In re: Syed Shahzad Hussain

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 15, 2014
• Docket: CC-13-1465-TaDKi
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED APR 15 2014 1 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL 2 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. CC-13-1465-TaDKi ) 6 SYED SHAHZAD HUSSAIN, ) Bk. No. SV 11-14331-VK ) 7 Debtor. ) Adv. No. SV 11-01434-VK ______________________________) 8 ) SYED SHAHZAD HUSSAIN, ) 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) OPINION 11 ) PATRICIA MALIK; SHAFQAT ) 12 MALIK; DAVID SEROR, TRUSTEE,* ) ) 13 Appellees. ) ) 14 15 Argued and Submitted on March 20, 2014 at Pasadena, California 16 Filed – April 15, 2014 17 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 18 for the Central District of California 19 Honorable William V. Altenberger,** Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 20 21 Appearances: John R. Habashy of the Habashy Law Firm for appellant Syed Shahzad Hussain; Peter D. Gordon of 22 Peter D. Gordon & Associates for appellees Patricia Malik and Shafqat Malik. 23 24 25 Before: TAYLOR, DUNN, and KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judges. 26 * 27 It appears that Mr. Seror was named solely in his capacity as chapter 7 trustee; he did not file a brief, appear at 28 argument, or otherwise participate in this appeal. ** United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 1 TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judge: 2 3 Debtor Syed Shahzad Hussain appeals from the bankruptcy 4 court’s judgment denying his chapter 7 discharge pursuant to 5 § 727(a)(3).1 We AFFIRM. 6 FACTS 7 In 2006, appellees Patricia Malik and Shafqat Malik met with 8 real estate brokers Syed Zakir Hussain (“Zakir Hussain”)2 and 9 Raza Ali regarding potential investment opportunities. Zakir 10 Hussain and Ali owned and operated Real Realty. 11 The first investment proposal involved the purchase of a gas 12 station located in Simi Valley, California. Based on 13 representations made by Real Realty, the Maliks believed that, in 14 exchange for an initial investment, Mrs. Malik would hold a 25% 15 interest in a four-person partnership, SJPJ Partners, that, in 16 turn, would own and operate the gas station. The Debtor was 17 slated as another 25% partner. Amenable to the proposed venture, 18 the Maliks invested $62,500. 19 The gas station sale closed eight months later. Just before 20 the closing, however, Zakir Hussain approached Mrs. Malik for 21 additional, “emergency” financing in order to complete the sale. 22 The Maliks agreed and tendered an additional $100,000. The sale 23 apparently closed two days later. 24 Unbeknownst to the Maliks, however, SJPJ Partners neither 25 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section 26 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 27 2 Given the similarities between the names of the Debtor 28 and Syed Zakir Hussain, we so refer to the latter for the sake of clarity. To our knowledge, the parties are unrelated.

2 1 purchased the gas station nor otherwise acquired title. Instead, 2 the Debtor purchased the gas station and was the sole owner. 3 Eventually the Maliks learned the details of the purchase and 4 demanded repayment directly from the Debtor. The Debtor later 5 provided Zakir Hussain with two signed, but otherwise blank, 6 checks payable from a personal bank account. Zakir Hussain 7 completed the checks, making both payable to Patricia Malik and 8 in the amounts of $62,500 and $100,000. He then transferred both 9 checks to the Maliks; both checks were returned for insufficient 10 funds by the Debtor’s bank. 11 In 2010, the Maliks commenced an action in state court 12 against the Debtor, among others, relating to the purchase and 13 sale of the gas station. Facing that action and a failing gas 14 station business, the Debtor filed his bankruptcy case in April 15 2011. Not long after, he lost the gas station to foreclosure. 16 The Maliks objected to the Debtor’s discharge pursuant to 17 § 727(a)(3), among other § 727(a) grounds, and also sought to 18 except the $162,500 debt from discharge under various provisions 19 of § 523(a). The bankruptcy court, after a one-day trial, found 20 that the Debtor failed to maintain adequate records or to justify 21 his failure to do so and ruled in favor of the Maliks on the 22 § 727(a)(3) claim. It denied the remainder of their § 523 and 23 § 727 claims. A judgment confirming the § 727(a)(3) ruling was 24 entered thereafter. 25 The Debtor timely appealed from the judgment. 26 JURISDICTION 27 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 28

3 1 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(J). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2 § 158. 3 ISSUE 4 Did the bankruptcy court err in denying the Debtor’s 5 discharge under § 727(a)(3)? 6 STANDARD OF REVIEW 7 In an action for denial of discharge, we review: (1) the 8 bankruptcy court’s determinations of the historical facts for 9 clear error; (2) its selection of the applicable legal rules 10 under § 727 de novo; and (3) its determinations of mixed 11 questions of law and fact de novo. Searles v. Riley (In re 12 Searles), 317 B.R. 368, 373 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff’d, 212 F. 13 App’x. 589 (9th Cir. 2006). 14 Factual findings are clearly erroneous if illogical, 15 implausible, or without support from inferences that may be drawn 16 from the facts in the record. Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 17 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). We give great deference to the 18 bankruptcy court’s findings when they are based on its 19 determinations as to witness credibility. Id. (As the trier of 20 fact the bankruptcy court has “the opportunity to note variations 21 in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the 22 listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.”). 23 DISCUSSION 24 The Debtor assigns error to the bankruptcy court’s denial of 25 his discharge as follows: (1) the Maliks lacked standing to 26 object to discharge as they were not his creditors; (2) the 27 Maliks failed to make a § 727(a)(3) prima facie case; and (3) 28 insofar as the burden of proof actually shifted, the bankruptcy

4 1 court incorrectly found that he failed to meet his statutory 2 burden of proof. We first address the standing issue. 3 A. The Maliks were creditors of the Debtor and, thus, were 4 authorized to object to his chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge. 5 Only a panel trustee, a creditor, or the U.S. Trustee may 6 object to a debtor’s discharge under § 727(a). See 11 U.S.C. 7 § 727(c)(1). The Debtor argues that the Maliks were not 8 creditors and, thus, lacked standing to bring a § 727(a)(3) 9 claim. The Maliks, in response, contend that the Debtor raises 10 this issue too late, i.e., for the first time on appeal and argue 11 that, in any event, they are creditors of the Debtor based on the 12 two checks they received from the Debtor. 13 Standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue and, thus, 14 ordinarily “we bear an independent obligation to assure ourselves 15 that jurisdiction is proper before proceeding to the merits.” 16 See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 17 U.S. 316, 324 (2008). This obligation applies whether or not the 18 Debtor raises standing for the first time on appeal. See id. 19 A recent Supreme Court decision – Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 20 Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 2014 WL 1168967 21 (Mar. 25, 2014) – causes us pause, however. In Lexmark, the 22 Court examined the propriety of limiting adjudication of a 23 statutory claim, which otherwise presents a case or controversy, 24 based on prudential grounds. It held that such limits were 25 improper. Id. at *7. Instead, the Court stated that whether a 26 plaintiff falls within a class legislatively authorized to sue 27 under a federal statute is not a question of standing, but one of 28 statutory interpretation. See id. at *6-7. Such an inquiry, in

5 1 turn, is non-jurisdictional. See id. at *7 n.4. 2 Here, whether the issue is one of standing, as the parties 3 argue, or one of statutory interpretation, and thus subject to 4 waiver, is ultimately inconsequential. We may exercise our 5 discretion to entertain an issue, even if raised for the first 6 time on appeal, if it presents a pure legal issue and is central 7 to the case. See Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. 8 Corp., 789 F.2d 705, 708 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986). Whether the Maliks 9 are creditors for the purposes of § 727 is a legal issue and 10 clearly central to the case as it involves the Debtor’s 11 bankruptcy discharge. We therefore examine the creditor status 12 issue.3 13 A “creditor” is defined as an “entity that has a claim 14 against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order 15 for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). And 16 a “claim” is broadly defined: it is either a right to payment or 17 an equitable remedy, “whether or not such right . . . is reduced 18 to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 19 undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” Id. § 101(5). Ultimately, 20 only creditors with claims affected by a debtor’s discharge can 21 22 3 Given our determination, we need not decide whether 23 waiver occurred. In any event, it appears to be a question open to debate; we note, for example, that in his post-trial brief, 24 the Debtor asserted that the Maliks were not his creditors in response to each claim except the § 727(a)(3) claim. While 25 reasonable minds may differ, it is not unreasonable to infer that 26 this failure was attributable to oversight rather than a conscious decision on the Debtor’s part. And, certainly, at the 27 time that the case was filed, the Maliks possessed the § 523 related tort claims against the Debtor, thereby establishing 28 their creditor status until the bankruptcy court decided against them on those claims.

6 1 object to discharge. See Stanley v. Vahlsing (In re Vahlsing), 2 829 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1987). 3 The Maliks asserted numerous claims against the Debtor, 4 including the various § 523 tort claims. But, concurrent with 5 the judgment on the § 727(a)(3) claim, the bankruptcy court found 6 that their § 523 tort related claims lacked merit. It did not 7 address what claim remained, and without a claim that supported 8 continuing creditor status, the Maliks lacked the ability to 9 object to the Debtor’s discharge. 10 As stated, the Maliks contend that the return of two checks 11 without payment established their creditor status. Before the 12 bankruptcy court (and somewhat on appeal), the Debtor disputed 13 that he gave any checks to the Maliks, testifying that he gave 14 Zakir Hussain two signed but otherwise “blank” checks. The 15 bankruptcy court, however, found that “[a]t one point in 2008 the 16 debtor gave the [Maliks] two postdated checks, one for [$]62,500 17 and one for [$]100,000, which were both returned for non 18 sufficient funds . . . .” Oral Op. Tr. (June 17, 2013) at 11:5- 19 7. This finding was clearly erroneous as there is no dispute 20 that the Maliks obtained the checks from Zakir Hussain, not 21 directly from the Debtor. Even so, the error is harmless as the 22 Debtor’s own actions concerning the checks independently gave 23 rise to the Maliks’ claim. 24 First, the Debtor essentially negotiated the checks to the 25 Maliks. The checks were negotiable instruments. See Cal. Com. 26 Code § 3104; Spencer v. Sterling Bank, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1055, 27 1058 (1998). As the checks were signed by the Debtor without a 28

7 1 payee,4 they were payable to bearer and, thus, enforceable by any 2 person in possession of the checks. See Cal. Com. Code §§ 3109; 3 3205; 3301. 4 The Debtor cannot disclaim the checks on the basis that 5 Zakir Hussain altered the checks. It was reasonable to assume 6 that Zakir Hussain would fill in the blank spaces. See Cassetta 7 v. Baima, 106 Cal. App. 196, 199 (1930) (“The general rule is 8 that, if one signs an instrument containing blanks, he must 9 intend it to be filled in by the person to whom it is 10 delivered.”). And, by endorsing the checks in blank and simply 11 handing them over to Zakir Hussain, the Debtor subjected himself 12 to possible liability against a drawee or obligee. See Cal. Com. 13 Code § 3406(a) (person who is negligent and contributes to 14 alteration of instrument is precluded from asserting the 15 alteration or forgery against a person who, in good faith, takes 16 an instrument for value or for collection). 17 Second, under California law, the returned checks created a 18 quasi-contractual relationship between the Debtor and the Maliks, 19 4 20 At oral argument, the Debtor attempted to argue that he did not provide the checks to Zakir Hussain, let alone endorse 21 the checks in blank. His own testimony, however – both in his deposition and at trial – provides to the contrary. Trial Tr. 22 (Dec. 20, 2012) at 69:5-19; Syed Shahzad Hussain Dep. (Mar. 13, 23 2012) at 73:13-22; 74:9-10; 75:17-18. In addition, the Maliks’ counsel pointed out at oral 24 argument that the declaration of Hakeem Bharwani established that the Debtor, in fact, was present when Zakir Hussain delivered the 25 checks to the Maliks. See Adv. ECF No. 31, Pt. 5. The 26 bankruptcy court’s decision does not reference the Bharwani declaration and, thus, neither do we. In any event, whether the 27 Debtor was physically present when Zakir Hussein presented the checks to the Maliks is ultimately irrelevant. If true, it only 28 serves to strengthen our conclusion as to the Maliks’ creditor status.

8 1 even if one did not previously exist. See Roff v. Crenshaw, 69 2 Cal. App. 2d 536, 541 (1945) (noting that “[t]here seems to be no 3 doubt as to the right of the payee of a check, upon its 4 nonpayment, to sue the drawer either upon the check itself or on 5 the original consideration.”) (citation omitted); see also 6 Gambord Meat Co. v. Corbari, 109 Cal. App. 2d 161, 162 (1952) 7 (party may create a payment liability to a payee by providing a 8 personal check even if on the obligation of another). 9 Based on the foregoing, the Maliks held a claim against the 10 Debtor which, in turn, sufficiently conferred creditor status for 11 the purposes of § 727(a). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5); 101(10)(A); 12 727(c)(1). The Maliks, thus, were authorized to object to the 13 Debtor’s discharge. 14 B. The bankruptcy court did not err in granting judgment in 15 favor of the Maliks on their § 727(a)(3) claim. 16 Section 727(a)(3) provides for denial of discharge where, 17 among other things, a debtor failed to keep or preserve any 18 recorded information from which his financial condition or 19 business transactions might be ascertained. The underlying 20 purpose of this subsection is “to make discharge dependent on the 21 debtor’s true presentation of his financial affairs.” Caneva v. 22 Sun Communities Operating Ltd. P’ship (In re Caneva), 550 F.3d 23 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2008). 24 Even so, § 727(a)(3) “does not require absolute completeness 25 in making or keeping records.” Id. Instead, a debtor must only 26 “present sufficient written evidence which will enable his 27 creditors reasonably to ascertain his present financial condition 28 and to follow his business transactions for a reasonable period

9 1 in the past.” Id. A debtor’s “duty to keep records is measured 2 by what is necessary to ascertain [his] financial status.” 3 Moffett v. Union Bank, 378 F.2d 10, 11 (9th Cir. 1967); see also 4 U.S. Trustee v. Hong Minh Tran (In re Hong Minh Tran), 464 B.R. 5 885, 893 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2012)(type of debtor, as well as 6 debtor’s sophistication, informs the bankruptcy court’s 7 determination). 8 1. The bankruptcy court did not err in determining that 9 the Maliks established a prima face case under 10 § 727(a)(3). 11 An objector establishes a § 727(a)(3) prima facie case by 12 showing that: (1) the debtor failed to maintain and preserve 13 adequate records; and (2) this failure rendered it impossible to 14 ascertain the debtor’s financial condition and material business 15 transactions. In re Caneva, 550 F.3d at 761. Once the objector 16 makes this showing, the burden shifts to the debtor to justify 17 the inadequacy or nonexistence of records. Id. Whether a debtor 18 failed to maintain and preserve adequate records is a finding of 19 fact, which we review for clear error. Cox v. Lansdowne (In re 20 Cox), 904 F.2d 1399, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1990). 21 Here, the Debtor argues that he provided all of the 22 information relating to the gas station’s gross revenues to his 23 accountant,5 who, in turn, used that information to prepare the 24 Debtor’s personal income tax returns. He also points out that 25 the Schedule C tax statements, detailing the business’s profits 26 27 5 The Debtor testified that the same firm handled his bookkeeping and accounting. Trial Tr. (Dec. 20, 2012) at 33:23- 28 25; 34:1. The record shows that he used the terms interchangeably.

10 1 and losses, were attached to the returns. 2 The bankruptcy court agreed that the only relevant records 3 produced by the Debtor relating to the gas station’s transactions 4 were his personal income tax returns. It acknowledged the 5 Debtor’s testimony that he kept a log of the business’s gross 6 sales and reported all activities to his accountant and that all 7 gas station income was reported on the income tax returns, 8 including monthly rental income from an independent auto body 9 shop tenant on the premises. It ultimately found, however, that 10 the Debtor’s records were inadequate as the income tax returns, 11 with nothing more, failed to reasonably present the Debtor’s 12 financial condition and his business transactions relating to the 13 gas station. It thus determined that the Maliks established a 14 prima facie § 727(a)(3) case. On this record, we agree. 15 The Debtor operated the gas station for approximately four 16 years, during which time he purchased and sold gasoline, rented a 17 space on the premises to an auto body shop for $5,000 a month, 18 and presumably purchased and sold goods at the convenience store 19 also located on the premises. It appears that he operated the 20 business through one general business account. Yet the record 21 reflects that as to the gas station’s transactions during the 22 pertinent four-year period, the Debtor only produced his personal 23 income tax returns. He, for example, did not produce the revenue 24 log, general account statements, or credit card statements 25 relating to payment of the gasoline “jobber” invoices. And 26 although the Debtor asserts that he reported all financial 27 information to his accountant, he never clearly explains what 28 this other information was.

11 1 At oral argument, the Debtor represented that he produced 2 other financial documents. Our review of the record shows that 3 not to be the case. The Debtor provided other documents relating 4 to the gas station purchase, such as the deed of trust, loan 5 agreement, escrow instructions, and SBA authorization. These 6 documents are not records relating to the gas station’s business 7 transactions during the pertinent four-year operating period. 8 What the Debtor fails to grasp is that, where a business is 9 involved, simply producing a bottom line number as to income 10 earned, expenses incurred, or losses suffered during a calendar 11 year may be insufficient. Under these circumstances, the income 12 tax returns or Schedule C tax statements could not meaningfully 13 inform a creditor as to the nature and quality of the gas 14 station’s profits and expenditures. This is particularly true in 15 the context of a cash intensive business where creditors cannot 16 easily identify possible preferences or fraudulent transfers 17 without more detail. 18 While the record may contain facts supportive of alternate 19 inferences, the bankruptcy court was in the best position to 20 evaluate the documentary and testimonial evidence. See In re 21 Retz, 606 F.3d at 1196. Viewed through the deferential lens 22 required on appellate review, the bankruptcy court’s findings 23 were not clearly erroneous. See id.; see also Palmdale Hills 24 Prop., LLC v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. (In re Palmdale Hills 25 Prop., LLC), 457 B.R. 29, 40 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (when there are 26 two permissible views of the evidence, the bankruptcy court’s 27 choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous). It thus did 28 not err in determining that the Maliks established a prima facie

12 1 case under § 727(a)(3). 2 The Maliks having made a prima facie showing, the burden 3 shifted to the Debtor to justify the inadequacy or nonexistence 4 of records. See In re Caneva, 550 F.3d at 761. 5 2. The bankruptcy court did not err in determining that 6 the Debtor failed to justify the inadequacy or 7 nonexistence of records. 8 The Debtor explicitly argues, for the first time on appeal, 9 that his lack of business sophistication, as well as his limited 10 English proficiency, explain any inadequacy or nonexistence of 11 records. We do not consider arguments not raised before the 12 bankruptcy court. The cases cited by the Debtor in support of 13 his position, thus, are unavailing, as those cases involved 14 matters where the bankruptcy court expressly made findings as to 15 the debtor’s level of business sophistication and education.6 16 Here, the bankruptcy court found that the Debtor failed to 17 offer a reasonable justification for the inadequacy or 18 nonexistence of records. Acknowledging that he ran a “mom and 19 20 6 See Floret, LLC v. Sendecky (In re Sendecky), 283 B.R. 21 760, 764 (8th Cir. BAP 2002) (no clear error as to bankruptcy court’s finding that debtor’s lack of education, sophistication, 22 and business experience explained his inadequate business 23 records); Strzesynski v. Devaul (In re Devaul), 318 B.R. 824, 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (justification for debtor’s missing 24 recorded information included limited education and dependence on others for assistance); G & J Invs. v. Zell (In re Zell), 108 25 B.R. 615, 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (that debtor did not keep 26 “most fastidious and precise business records” was excusable when debtor was relatively unsophisticated businesswoman); Energy 27 Mktg. Corp. v. Sutton (In re Sutton), 39 B.R. 390, 398 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (while records were not a “paragon of clarity,” 28 debtor was self-employed and had very little formal education, which justified inadequate records).

13 1 pop” gas station and, thus, was not required to maintain 2 sophisticated records, it nonetheless found that the Debtor had a 3 duty to maintain something more than personal income tax returns. 4 In so finding, the bankruptcy court implicitly rejected the 5 Debtor’s only proffered explanation, namely, that he turned over 6 all financial information to his accountant. As previously 7 noted, the Debtor never clearly explained the particulars of the 8 financial information provided to his accountant. Nor did he 9 offer declaratory evidence from the accountant in support of his 10 argument. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the 11 bankruptcy court’s findings were clearly erroneous. See In re 12 Retz, 606 F.3d at 1196; In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC, 457 B.R. 13 at 40. Therefore, it did not err in determining that the 14 Debtor’s explanations failed to justify the inadequate or 15 nonexistent records. 16 In sum, the Debtor has shown no error in the bankruptcy 17 court’s judgment denying his discharge under § 727(a)(3). 18 CONCLUSION 19 We AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s denial of the Debtor’s 20 discharge under § 727(a)(3). 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28