In re S.Y.

2025 IL App (1st) 250039-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 17, 2025
• Docket: 1-25-0039
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 250039-U

FIRST DIVISION November 17, 2025

No. 1-25-0039

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

In re THE MATTER OF S.Y.: ) Appeal from the Circuit Court RYAN YOUNG, ) of Cook County. ) Petitioner-Appellant, ) ) and ) No. 2014 D 79049 ) BENE SIMS, ) The Honorable ) D. Renne Jackson, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

HELD: Trial court’s grant of appellee’s petition to relocate affirmed, where it was supported by the record, the court properly applied all applicable statutory factors to the circumstances presented, and there was no manifest error in its determinations.

¶1 Petitioner-appellant Ryan Young (Ryan) appeals from a trial court order granting

defendant-appellee Bene Sims’ (Bene) petition to relocate the parties’ minor child, S.Y.,

from Illinois to California. His sole contention on appeal is that the court’s holding, based on No. 1-25-0039

its evaluation of relevant statutory factors of section 609.2 of the Illinois Mariage and

Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2022)) governing relocation,

was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented. He asks that we reverse the

court’s grant of the petition. For the record, Bene has not filed an appearance or a brief in

this matter. We entered an order taking the case for consideration on the record and Ryan’s

brief only, and we proceed with our review accordingly, pursuant to First Capitol Mortgage

Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). For the following reasons,

we affirm.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 The record in this matter is voluminous and exhibits protracted and intense litigation

between the parties, spanning over a decade. The majority involved myriad orders of

protection and temporary restraining orders sought and received by both parties against each

other over the years, as well as disputes over visitation, possession, and custody of S.Y. since

her birth; she will soon be 12 years old. Again, this appeal involves only the trial court’s

grant of a petition for relocation, which was filed by Bene in October 2022. While the prior

litigation is relevant, it is not our principal focus. Accordingly, we briefly summarize that

background information and present in more detail those facts most pertinent to the court’s

relocation decision, as that is the only holding at issue in this appeal. 1

¶4 The parties were in a relationship and living in Chicago when Bene became pregnant.

They never married. S.Y. was born in December 2013. 2 At this time, Bene had a son from a

1 Ryan presented a very thorough background of the prior litigation, detailing every instance of the parties’ trial court appearances and the court’s resulting orders, from February 2014 to April 2024. 2 There is no dispute that Ryan is S.Y.’s biological father. 2 No. 1-25-0039

prior relationship who lived with her ex-partner in California, while Ryan, several years after

his relationship with Bene ended and after S.Y. was born, had a daughter with a new partner

living in the Chicago area. Thus, S.Y. currently has an older maternal half-brother in

California and a younger paternal half-sister in Illinois.

¶5 The parties had a tumultuous relationship. Towards the end of her pregnancy with S.Y.,

Bene sought and received an order of protection against Ryan. However, upon S.Y.’s birth

and before the order of protection expired, Bene allowed Ryan to be present at the hospital

and went home with him to the parties’ residence to live as a family. In mid-January 2014

when S.Y. was approximately two weeks old, Bene took her to California without informing

Ryan. When Ryan located them, he filed emergency motions for S.Y.’s return to Illinois,

temporary custody, and injunctive relief. The trial court granted these motions and declared

Illinois to be S.Y.’s home state for jurisdictional purposes. It also ordered Bene to return and

appear in court. Meanwhile, Bene filed a report of sexual abuse by Ryan toward S.Y. with

the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS); this was eventually ruled

“unfounded.” 3 The trial court entered orders declaring that Bene had absconded with S.Y.

and directing law enforcement to compel her compliance with its orders of return home.

Bene returned with S.Y. and filed an appearance in court. The parties agreed to share joint

and physical custody and returned to living together in Chicago.

¶6 This did not last and the same pattern recurred. In May 2014, when S.Y. was five months

old, the parties filed dueling orders of protection against each other. After hearings, Ryan

3 For the record, Bene made a second DCFS report years later, alleging Ryan cut S.Y.’s hair inappropriately. DCFS ruled this report “unfounded,” as well. 3 No. 1-25-0039

received temporary sole possession of S.Y. and Bene was awarded visitation. A 50/50

parenting schedule was later entered. By fall 2014, Bene made new accusations against

Ryan, leading the trial court to order anger management for the parties, drug testing for Bene

and alcohol treatment for Ryan, as well as adjusting visitation and parenting time over the

next few years. In July 2017, Ryan returned to court alleging Bene again improperly

removed S.Y. to California. This led to the court’s entry of an Allocation Judgment and

Parenting Plan, as agreed to by the parties. The judgment recognized both parties to be fit

and proper parents and allocated 50/50 parenting time, holiday time, and equal decision-

making responsibilities regarding S.Y., now four years old.

¶7 Time passed, but tensions, allegations, court hearings, and noncompliance with court

orders continued. On February 8, 2022, Bene sent Ryan a text message informing him of her

intent to relocate to California with S.Y. Ryan objected. Months passed and at some point,

Bene again took S.Y., now eight years old, to California without notice or Ryan’s consent.

Bene informed Ryan that she was in California with S.Y. and that her son had been in a car

accident. She eventually returned with S.Y.

¶8 In October 2022, Bene texted Ryan to inform him she had left Chicago for California

with S.Y. so she could care for her son; she indicated this move would be permanent and her

attorney would be contacting him. Ryan filed an emergency motion for return of S.Y. to

Illinois. Bene returned with S.Y. and on October 25, 2022, she filed a formal notice and

petition for relocation in the trial court. The court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for

S.Y. Over the next year, the GAL visited the parties and S.Y. in California and Chicago,

spoke to witnesses, and submitted a report to the court.

4 No. 1-25-0039

¶9 The court held a hearing on Bene’s petition to relocate, at which many witnesses

testified. 4 As expected, Bene and her witnesses testified as to why they believed S.Y. should

relocate with her to California, and Ryan and his witnesses testified as to why they believed

S.Y. should remain with him in Illinois. Summarily, on Bene’s behalf, her friend, Chanel

Hawkins, testified that the parties have always had a “toxic” relationship and that Ryan is

“controlling and aggressive.” She recounted that on the day of Bene’s baby shower, Bene

told her Ryan had punched her in the face; Hawkins saw bruising. She often accompanied

Bene to pick S.Y. up from her parenting time with Ryan, and S.Y. would say Ryan did not

feed her. Admittedly, Hawkins never saw Ryan behave aggressively toward S.Y. Bene’s

twin sister, Germain Johnson, testified she and Bene were born and raised in California and

moved to Illinois together. Johnson married, and she and her husband introduced the parties;

she later divorced her husband and moved back to California, where she currently resides.

Johnson recounted instances during which she believed Ryan was controlling and/or abusive

of Bene, and instances she believed he was intoxicated and exhibited a drinking problem.

Johnson further testified she would help Bene with S.Y. if she were permitted to relocate to

California, including transporting S.Y. to and from school, where S.Y. would attend with her

daughter, S.Y.’s cousin; she would also be caring for S.Y. when Bene could not. Johnson

admitted she never witnessed Ryan exhibit any abusive or unsafe behavior toward S.Y.

4 The transcript of this two-day hearing was not included in the record on appeal. However, the record contains a lengthy bystander’s report detailing the testimony presented. Additionally, the transcript of the hearing held by the trial court to address Ryan’s subsequent motion to reconsider is contained in the record in full. 5 No. 1-25-0039

¶ 10 Bene testified she is a surgical technologist employed by a hospital in California, where

she has been working for the past year. She detailed that her relationship with Ryan

“changed drastically” after S.Y. was born, with Ryan consuming more alcohol than usual and

being more emotionally and physically abusive towards her and causing several alleged

instances of domestic violence. She first left for California with S.Y. shortly after her birth

after one such alleged incident, fearing for her and S.Y.’s safety. She returned, but the abuse

worsened, and she recounted an instance when S.Y. was supposed to be in Ryan’s care but he

had left her at a friend’s home; Bene called him and he appeared “extremely intoxicated.”

She further testified that despite all this, she believed Ryan was a good father and that, if

permitted to relocate with S.Y., she would facilitate the maintenance of Ryan and S.Y.’s

relationship. She believed it was in S.Y.’s best interest to relocate with her for several

reasons, including that she had an employment offer in California with a limited acceptance

time; she had just purchased a bigger home in safe, gated community; and her immediate

family, including S.Y.’s half-brother, lived nearby and provided support and assistance. She

concluded by explaining she told Ryan throughout their relationship that she wanted to return

to live in California, and while she acknowledged some of her various instances of improper

removal of S.Y., noncompliance with orders, and interference with Ryan’s court-ordered

parenting time over the years, she did not believe S.Y. was safe with Ryan due to his history

of domestic and alcohol abuse.

¶ 11 On Ryan’s behalf, his friend, Hugh Lindsay, testified that he has observed Ryan over the

last six years, as S.Y. and Lindsay’s daughters attended dance classes together, and he

believed Ryan is an excellent father and very involved with S.Y.’s education and

6 No. 1-25-0039

extracurricular activities. He has never witnessed Ryan drink alcohol nor exhibit aggressive

behavior toward S.Y. He did not believe Ryan’s current relationship with S.Y. could be

sustained if S.Y. were permitted to relocate. Lindsay admitted he has never met Bene and,

thus, could not assess how she is as a parent. Ryan’s long-time friend, Freddie Mims,

testified Ryan is a “great father” who worked hard to get S.Y. admitted into the gifted

program at her school and to become an accomplished swimmer. S.Y. never exhibited any

fear or discomfort around Ryan but, rather, they have “an excellent relationship.” Mims

admitted Ryan consumes alcohol but does so only casually and not excessively; he has never

seen Ryan intoxicated in S.Y.’s presence. Mims also admitted he has only met Bene a few

times, when the parties were dating. Ryan’s cousin, Ashley Gray-Holloman, testified she

and Ryan grew up together, and the parties often relied on her to care for S.Y. She stated

Ryan and S.Y. exhibit a very close and loving relationship. Her interaction with Bene has

been minimal, and she has witnessed several heated exchanges between the parties over the

years taking place in front of S.Y. She noted S.Y. is enrolled in a great school in Chicago,

has a good friend group, and is thriving. Holloman admitted she has witnessed Ryan drink

alcohol, once doing so while at her home with S.Y., but she has never seen him drink to the

point of belligerence.

¶ 12 Ryan testified the parties became pregnant early in their relationship and their

relationship was “toxic” on both their parts. They argued frequently, but he denied he was

ever physically abusive toward Bene. He also denied that he drank excessively and pointed

out he never failed any of his court-ordered alcohol tests. He detailed many instances when

he was awarded parenting time by the court with which Bene interfered without explanation

7 No. 1-25-0039

or remorse, as well as various court orders with which she was noncompliant. Ryan

recounted those times Bene removed S.Y. to California without notice or his consent, pulling

her out of her school and failing to provide him with an itinerary or information regarding

their whereabouts. Ryan further testified that since the institution of the relocation

proceedings, S.Y. has lived primarily with him in Chicago over the last year. Ryan and S.Y.

have established a routine involving school, where he worked hard with her to achieve her

admittance into the gifted program, and extracurricular activities. Ryan volunteers at the

school and knows all S.Y.’s teachers, whereas Bene does not. S.Y. speaks to Bene over the

phone when she can. Although his parents are deceased, Ryan’s support system includes his

cousin and friends. He believed it was in S.Y.’s best interest to remain in Illinois with him

for several reasons, including that he has been taking excellent care of S.Y.; relocation would

severely impact his very close current relationship with S.Y., who seems “minimally

impacted” by her current separation from Bene; and relocation would jeopardize S.Y.’s

relationship with her younger half-sister. He also testified that he believed Bene “was a bad

mom,” and that she was not an involved parent nor provided S.Y. with “structure.” Ryan

admitted S.Y. clearly loves Bene. He also admitted he knew during his and Bene’s

relationship of Bene’s desire to move back to and live in California.

¶ 13 The GAL testified at length during the hearing, detailing the contents of her report to the

trial court. She first met then nine-year-old S.Y. via Zoom from her room at Ryan’s home in

March 2023, after her school day and extracurricular activities. The GAL described her

room was dark and her demeanor was subdued; they spoke about her school and her half-

sister. S.Y. expressed the desire to continue living in Illinois with Ryan and to see Bene on

8 No. 1-25-0039

school breaks. The GAL preliminarily recommended S.Y. stay in Illinois. However, the

GAL’s recommendation changed upon further interviews. She next met with S.Y. at Bene’s

home in California in July 2023, while she was on summer vacation. She noted S.Y.

“seemed like a notably different child,” as she was bright and excited. At this time, S.Y.

expressed her desire to live in California with Bene. She also stated she did not want to hurt

either of her parent’s feelings and she was comfortable in both locations. The GAL further

testified that S.Y. recounted an alleged fight she witnessed between Ryan and his girlfriend,

and S.Y. told the GAL that she believed Ryan was drunk at the time. She also disclosed that

Ryan drinks “almost an entire bottle of alcohol every night,” and that he “could not help it.”

The GAL met with S.Y. a third time a few months later, again at Ryan’s residence after

school and her activities. She noted S.Y.’s disposition “again seemed dramatically

different,” and that she backed away when the GAL reached out to her and did not return her

smile. When the GAL asked her if she still wanted to live in California, S.Y. again

responded that she did not want to hurt either parent.

¶ 14 In addition to the parties’ collateral witnesses, the GAL interviewed Bene, who expressed

concern over Ryan’s alleged alcohol abuse and history of domestic violence. The GAL

found Bene’s intentions to relocate were “genuine,” as Bene wanted to care for her son and

explained she left Illinois to escape Ryan’s domestic violence. The GAL further noted that

Bene did not intend to interfere with Ryan’s relationship with S.Y. Conversely, the GAL

testified that during her interview with Ryan, he expressed he was the better parent and that

Bene was a “ ‘bad mother,’ ” and she noted that he was “obviously very angry” about the

situation.

9 No. 1-25-0039

¶ 15 The GAL then informed the trial court of her determinations regarding each of the 11

statutory factors of section 609.2 of the Act, governing relocation. First, she concluded, as

she previously testified, that Bene’s intention to relocate was genuine, as she was originally

from California and always wanted to return there. While she noted Bene’s history of

improperly removing S.Y., Ryan’s alleged domestic abuse was an extenuating factor, as

supported by her interviews with Bene’s collateral witnesses. Second, the GAL believed that

while Ryan and S.Y. had a close and loving relationship, Ryan’s motivation for not agreeing

to the relocation was to defeat Bene and prove she was a bad mother. Third, the GAL noted

both parties have exercised their rights and responsibilities to S.Y. With respect to schools,

the GAL’s research found there was “not much of a difference” between her school in

Chicago and the proposed school in California; the GAL did note there was a superior school

closer to Bene’s residence than the proposed school, and Bene told the GAL she would look

into it. Fifth, the GAL observed that Bene had a significant number of family members

(including her son, twin sister, mother, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins) residing

in California compared to Ryan’s family in Illinois, giving Bene a better familiar network.

Next, the GAL testified she “strongly believe[d]” S.Y. would be “a much happier child” in

California per her direct observations, and the parties would be able to fashion a reasonable

allocation judgment, even though Ryan would not be afforded the same parenting time he has

currently. Along with those factors, the GAL further commented that S.Y. “clearly

expressed her desire to live in California with” Bene and that it was possible to fashion a

schedule for Ryan to visit her as much as possible. While she admitted there would be some

impact on Ryan and S.Y.’s relationship, this could be minimized via technology. Finally, the

10 No. 1-25-0039

GAL testified that her recommendation took into account other factors, including Ryan’s

“verbal and physical abuse of” Bene and “his excessive use of alcohol.”

¶ 16 On cross-examination, the GAL stated she did not believe the fact she interviewed S.Y.

after school and activities in Illinois compared to summer vacation in California impacted

S.Y.’s decision on where she wanted to live, because Bene’s collateral witnesses stated S.Y.

appeared to be a different person depending on her location, just as she, herself, had

observed. The GAL admitted she did not perform an investigation into S.Y.’s Chicago

school or the proposed school, nor into the quality of her relationships with Bene’s

immediate family as opposed to Ryan’s support system; however, she believed being around

immediate family was in S.Y.’s best interest. Finally, the GAL acknowledged Ryan had not

failed any court-ordered alcohol testing and she had not witnessed abuse between the parties

since the time of her appointment.

¶ 17 Following closing argument, the trial court issued its Memorandum of Opinion and

Order. At the outset, the court provided a short procedural history and stated it had reviewed

and considered “all relevant pleadings, motions, responses, replies, exhibits, the GAL’s

report, testimony and oral arguments” in the matter. It also described the “serious co-

parenting challenges” the parties have faced over the years and their “contemptuous and

disrespectful parenting relationship.”

11 No. 1-25-0039

¶ 18 Next, the court examined the evidence presented regarding section 609.2’s 11 statutory

relocation factors, summarizing the parties’ conflicting testimony and the GAL’s testimony

and opinion with respect to each factor. 5

¶ 19 In the last section of its Order, the court provided its final analysis of the statutory factors

and its evaluation of the evidence presented. It found that six factors (1, 2, 5, 6, 8 and 11)

“weigh more heavily” in Bene’s favor. In this respect, the court concluded there was no

credible reason to believe Bene filed her petition to relocate simply to interfere with S.Y. and

Ryan’s relationship; instead, the court found Bene desired to return to her home in California

due to her injured son, her family’s support, and the “high conflict parenting relationship

between the parties.” Particularly, it noted that while Ryan has some support in Illinois,

Bene “has [a] stronger family presence and support system” in California. It also noted that

Ryan believes Bene is a “ ‘bad mother’ but provided little evidence to support this.” The

court “gave considerable weight” to Ryan’s “proclivity to alcohol abuse and aggressiveness,”

which “has led to the verbal and mental abuse of” Bene, as well as the instances when Bene

reported Ryan was drunk with S.Y. in his care. This was accompanied by S.Y.’s own reports

to the GAL that he was drunk during the recent argument with his girlfriend which took place

in front of S.Y., S.Y.’s sentiment that he “ ‘can’t help’ ” his drinking, and the GAL’s opinion

that S.Y. sometimes appears “ ‘afraid’ ” of Ryan. The court found that Ryan “does not

consider S.Y. when he elects to drink and act out” in her presence and that this was not in her

best interest. As to the remaining factors (3, 4, 7, 9 and 10), the court found these to be

5 As Ryan challenges the court’s holdings as to all the 11 statutory factors, we enumerate and discuss the evidence it considered with respect to each of them in more detail below. 12 No. 1-25-0039

“neutral meaning that” both parties would provide S.Y. with excellent educational

opportunities and extracurricular activities in either state; both love her and have played an

active role in her life; neither has refused parenting time or responsibilities; and a reasonable

allocation plan and visitation arrangements can be fashioned for the continued exercise of

parental responsibilities appropriate to the parties’ resources and S.Y.’s development.

¶ 20 At the conclusion of its Order, the court found that, “[b]ased on all the factors,” “the

testimony and credibility of all the witnesses,” the GAL’s report and S.Y.’s best interest,

S.Y.’s general quality of life would be enhanced upon relocation with Bene. The court

declared it was in S.Y.’s best interest to relocate, and she had expressed her wishes to do so

via the GAL. The court went on to fashion what it deemed a reasonable allocation of

parental responsibilities, with the goal of minimizing any impairment on S.Y. and Ryan’s

relationship. Accordingly, the court granted Bene’s petition to relocate with S.Y., and the

remainder of its Order provided a detailed parenting time and visitation plan for Ryan.

¶ 21 Ryan filed a motion to reconsider. At an ensuing hearing, Ryan argued that, while the

court did not err in applying the law, it erred in its review of the facts presented and, thus, in

its final determination. Ryan addressed the 11 statutory factors and outlined how the court

incorrectly applied and inappropriately weighed the evidence regarding each one. The court

denied Ryan’s motion to reconsider, as he did not meet his burden of demonstrating newly

discovered evidence, changes in the law or the court’s error in applying the law but, rather,

sought only a reexamination of the decision and a reassessment of the facts. However, as to

this point, the court made clear for the record that it had “carefully considered all witnesses,

13 No. 1-25-0039

the law, credibility, the evidence, and most importantly the best interest of the child” in

rendering its final decision.

¶ 22 ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, Ryan contends that the trial court’s grant of Bene’s petition to relocate S.Y. to

California was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He presents challenges to each

of the 11 statutory factors, asserting that the court erred in its conclusions, disregarded

evidence, and discounted or underestimated the impact relocation would have on him and the

father-child relationship. He also asserts that the court gave “unbalanced weight” to

allegations of abuse and permitted prejudicial evidence against him. We disagree.

¶ 24 As Ryan points out in his brief, pursuant to the Act, the burden rests with the parent

seeking relocation to prove that relocating the minor child is in her best interest, as measured

by the 11 factors enumerated in section 609.2(g) of the Act. See In re Marriage of Kenney,

2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 36 (citing In re Marriage of Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st)

201405, ¶ 78 (citing In re Marriage of Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, ¶ 57)). Here, that

was Bene; as the petitioner, she had both the burden of production (to produce evidence on

S.Y.’s best interest) and persuasion (to convince the court that S.Y.’s best interest included

her relocation to California) pursuant to the statutory factors. See Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st)

221558, ¶ 36 (citing Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 78; Levites, 2021 IL App (2d)

200552, ¶ 61); see also In re Parentage of P.D., 2017 IL App (2d) 170355, ¶ 15; and In re

Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 325 (1988)).

¶ 25 Ryan is also correct that the applicable standard of review is manifest weight of the

evidence. This standard is most appropriate for relocation matters because they necessarily

14 No. 1-25-0039

involve the best interest of the child. See Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 33 (citing In

re Marriage of Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32, and noting this standard applies for that very

reason). The marked deference of this standard “ ‘recognizes that the trial court, as the trier

of fact, had a superior opportunity “to observe both parents and the child and, thus, is able to

assess and evaluate their temperaments, personalities, and capabilities.” ’ ” Kenney, 2023 IL

App (1st) 221558, ¶ 33 (quoting Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 75 (quoting

Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32)); accord In re Marriage of Dorfman, 2011 IL App (3d)

110099, ¶ 46.

¶ 26 Accordingly, under this standard, we, as a reviewing court, cannot reverse a lower court’s

grant of a relocation petition “ ‘ “unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of the

evidence and it appears that a manifest injustice has occurred.” ’ ” Kenney, 2023 IL App

(1st) 221558, ¶ 33 (quoting Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 75 (quoting Fatkin,

2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32). “A court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence

only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or where its findings are unreasonable,

arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” In re Marriage of Kavchak, 2018 Il App

(2d) 170853, ¶ 65; accord Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 33 (reversal is permitted

only when the opposite conclusion is called for because the trial court’s factual findings are

clearly, plainly, and indisputably erroneous).

¶ 27 Specifically, section 609.2 of the Act governs relocation. In subsection (g), the

legislature enumerated 11 factors a trial court must consider in determining whether

relocation is in the child’s best interest and, thus, appropriate. See 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)

(West 2022); P.D., 2017 IL App (2d) 170355, ¶ 17. As this Court recently noted in Kenney,

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our supreme court has made clear that relocation determinations “ ‘ “cannot be reduced to a

simple bright-line test.” ’ ” Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 57 (quoting Fatkin, 2019 IL

123602, ¶ 32 (quoting Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326)). Rather, precisely because the child’s best

interest is involved, relocation decisions “ ‘ “must be made on a case-by-case basis,

depending, to a great extent, upon the circumstances of each case.” ’ ” Kenney, 2023 IL App

(1st) 221558, ¶ 57 (quoting Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32 (quoting Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at

326)); accord Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 74. And, because a relocation case’s

unique facts dominate it, comparisons to other relocation cases are of little value. See

Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 57; Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 74

(citing Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, ¶ 71). “[T]he determination of a relocation

petition

‘ “cannot be reduced to a simple tally of which party ‘won’ a majority of the

enumerated factors; instead, because some factors in a particular case may weigh

more heavily than others, the trial court must consider all factors and evidence

touching on the issue and must arrive at a reasonable result.” ’ Kimberly R., 2021 IL

App (1st) 201405, ¶ 74 (quoting Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, ¶ 71).”

Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 57. Ultimately, “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he presumption in favor of the

result reached by the trial court is always strong and compelling in this type of case,’ ” ’ ”

(Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 33 (quoting Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32 (quoting

Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330 (quoting Gallagher v. Gallagher, 60 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31-32

(1978))); accord Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 75), and while we are called upon

to examine the reasonableness of the result, we will not “reweigh the evidence or assess the

16 No. 1-25-0039

credibility of testimony and set aside the trial court’s determination merely because a

different conclusion could have been drawn from the evidence” (P.D., 2017 IL App (2d)

170355, ¶ 19 (this is not the function of reviewing court in relocation matters)).

¶ 28 In its Order granting Bene’s petition to relocate, the trial court addressed each of the

section 609.2(g) factors with specificity and weighed each one in light of the evidence

presented. It found six favored Bene and five were neutral; it did not find any favored Ryan.

Ryan challenges each one of those findings. We address them now, concluding that, based

on the record before us, the court’s decision to grant relocation of S.Y. was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 29 The first 609.2(g) factor is “the circumstances and reasons for the intended relocation.”

750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)(1) (West 2022). The trial court found this weighed more heavily in

Bene’s favor, stating it believed Bene’s testimony that she returned to California to care for

her injured son and there was “no credible reason to believe that she filed [the petition]

simply to interfere with S.Y. and [Ryan]’s relationship.” Additionally, the court found there

were valid “circumstances” underlying Bene’s desire to relocate, including the “high conflict

parenting relationship between the parties,” prompting her to return to where she had familial

support.

¶ 30 The evidence underwrites this assessment. The GAL, who interviewed Bene and Ryan

on multiple occasions, testified she believed Bene’s intentions to relocate were “genuine,”

and she indicated this in her written report as well. The GAL detailed for the court Bene’s

assertions that she wanted to be in California to care for her son who was involved in a

serious car crash in the summer of 2022, and to escape Ryan’s domestic violence against her.

17 No. 1-25-0039

While the GAL did not condone Bene’s history of improperly removing S.Y. in violation of

prior court orders, she stated she did not believe Bene was intending to interfere with Ryan’s

relationship with S.Y. under the circumstances, which included the parties’ volatile

relationship. Bene’s testimony corroborated the GAL’s. Additionally, Bene testified she had

just purchased a bigger home in California in a gated community for her and S.Y. and that

she had a new nursing job offer there. Significantly, she testified she had repeatedly told

Ryan while they were together that she wanted to return to live in California, her state of

origin—a fact Ryan admitted during his own testimony he was aware of throughout their

relationship.

¶ 31 Ryan asserts the court “failed to consider and appropriately weigh” Bene’s “antics and

attempts to conceal” S.Y. in order to “advance her relocation efforts.” He also discusses the

several times Bene removed S.Y. to California without providing him notice, the court orders

he obtained finding she had absconded with S.Y., and her violations of his court-ordered

parenting time. He further cites Bene’s initial February 2022 notice of relocation which he

claims was “improper” and suspicious as it occurred three months before her son’s accident,

and her alleged failure “to provide evidence of any ‘better life’ ” for S.Y. in California.

¶ 32 Ryan’s assertions do not support reversal of the court’s determination as to this factor.

Upon our reading of the decision, the court clearly, and repeatedly, considered the many

times Bene removed S.Y. from Illinois. The court specifically stated, in both its decision and

in its colloquy during the motion to reconsider, that it had examined all the relevant

“pleadings, motions, responses, replies, [and] exhibits” in this matter, which included Bene’s

history of removal. There was testimony about this from several witnesses and the GAL

18 No. 1-25-0039

outlined this in her report, stating she had “reviewed” all the prior litigation filed by the

parties and resulting court orders since November 2013; she listed these (some 25) in the

report she submitted to the trial court. And, the court even noted in its written Order that

Bene “was previously sanctioned for ‘unauthorized relocation.’ ” Thus, contrary to Ryan’s

claim, the court did consider and weigh this; it simply did so in a way with which he

disagrees. 6

¶ 33 Moreover, we find no merit in Ryan’s assertions regarding what he deems Bene’s

“improper” or suspicious petition to relocate in February 2022. Yes, the evidence indicates

Bene texted Ryan in February 2022 informing him she wanted to relocate with S.Y., and this

occurred before her son’s accident. However, when Ryan returned her text with an

objection, that was the end of the matter. Bene never filed a formal petition to relocate at that

time. Rather, she did not file her formal petition, in court, until October 25, 2022—after her

son’s accident and after she had been making trips back and forth from Illinois to California

to care for him. That Bene may have conveyed to Ryan she contemplated filing a petition in

February does not negate, discredit, or cast suspicion on the petition she actually filed some

eight months later, particularly where the evidence shows both that her son was injured in the

meantime and that Ryan knew throughout their relationship Bene always wanted to return to

California.

6 Ryan does not lodge a claim of error under section 609.2(d), which governs statutory notice requirements placed on the relocating parent. However, we note for the record that a relocating parent’s violation of section 609.2(d)’s statutory notice requirements does not require automatic denial of her petition or preclusion of relocation; the only consequence is that the trial court “may consider” it as a factor in determining good faith with respect to relocation and once it does so, and its conclusion is supported by the record, there is no error. See Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶¶ 54-55. 19 No. 1-25-0039

¶ 34 Also, we do not agree with Ryan that Bene “failed” to provide any evidence of how

S.Y.’s life could, or would, improve in California. Rather, the court discussed throughout its

decision that Bene, whom it found credible, had demonstrated this. We will discuss this

more herein, but suffice to say with respect to this first factor, Bene provided testimony of

the new home she had purchased in a gated community and of a new job offer pending her

relocation. Based on all this, we do not find any error in the court’s conclusion that factor (1)

weighed in favor of Bene.

¶ 35 Factor (2) comprises “the reasons, if any, why a parent is objecting to the intended

relocation.” 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)(2) (West 2022). The trial court found this factor favored

Bene. It noted that Ryan’s objection to the relocation was principally based on his belief that

Bene was, as he put it in many instances, a “bad mother.” The court declared, however, that

this was not borne out by the evidence.

¶ 36 In contending the court’s finding was manifestly erroneous, Ryan again cites to Bene’s

history of non-compliance with court orders, and to his and his witnesses’ testimony that he

plays a significant role in S.Y.’s life while Bene does not. We do not minimize neither

Bene’s history nor Ryan’s devotion to S.Y. However, the court’s conclusion that factor (2)

favored Bene was not unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. That is, both during

her testimony and in her written report, the GAL testified that, upon her observations and

interviews of the parties, she believed Ryan’s motivation for objecting to the relocation was

more so to defeat Bene in the litigation and to demonstrate she was a “bad mother,” rather

than contemplating which location was really better suited for S.Y. She noted he used this

phrase during their interview, expressing he was the better parent while also demonstrating

20 No. 1-25-0039

he was “obviously very angry” about the situation. This was corroborated by Ryan’s own

testimony, wherein he referred to Bene before the trial court as “a bad mom” and that she

was not an involved parent nor provided S.Y. with “structure.” Bene, meanwhile, testified

that despite their tumultuous relationship, she believed Ryan was a good father. Also, we

recognize that Ryan’s witnesses testified at length about his admirable parenting skills.

However, none of them provided any evidence to support the assertions he repeatedly made

during the proceedings that Bene is a “bad mother.” In fact, all his witnesses admitted they

could not say what type of parent Bene was: his friend Lindsay stated he has never met Bene,

his friend Mims stated he only met Bene a few times when they were dating, and his cousin

Holloman stated her interaction with Bene was very minimal, taking place only during heated

exchanges between the parties. Without more, we cannot find the court’s decision that factor

(2) favored Bene was unreasonable.

¶ 37 The third factor the court considered was the history and quality of each party’s

relationship with S.Y. and whether they had failed or refused to exercise parental

responsibilities. See 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)(3) (West 2022). The court noted that, based on

the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, it was clear both Bene and Ryan have played

an active role in S.Y.’s life since her birth, fully exercising their parental responsibilities,

establishing a close and loving relationship with her, and exercising substantial parenting

time, including periods of separate majority parenting time. Commenting that both wanted

the best for S.Y. and her future, the court thus found this factor to be neutral. Ryan disputes

this finding, arguing that the court should have taken more note of the fact that he has cared,

and “shouldered all the parenting responsibilities,” for S.Y. for the last 18 months (from

21 No. 1-25-0039

November 2022 until April 2024, the date of the court’s Order), rendering him the primary

caretaker save for one month when S.Y. went to California to stay with Bene for summer

vacation. We are mindful that S.Y. lived with Ryan exclusively for the 18 months prior to

the court’s issuance of its final decision. But, that does not render the court’s neutrality

finding as to this factor unreasonable. S.Y. primarily lived with Ryan and he assumed

parenting responsibilities during this time. The trial court was aware of this. However, as

the court stated, both parties shouldered primary parenting responsibilities at various times

from S.Y.’s birth to the date of the Order. This was more than evident throughout the record.

Just as she lived exclusively with Ryan for an extended period before this decision, there

were times in the past when S.Y. lived with Bene for extended periods. That is, while the

parties generally shared 50/50 custody, there were periods where one of them served as

S.Y.’s primary caretaker while the other sought and/or exercised court-ordered parenting

time. Accordingly, the court’s conclusion that this factor was neutral was not against the

¶ 38 Similarly, the trial court found the fourth factor, “educational opportunities for the child”

at each location, was neutral. 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)(4) (West 2022). The court pointed out

the GAL, who visited S.Y. in both California and Chicago, “established in her testimony that

there is an insignificant and minimal difference in opportunity between the proposed schools

[of] California and the minor child’s current school in Illinois.” Noting, as well, the parties’

active relationships with S.Y., the court further stated that, as each of them clearly wants the

best for her, it was sure they “will seek out the best educational and extracurricular

opportunities for her.”

22 No. 1-25-0039

¶ 39 In his claim that this factor should have favored him, Ryan makes much of what he

asserts was the court’s disregard of the gifted program S.Y. is enrolled in at her school in

Illinois which he “fought hard to get [her] placed in,” and its ignorance of Bene’s true

motivation for selecting the California school some 30 minutes from her home, which was

that S.Y.’s cousins attend there and it is more convenient for Bene’s sister to access as she,

and not Bene, will be transporting S.Y. to and from school when Bene works. Ryan notes

the court did not comment on the California STEM school much closer to Bene’s home the

GAL proposed for S.Y. which Bene said only that she would look into, and he takes issue

with what he deems was the GAL’s insufficient research of the schools, such as neither

speaking to teachers and principals nor comparing curricula and ratings.

¶ 40 We find that the trial court’s neutral finding as to this factor was not arbitrary nor

manifestly erroneous; rather, it was supported by the evidence. The trial court heard much

testimony, mostly from Ryan, regarding S.Y.’s gifted program; clearly, the court was aware

of this and the lengths Ryan has gone to in order to give S.Y. the best education he can.

However, there was other testimony, mainly from Bene and her witnesses, explaining that

when S.Y. was living with her, she attended a certain elementary school in Beaumont,

California, for three months. Despite Bene’s move from Beaumont to Ontario, California

(approximately 30 minutes away), she planned to return S.Y. to the Beaumont school. Bene

explained that her sister will be caring for S.Y. when she is at work, and this would mean

taking her to and picking her up from school when needed. Bene’s sister still lives in

Beaumont and her children (S.Y.’s cousins) attended that school with S.Y. when she lived

there and they continue to attend currently—a school S.Y. is familiar with as a former

23 No. 1-25-0039

student, she knows the staff, and she will have a built-in friend group of prior classmates and

relatives. Considering both these important perspectives (scholastic program versus

familiarity), it is not unreasonable that the court deemed this factor neutral.

¶ 41 Critically, we do not accept Ryan’s characterization of the GAL’s research as insufficient

because she did not interview the staff at each school or compare curricula and ratings. In

fact, the record partially dispels Ryan’s assertion. He seems to be correct that the GAL did

not speak to teachers or principals at either school. Yet, this is not required pursuant to

section 609.2(g) for the court to properly evaluate this factor. More importantly, however,

while the GAL may have only briefly testified at the hearing that it was her view there “not

much of a difference” between S.Y.’s school in Chicago and the proposed school in

California, her report contained much detailed comparative research between them. That is,

in her written report submitted to the trial court, which is contained in the record, the GAL

notes the location of both schools. She then presents her online research: 7 she found that

S.Y.’s Chicago community is rated an A, but her school is rated a B-, with only 32% of

students proficient in reading and math; meanwhile, the proposed community in California is

rated a B-, but the proposed school is rated a B+, with 60% of students proficient in reading

and 57% proficient in math. The GAL also examined the racial composition of the schools, a

relevant consideration as S.Y. is of mixed-race; she noted the Chicago school is 71% black

compared to only 5% at the proposed school, but the total minority enrollment of the

7 In her report, the GAL referred to ratings “on Niche” when making comparisons of the schools. This Court may take judicial notice that www.Niche.com is a website devoted to rankings for schools nationwide offering education from preschool to 12th grade, be they public, private, religious, special education, charter, magnet, Montessori, etc. See Kopnick v. JL Woode Management Co., LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 152054, ¶ 26 (citing People v. Crawford, 2013 IL App (1st) 100310, ¶ 118, n.9 (this Court may take judicial notice of information on public websites)). 24 No. 1-25-0039

proposed school is 73%. As to the STEM school the GAL researched near Bene’s new

home, while it was rated superior to both the Chicago and the proposed California schools,

Bene explained that she could not provide secure childcare to send S.Y. there. Ultimately,

the point is this: the court did, indeed, have much evidence before it, thanks to the GAL, as to

the differences in the schools. Its evaluation was that the differences were negligeable,

especially considering its view that both Ryan and Bene were dedicated to seeking out the

best educational opportunities for S.Y.; it also found important the considerations of S.Y.’s

familiarity and available childcare. In light of all the evidence presented, and contrary to

Ryan’s insistence, there was a sound basis for the court’s neutral finding.

¶ 42 In challenging the fifth factor of “the presence or absence of extended family” at each

location (750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)(5) (West 2022)), which the court found favored Bene, Ryan

argues it improperly “discounted” his “extended family” in Illinois, particularly his cousin

Holloman who testified she would pick S.Y. up from school if needed, and a family friend

who testified Ryan once enrolled in and drove S.Y. to a faraway summer camp just so she

could attend with her friends. He also contends the court ignored that S.Y. has a paternal

two-year-old half-sister in Chicago, and that it “was only entranced by” the existence of

Bene’s extended family which caused it to “trump [his] active daily involvement” as a father.

¶ 43 In its decision, the court acknowledged Ryan has “some support in Illinois,” specifically,

an “ ‘extended family’ ” comprised of cousins and friends who the parties relied on in the

past to help care for S.Y., as well as a young daughter with whom S.Y. has a close

relationship. The testimony confirmed this; Ryan’s parents (S.Y.’s paternal grandparents)

are deceased and as he has no siblings, his cousins and friends serve as his family, and some

25 No. 1-25-0039

of them testified as to their time caring for S.Y. while she lived in Illinois. However, the

court balanced this with Bene’s “strong presence of family in California.” This includes her

16-year-old son (S.Y.’s older maternal half-brother), and her mother (S.Y.’s grandmother), as

well as her twin sister and various aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins. Ryan may

have a support system in Illinois, but the fact remains the majority of its members are

nonrelatives. Meanwhile, the court found that S.Y. is surrounded by “a stronger family

presence and support system in California” made up of direct relatives and an older brother

who can tend to her needs, if required. While other arbitrators may have weighed Ryan’s

support system differently, this is what the trial court determined was best for S.Y. and, as it

was based on the evidence presented, we cannot overturn it.

¶ 44 With respect to factor (6), the anticipated impact of relocation on the child (see 750 ILCS

5/609.2(g)(6) (West 2022)), the trial court acknowledged S.Y. “has significant ties to the

State of Illinois,” but also recognized she has spent time in California and the GAL was “

‘convinced that S.Y. will be a much happier child in California, than in Illinois’ based upon

her observations of S.Y.’s behavior in both places.” Thus, the court found this factor

weighed in favor of Bene. Ryan insists the court “failed to discern the circumstances

surrounding the GAL’s meetings” with S.Y., suggesting the findings were skewed because

she met with S.Y. once in California while she was on summer vacation, but met with her

twice in Illinois, once in person and once on Zoom, both after full days of S.Y.’s “arduous

gifted program” and activities.

¶ 45 The record shows, contrary to Ryan’s insistence, that the court did, indeed, discern the

circumstances surrounding the GAL’s meetings with S.Y., as he characterizes them. The

26 No. 1-25-0039

GAL testified at length about her visits with S.Y. and was clear in her testimony that her

California visit took place during summer vacation and her two Illinois visits took place after

school, with the initial one via Zoom. This was not a secret. The GAL went on to testify that

the first Illinois Zoom meeting was from S.Y.’s room which she noted was “dark” with her

curtains having been drawn, that it was March in Chicago, and that S.Y.’s demeanor was

“subdued.” Nevertheless, after this meeting, the GAL preliminary recommended S.Y. stay in

Illinois. This changed, however, following two more interviews. At the second, the GAL

visited S.Y. in July in California. She noted S.Y. “was very happy, upbeat and outgoing” and

“seemed like a notably different child” than when in Illinois, demonstrating brightness and

excitement, particularly at showing the GAL her room. The GAL’s last interview took place

again in Chicago after school and activities, with the GAL noting S.Y. “again seemed

dramatically different” than her last visit, as S.Y. backed away from her when she reached

out, did not return her smile, and spoke in a “low and monotone” voice. The GAL’s direct

observations prompted her to change her recommendation.

¶ 46 There is no basis to reverse the court’s ruling on this factor. The record is clear that the

GAL changed her recommendation, as the trial court stated, on her observations of S.Y. at

both locations. If, as Ryan posits, it was somehow unfair that S.Y. was interviewed after a

long day at school and activities in March in Illinois compared to summer vacation in July in

California (or that the GAL and/or the court improperly failed to discern this difference),

then the GAL would not have preliminarily recommended she stay in Illinois after the first

Zoom visit. That is, the GAL immediately noted S.Y.’s room was dark and she was subdued;

however, she still concluded S.Y. should stay in Illinois. It was not until she visited S.Y. two

27 No. 1-25-0039

more times and observed the differences in her behavior, rather than in the time of day or

year, from one location to the other that she switched her recommendation. Once her visits

were complete, she compared her observations that S.Y. acted in a brighter and more excited

and open way while in California with Bene than when she was in Illinois with Ryan, where

she was skittish and closed-off. Significantly, Ryan’s counsel cross-examined the GAL with

precisely the same insinuations he now raises on appeal, i.e., whether she believed the

difference in times and dates impacted S.Y. and their interviews, and she responded in the

negative. Also of note, several witnesses who testified at the relocation hearing corroborated

the GAL’s description of S.Y. acting differently in these ways depending on whether she was

in Illinois with Ryan or in California with Bene. From all this, we find no error in the court’s

finding that this factor favored Bene.

¶ 47 Ryan next asserts that the trial court erred in holding that factor (7), whether “a

reasonable allocation of parental responsibilities” can be fashioned upon relocation (750

ILCS 5/609.2(g)(7) (West 2022)), was neutral because it “failed to consider” Bene’s

“disregard” and “disrespect” of the court and its orders and the “likelihood” that she will

ignore subsequent orders, including the new Allocation Judgment. We are mindful of the

assertions Ryan makes, particularly in light of the history of this matter he has highlighted,

pointing out the many times Bene failed to abide by his court-ordered parenting time and the

equally many times (if not more) he sought court orders to enforce his parental rights. We

are also mindful that the Allocation Judgment, entered by the trial court upon its grant of the

relocation petition, will reduce Ryan’s parenting time with S.Y.—dramatically so, when one

considers she lived with him for the 18 months prior to the ruling. Yet, this is inherent in the

28 No. 1-25-0039

nature of relocation decisions; as parents cannot be forced to live in the same state, one will

inevitably lose parenting time when a child relocates.

¶ 48 Ryan is correct that, if a noncustodial parent has diligently exercised his rights, then a

court “should not interfere with those rights for frivolous, unpersuasive or inadequate

reasons” (In re Marriage of Gibbs, 268 Ill. App. 3d 962, 968-69 (1994)). However, the

record shows that the trial court here provided many reasons that were not frivolous,

unpersuasive, or inadequate in determining that a reasonable allocation could be fashioned—

reasons it supported via record evidence. Moreover, Bene testified that she was willing to

allocate all vacation and holiday time to Ryan and would abide by the court’s judgment.

This is, in fact, what the court ordered, giving Ryan every spring, summer, Thanksgiving,

and winter break with S.Y. in Chicago, and two additional parenting time periods in

California and video call parenting time three days a week. Without more, we cannot find

that this allocation was unreasonable and, thus, there is no basis to reverse the court’s finding

that this factor was neutral.

¶ 49 In challenging the finding that factor (8), the wishes of the child, taking into account her

maturity and ability to express reasoned and independent preferences as to relocation (750

ILCS 5/609.2(g)(8) (West 2022)), weighed more heavily in favor of Bene, Ryan posits that

the court should have instead found this factor to be neutral since S.Y. vacillated when asked

where she wanted to live. He claims that, as the court did not interview S.Y. in camera, it

relied on the GAL, who reported that when she interviewed S.Y. in Illinois, she stated she

wanted to live there, and when she interviewed S.Y. in California, S.Y. stated she wanted to

live there.

29 No. 1-25-0039

¶ 50 It is true that S.Y. vacillated with respect to her wishes about where she wanted to live.

However, Ryan slightly mischaracterizes the GAL’s report in this respect and, more

importantly, his argument that S.Y.’s vacillation should automatically render the factor

neutral does not take into account the full context of S.Y.’s interviews with the GAL. Yes,

when the GAL first interviewed S.Y., it was in Chicago and S.Y. expressed a desire to live

there. However, this was not S.Y.’s immediate response. Rather, as detailed in her report,

the conversation between the GAL and S.Y. regarding where she wanted to live began with

the GAL asking S.Y. “what she wanted her schedule to look like,” and “[a]t first [S.Y.] said

she would like to be in both places equally.” The GAL then explained to S.Y. that “it would

be very hard to go to school in both states at the same time,” and instead proposed a

“recommendation of going to one school and staying put and maybe seeing her mother

during vacation and holidays.” It was only then, after S.Y. initially stated she wanted to live

in both places and after she was told this was not feasible, that S.Y. “said she felt good about

[the GAL’s] recommendation” to stay in Illinois.

¶ 51 When the GAL interviewed S.Y. later in California, as S.Y. lived there for a month, the

GAL asked her to compare Chicago and California. S.Y. “said that both had good points, but

that she wanted to stay with her mom in California.” The GAL noted in her report that when

she “asked why, [S.Y.] said that her mom was a girl and could help her better with girl

things;” which the GAL “sensed that her mother had maybe discussed with her.” The GAL

also asked S.Y. if she “felt caught in the middle,” whereupon S.Y. “burst into tears.” The

GAL comforted her by telling her that both Ryan and Bene loved her and the most important

thing was for S.Y. to feel happy and most comfortable, and S.Y. repeated that, while she felt

30 No. 1-25-0039

happy and comfortable in both locations, “she felt like her mother could tell her things she

needs to know, because she’s a girl, too.” The GAL’s report states: “She then told me that

she really wanted to live in California. But, she continued to be very worried about hurting

or upsetting her father – she did not want his feelings to be hurt.”

¶ 52 At their last meeting in Chicago, the GAL asked S.Y. “if she still felt the same way that

she did in California, about staying there,” and S.Y. “said she didn’t know.” In response, the

GAL expressed that she knew S.Y. loved both parties and did not want to hurt either of them,

which S.Y. affirmed. The GAL then told S.Y. she would not say that S.Y. chose one location

over the other but, rather, would make a recommendation based on what was best for her,

and S.Y. “said yes to that and seemed relieved.”

¶ 53 Contrary to how Ryan reduces the context of discussions between the GAL and S.Y.

about S.Y.’s wishes, the record shows that S.Y. did not simply state she preferred to live in

one place over the other merely because she was physically present in that location when

interviewed. Rather, it is clear that she took other considerations into account, many of

which battled each other: her own comparisons of the locations, not wanting to hurt Ryan’s

feelings, reasoning she could receive more guidance from her mother regarding female

issues, and, as the court recognized, being “very cognizant of the impact of any choice she

make[s] on her parents.” Based on the GAL’s detailed report, we do not believe the trial

court erred in finding this factor favored Bene.

¶ 54 The trial court found both relocation factor (9), the “possible arrangements for the

exercise of parental responsibilities appropriate to the parents’ resources and circumstances

and the developmental level of the child,” and (10), the “minimization of the impairment to a

31 No. 1-25-0039

parent-child relationship” cause by relocation, to be neutral. 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)(9), (10)

(West 2022). Ryan challenges these findings by claiming that the court focused too much on

the availability of technology to minimize the impairment relocation will have on his

relationship with S.Y. with whom he has lived for the last 18 months, while failing to

consider that Bene testified S.Y. will be with her sister all day while she works. Ryan’s

argument somewhat misses the mark. These factors examine possible arrangements, parental

resources, minimization of impairment and the child’s development. The trial court was

aware of the time S.Y. lived with Ryan before its decision. However, again, with relocation

petitions, a school-age child cannot physically be with both parents for equal amounts of

time. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to cite technology like FaceTime and Zoom

calls between Ryan and S.Y. as viable tools to minimize any impairment to their relationship,

particularly since this was in line with the GAL’s opinion on the matter and considering that

S.Y. is about to enter her teenage years. Moreover, while Bene admittedly testified that her

sister will be driving S.Y. to and from school when she is at work, she also testified she has a

flexible schedule. Significantly, Ryan similarly admitted that when he works, it is sometimes

until 9 or 10 pm and, thus, he likewise will be relying on others to care for S.Y. when he is

unavailable. Also, the court noted the GAL’s opinion that S.Y. “ ‘is a very articulate and

intelligent child.’ ” While Ryan has indubitably done much to assist her in her scholastic and

extracurricular development, and while S.Y. loves him very much and wants to maintain

daily contact with him, the record shows that at her level of development—again, 12 years

old and about to enter her teenage years—she has already been concerning herself with topics

regarding her feminine development and has expressed her feelings that Bene may be able to

32 No. 1-25-0039

better assist her in those respects. Thus, that the court found these factors to be neutral was

not manifestly erroneous.

¶ 55 Finally, factor (11) is a statutory catch-all provision, allowing the trial court to consider

“any other relevant factors bearing on the child’s best interest.” 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g)(11)

(West 2022). In its written Order, the trial court enumerated ten points it “gave the most

weight to in terms of bearing weight on the child’s best interest.” These included: the

family’s involvement with DCFS with “unfounded” investigations; the family’s involvement

in criminal proceedings Bene filed against Ryan for sexual assault with a “not guilty”

finding; Ryan’s documented issues with alcohol abuse and treatment, after which he was

granted parenting time; S.Y.’s report to the GAL of Ryan’s excessive use of alcohol; S.Y.’s

report to the GAL of a recent argument between Ryan and his girlfriend in front of her

wherein she believed he was drunk; Bene’s “credible evidence” of past verbal and mental

abuse by Ryan; the GAL’s opinion, corroborated by her observations and those of others, that

S.Y. appears “afraid” of Ryan at times; Bene’s historical interference with Ryan’s parenting

time; Bene’s “little regard” for court orders and authority; and Ryan’s failure to facilitate

contact between Bene and S.Y. and refusing to allow unmonitored (electronic) parenting time

between them while S.Y. has been living with him during these proceedings. Upon

balancing these points, the court found factor (11) favored Bene. Specifically, it stated the

basis for its determination was the “considerable weight” it was giving to Ryan’s “proclivity

to alcohol abuse and aggressiveness,” which have led him to be verbally and mentally

abusive. The court noted there was evidence of instances where Ryan was “drunk” when

with S.Y., and that S.Y. herself reported both that he was “drunk” during an argument in

33 No. 1-25-0039

front of her and that he “can’t help his drinking.” The court found these instances

demonstrate that Ryan “does not consider S.Y. when he elects to drink and act out in [her]

presence” and renders S.Y. “ ‘afraid’ of” him at times, which “is not in the best interest of the

minor child.”

¶ 56 Ryan challenges the court’s determination that this factor favored Bene, at length.

Principally, he asserts that the court gave “unbalanced weight” to allegations of his alcohol

abuse and abuse toward Bene, which he characterizes as “dated and unfounded allegations

made by Bene to bolster” her position in this matter. He argues that the DCFS reports were

unfounded and were filed by Bene immediately before court orders requiring her to return

S.Y. were about to expire, he was never convicted on any criminal charges of abuse, and

there were no reports he ever failed any alcohol testing. He further claims the court wholly

discounted the GAL’s interview with his girlfriend who stated Ryan was not drunk during

their argument, and he points out that the GAL never expressed the need for alcohol testing,

evaluation, or treatment while S.Y. lived with him. In Ryan’s view, he believes the court

permitted “prejudicial evidence against” him of alleged behavior that occurred years ago

rather than focusing on the last 18 months during which he cared for S.Y., resulting in

reversible error.

¶ 57 Based on the record before us, we do not agree with either Ryan’s contention that trial

court gave “unbalanced weight” to abuse allegations nor with his assertion that it manifestly

erred in determining factor (11) favored Bene rather than him.

¶ 58 As we discussed earlier, because relocation matters are sui generis, and because they

center on the best interest of the particular child involved and the unique facts pertaining to

34 No. 1-25-0039

her situation (see Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 57), a court is not required to weigh

or balance all the section 609.2(g) factors equally. Rather, while the court must, indeed,

consider each and every statutory factor, it is inherent that “some factors in a particular case

may weigh more heavily than others.” Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 7; accord

Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32 (the propriety of the court’s determination should not be

reduced to just a simple count of how many factors favor one party over the other).

Accordingly, as long as the trial court considers all the factors, and as long as it arrives at a

reasonable result in light of the evidence accompanying them, then we cannot find reversible

error in its ultimate decision to grant a relocation petition.

¶ 59 Here, it is obvious that the trial court considered all the statutory factors; that is more than

evident in its written Order, wherein the court provided both a detailed summary of the

relevant facts it considered as to each factor and, separately, an analysis of each factor based

on those facts. We have reviewed this exhaustively. When the court reached the final factor,

factor (11), it specifically noted that the statute gives it “discretion to consider other relevant

factors bearing on [S.Y.]’s best interest,” and it went on to enumerate ten considerations it

found significant.

¶ 60 Clearly, the court followed the mandates of the statute as a whole, and factor (11)

specifically—to a T. We cannot find any reversible error in what the court did. Ryan is

correct; the court did give unbalanced weight to his alcohol abuse and his aggressive

behavior. It explicitly said as much. Yet, that was in the court’s discretion, and it was not

incorrect to do so under factor (11). As the court explained, it believed these things had a

35 No. 1-25-0039

direct impact on S.Y.’s best interest, under the circumstances of this particular case. And, the

evidence fully supports the court’s reasoning.

¶ 61 Initially, we note that Ryan’s citations on appeal to the DCFS reports, criminal charges

and alcohol tests are, essentially, of naught. Contrary to his intimations, the court did not

consider these against him; rather, it mentioned them and, just as he does in his brief before

this Court, it discounted them. The court made clear in its Order that the DCFS reports Bene

filed against Ryan had been declared “unfounded,” that Ryan had been acquitted and never

convicted of any criminal charges, and that no evidence had ever been presented that he

failed an alcohol test he was made to take under court order. Undeniably, the trial court

already knew all these points. 8 Moreover, the record is undisputed that Ryan abused alcohol

in the past and, in March 2016, when S.Y. was two years old, his parental rights were

suspended and he was sent via court order to alcohol treatment and required to participate in

regular testing to regain, and then maintain, parental access to her. Ryan completed

treatment and continued to test negative, and his full parental rights were restored in June

2017. For this, he should be applauded.

¶ 62 What the court focused on, however, was S.Y.’s best interest, which it was required to

do. And, in doing so, it found critical this point: Ryan’s current use of alcohol, while in the

presence of S.Y., his aggressiveness, and how these affect her. It was S.Y.’s revelations to

the GAL, and not Ryan’s years-old documented issues with alcohol, that were the tipping

point for the court’s determination with respect to factor (11). And, the record supports its

8 For the record, concomitant with the considerations Ryan claims prejudiced him, the court also balanced considerations that were “negative” towards Bene, including her historical interference with Ryan’s parenting time, her disregard of court orders, and her disrespect for the court’s authority. 36 No. 1-25-0039

views. Long after Ryan’s full parental rights were restored to S.Y. when she was 3 years old,

and upon her interviews with the GAL in 2023 when she was almost 10 years old, S.Y.

reported that Ryan and his girlfriend, Ami (the mother of S.Y.’s paternal half-sister who was

approximately two years old at that time), had gotten into “a big fight, which involved hitting

and the police were called.” That fight took place in front of S.Y., and she detailed that

police took her father’s identification because “he was drinking and shouldn’t drive while

drunk.” In addition to this incident, S.Y. went on to recount to the GAL that Ryan “has only

be angry with her once,” and while “she didn’t think at the time that it was because he was

drunk, [] now she thinks maybe he was.” Ultimately, S.Y. further described for the GAL that

Ryan “drinks almost a whole bottle of alcohol every night,” and S.Y. “knows he can’t help it,

but she thinks he likes how it tastes.” Again, S.Y.’s interviews with the GAL were

conducted in 2023, during the 18 months when she lived with Ryan. 9 That the court used its

discretion when reviewing S.Y. circumstances to find that Ryan’s “alcohol abuse/overuse

and aggressive behavior” were not in her best interest is fully supported by the record.

¶ 63 Ryan’s claims that the court discounted Ami’s interview with the GAL and that the GAL

failed to order alcohol testing, evaluation, or treatment for him are of no avail. The GAL was

appointed by the trial court to give an overview of S.Y.’s living conditions and provide an

opinion on the effect relocation would have on her, not to evaluate whether Ryan has an

alcohol problem or what should be done to rectify it. Additionally, we do not believe the

9 Though the date of the fight S.Y. witnessed is not specified, it can be inferred that it was near to the time of the GAL’s July 2023 interview. This is so because the GAL’s report notes S.Y. recounted the fight upon the GAL’s question of what she liked about living in Chicago, to which S.Y. responded her baby sister, but “she didn’t feel she would see her for a while because” of the fight Ryan had with Ami. 37 No. 1-25-0039

court discounted Ami’s, or anyone else’s, interview or testimony. Again, the court stated in

its Order and during its colloquy on Ryan’s motion to reconsider that it considered

everything presented before it. It is true the GAL reported that Ami, in her interview,

“confirmed the argument” S.Y. described “and that police were called, but not that Ryan was

drunk and not permitted to drive.” However, there was much testimony regarding Ryan’s

alcohol use. The majority was from Bene and her witnesses and, obviously, this placed the

court in the position of determining credibility between Ryan’s former partner who moved

for relocation and her relatives/friends, and his current partner who supports and has a child

with him. But critically, and what else was before the court, was the testimony of Ryan’s

cousin, Holloman, which Ryan does not address here. Apart from her witnessing “heated”

exchanges between Ryan and Bene during pick-up and drop-off of S.Y. that “always” took

place “in front of” S.Y., Holloman admitted “she has witnessed Ryan drink alcohol.” She

testified that on one of these occasions, Ryan drank at her home, with S.Y. present. Though

Holloman described him as “not intoxicated,” she suggested he spent the night there and he

obliged. She further admitted “on that occasion it was possible Ryan may have driven home

with [S.Y. had he not stayed] because he didn’t feel intoxicated.”

¶ 64 Ultimately, the trial court found Ryan’s use of alcohol, particularly in front of S.Y., was

not in her best interest. Based on the record, and just as with all the other factors challenged

by Ryan on appeal, we do not find any error in its determination that factor (11) favored

Bene.

¶ 65 CONCLUSION

38 No. 1-25-0039

¶ 66 We are most certain Ryan loves S.Y. and genuinely wants her to live in Illinois so he can

maintain a close relationship with her. Even the most cursory review of the record

demonstrates this. Undeniably, he has fought since her birth to exercise his parental

relationship with her, and he has, during certain periods of her life, been the parent to “raise”

her. However, “[t]here is no perfect solution inherent in relocation cases, which are

markedly difficult, no matter the outcome.” Kenney, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 68. We

sympathize, and we hope Ryan takes advantage of every opportunity he has been given

pursuant to the allocation of parenting time awarded him by the trial court to foster that

relationship in an appropriate way, both during S.Y.’s future visits to Chicago and his future

visits to California. But, here, we find that the trial court’s decision granting Bene’s

relocation petition was proper and reasonable based on the record and, therefore, there is no

basis of error meriting reversal.

¶ 67 Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 68 Affirmed.