In re Swetic

493 B.R. 635, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 106, 2013 WL 3455947, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2751
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJuly 9, 2013
DocketCase No. 8:12-bk-09142-MGW
StatusPublished

This text of 493 B.R. 635 (In re Swetic) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Swetic, 493 B.R. 635, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 106, 2013 WL 3455947, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2751 (Fla. 2013).

Opinion

Chapter 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEBTORS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Michael G. Williamson, United States Bankruptcy Judge

Section 443.051(2), Florida Statutes, provides that unemployment compensation [636]*636“benefits due ... may not be ... encumbered and ... are exempt from all claims of creditors and from ... attachment ... for ... collection of a debt.” At the time they filed this case, the Debtors were holding $15,631 in accumulated unemployment compensation benefits. They claimed those benefits as exempt. But the Court ruled that section 443.051 only exempts benefits owing but not yet paid.1 As a consequence, because the accumulated benefits were not exempt, the Swetics’ Chapter 13 Plan failed the “best interests of the creditors” test under Bankruptcy Code § 1325(a)(4).

The Debtors have asked the Court to reconsider its ruling because they say that the wording of section 443.051 exempts not only “benefits due” but benefits received and in the possession of the Debtors on the petition date.2 In support of this conclusion, they argue that section 443.051 should be broken down into two clauses: under the first clause, “benefits due” may not be encumbered, while under the second clause “benefits” — whether due or already paid — are exempt from execution. The Debtors’ interpretation of section 443.051, however, is grammatically incorrect.

The words “benefits due” must apply throughout the statute because the statute consists of a compound predicate,3 and the second verb in a compound predicate joined by a conjunction must have the same subject as the first verb. Plus, the word “due” in this case is a postpositive adjective,4 which means it modifies the noun it follows: “benefits.” The Debtors’ interpretation of section 443.051 ignores both of these grammar rules. The Court’s interpretation does not. Accordingly, the Court declines to vacate its previous ruling.

Background

The facts of this case are not in dispute. Before filing for bankruptcy, the Debtors had accumulated $15,631 in unemployment compensation benefits.5 When they filed for bankruptcy, the Debtors claimed those funds (which were sitting in a bank account at Branch Banking & Trust) as exempt.6 Under section 443.051, Florida Statutes, unemployment compensation “benefits due” to the recipient are exempt from execution:

[BJenefits due under this chapter may not be assigned, pledged, encumbered, released, or commuted and, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, are exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, or attachment, or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived.7

[637]*637The Trustee objected to the claim of exemption. So the Court, in considering whether to confirm the Debtors’ plan, had to decide whether “benefits due” included benefits already paid to the Debtors.

That issue was one of first impression.8 Looking solely at the text of the statute, this Court initially concluded that the phrase “benefits due” was unambiguous and did not include benefits that had already been “paid.”9 The Court reasoned that “due” was not analogous to “paid.” But the Debtors pointed to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Broward v. Jacksonville Medical Center, where the Florida Supreme Court held that workers compensation benefits that had already been paid out were exempt from execution under a similar statute.10

The statute in that case provided that worker compensation benefits “due or payable” could not be assigned and that the “benefits” were exempt from execution:

No assignment, release, or commutation of compensation or benefits due or payable under this chapter except as provided by this chapter shall be valid, and such compensation and benefits shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and from levy, execution and attachments or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived.11

According to the Florida Supreme Court, the statute was, at best, ambiguous.12

On the one hand, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the words “due or payable” meant “something owing.”13 Under that definition, then, benefits “due or payable” would not include benefits already paid. On the other hand, it was not clear to the Supreme Court that the words “due or payable” applied to the whole statute.14

After all, unlike section 443.051, section 440.22 (the statute involved in Jacksonville Medical) consisted of two clauses with two separate subjects.15 The first clause prohibited a beneficiary from disposing of benefits “due or payable” — i.e., before they were paid. The second clause exempted “benefits” — without the postpositive adjectives due or payable — from collection once they were in the beneficiary’s hands. The Court in Jacksonville Medical reasoned that the words “due or payable” arguably applied only to the first clause because those words (which refer to benefits that are “owing”) have little relevance to the collection remedies specified in the second clause.16

This Court, in analyzing Jacksonville Medical, noted this crucial difference when comparing the statute in that case with the one in this case: unlike the statute in Jacksonville Medical, the statute in this case cannot be broken down into two independent clauses.17 Consequently, this Court concluded that the words “benefits [638]*638due” applied throughout section 443.051 and did not include benefits already paid to the Debtors.18

Analysis

The Debtors say this Court’s analysis is wrong for two reasons. First, the Debtors say the Jacksonville Medical Court never said — contrary to this Court’s analysis — that the statute in that case consisted of two separate and independent clauses.19 According to the Debtors, the Jacksonville Medical Court only said the statute consisted of two clauses. For that reason, the Debtors say Jacksonville Medical is not distinguishable from this case. Second, because Jacksonville Medical is not distinguishable, the Debtors say this Court should have followed that decision and broken section 443.051 down into a subject (“benefits”) and two clauses (the first clause being “due under this chapter may not be assigned, pledged, encumbered, or released,” and the second clause being “are exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, or attachment, or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt”).20 Under that interpretation, “benefits” — and not “benefits due” — are exempt. The Debtors’ interpretation of Jacksonville Medical and the statute in this case, however, is based on faulty grammar.

For starters, a comma is used with a coordinating conjunction to join two clauses — like in Jacksonville Medical

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Related

Broward v. Jacksonville Medical Center
690 So. 2d 589 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1997)
Trust Care Health Services v. Agency for Health Care Administration
50 So. 3d 13 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
493 B.R. 635, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 106, 2013 WL 3455947, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2751, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-swetic-flmb-2013.