2025 3:38:20 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

In re Synergy Global Outsourcing, LLC,

Relator.

Original proceeding arising from the First Business Court Division, Dallas County No. 24-BC01B-0007 Hon. Bill Whitehill, Presiding

Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus

David S. Coale Lynn Pinker Hurst & State Bar No. 00787255 Schwegmann, LLP dcoale@lynnllp.com 2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2700 Michael K. Hurst Dallas, Texas 75201-7919 State Bar No. 10316310 Telephone: (214) 981-3800 mhurst@lynnllp.com Facsimile: (214) 981-3839 Gregory A. Brassfield Attorneys for Relator State Bar No. 240799900 gbrassfield@lynnllp.com Daniela Vera Holmes State Bar No. 24124113 dholmes@lynnllp.com Leo Park State Bar No. 24122983 lpark@lynnllp.com

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ......................................................................................... 2

Introduction ................................................................................................. 3

Reply Argument ........................................................................................... 3

1. The text does not prevent jurisdiction and Relator’s case effectuates the legislature’s intent .................................... 3

2. Rules of statutory construction prevent Defendants’

interpretation ........................................................................... 4

3. The procedural nature of H.B. 19 § 8, read consistently with other statutes, permits inclusion of this case in the business court .......................................................................... 5

4. Defendants’ citation to administrative material and commentary do not illuminate the Legislature’s intent. .......... 6

Conclusion ................................................................................................... 7

Certificate of Service.................................................................................... 9

Certificate of Compliance ............................................................................ 9

Introduction

The business court abused its discretion by misconstruing H.B. 19 §

8 and remanding this case to the 191st District Court, which permanently

deprived Relator of its right to litigate in the forum best suited to adjudicate

these claims. Accordingly, mandamus relief is appropriate and in similar

situations, the Texas Supreme Court has held as much by issuing writs of

mandamus. This Court should issue the writ compelling the business court

to adjudicate Relator’s case.

Reply Argument

In reply to the arguments of the real parties in interest, Relator makes

the following four points.

1. The text does not prevent jurisdiction and Relator’s case effectuates the legislature’s intent

Nothing in H.B. 19 Section 8 excludes this case from the business

court’s jurisdiction. 1 Indeed the plain reading of the text is silent as to cases

commenced before September 1, 2024. The Court should not interpret this

silence as a prohibition of jurisdiction.

“The primary objective in construing any statute is to determine and

give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Warner v. Glass, 135 S.W.3d 681, 683

(Tex. 2004). Interpreting H.B. 19 to permit removal of cases filed before

1 Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 380, § 8 (“The changes in law made by this Act apply to civil actions commenced on or after September 1, 2024.”).

September 1, 2024—such as this one—is consistent with its text, 2 and the act’s express purposes of relieving back logged district court dockets and

funneling complex business disputes to be resolved by the business court. 3

Relator’s case—a business case with internal governance disputes, the complexity of which has languished in the district court for over 5

years—is exactly the kind of case the Legislature intended the business

court to resolve.

2. Rules of statutory construction prevent Defendants’

interpretation

Defendants insist that Section 8 prohibits the business court from

exercising jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Legislature. 4 However its

reading of Section 8 is contrary to the Texas Supreme Court’s instruction

that “[a] court may not judicially amend a statute by adding words that are

not contained in the language of the statute.” 5 Defendants’ 6 position

implies the addition of “only” to Section 8, where the Legislature did not

include it. D civil actions commenced before September 1, 2024.

2 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25A.006(d) (“A party to an action filed in a district court or county court at law that is within the jurisdiction of the business court may remove the action to the business court.”) (emphasis added). 3 See House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 19, 88th Leg., R.S. (2023) (discussing the need to “streamline resolutions of business disputes” and relieve backlogged district court dockets). 4 See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25A.004(c) (conferring business court jurisdiction). 5 Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 543 (Tex. 2021). 6 Resp. 13 (“Synergy renders Section 8 meaningless.”).

3. The procedural nature of H.B. 19 § 8, read consistently with other statutes, permits inclusion of this case in the business court

The Court should reject Defendants’ interpretation because it turns

decades of legislative acts on their head. The Legislature consistently and

deliberately uses the word “only”, when it intends an act to be effective only

prospectively. 7 Tellingly, the Legislature did not do so here.

Defendants’ and the business court’s theory is contrary to the

Court’s instruction that “every word excluded from a statute must . . . be

presumed to have been excluded for a purpose”. 8 And, if accepted, would

render portions of many other legislative acts superfluous. 9 Further, the

Court should not hold that the absence of the word “only” is meaningless,

because it is contrary to the canon that presumes the entirety of a statute is intended to have effect. 10

Furthermore, there is no dispute that Chapter 25A’s rule regarding

removal that Relator invokes is procedural. And the “well settled” 11 and

7 See Pet. 16-18 (citing acts from 1999 to 2021 applying changes in law “only” to conduct occurring on or after the act’s effective date); see also, Act of May 17, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 763, § 2 (codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 52.007) (“The change in law made by this Act applies only to a civil action commenced on or after the effective date of this Act. A civil action commenced before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect immediately before the effective date of this Act, and that law is continued in effect for that purpose.” (emphasis added)); Act of May 12, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 148, § 6, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 683, 684 (using “only” three times to reflect only prospective application of the “changes in law”). 8 Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981). 9 See infra n. 13. 10 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021(2).

11 Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. Work, 62 S.W.2d 490, 490 (Tex. 1933) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)).

“general rule is that a new remedial or procedural statute applies to both

pending and future actions.” 12 Of course the Legislature knew this and

selected its words deliberately. This shows that this procedural law does not

apply only “to civil actions commenced on or after September 1, 2024” 13

and therefore can apply to this case commenced before that date.

4. Defendants’ citation to administrative material and commentary do not illuminate the Legislature’s intent.

Defendants cite a non-binding memo from the Texas Office of Court Administration and third-party attorney commentary. 14 But secondary

materials should not be consulted for statutory interpretation, particularly

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