In Re Summit Ventures, Inc.

135 B.R. 478, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1877, 1991 WL 279831
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Vermont
DecidedJuly 9, 1991
Docket19-10013
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 135 B.R. 478 (In Re Summit Ventures, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Summit Ventures, Inc., 135 B.R. 478, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1877, 1991 WL 279831 (Vt. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 7 INTERIM TRUSTEE FOR AN EMERGENCY BORROWING ORDER

FRANCIS G. CONRAD, Bankruptcy Judge.

We are asked, in this matter, 1 to decide between two competing superpriorities; namely, whether superseding Chapter 7 administrative expenses should be paid in full before priority administrative claims in *479 the superseded Chapter 11 case. For policy reasons, we hold that the Chapter 7 administrative expenses prevail over Chapter 11 priority expenses.

On April 27, 1990, Debtors filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., and operated as debtors in possession under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a) and 1108, until their conversion to Chapter 7 cases on April 12, 1991.

Trustee triggered this matter, on April 17, 1991, by filing an application for an emergency order to borrow $35,000 from Debtors’ secured lenders, Lloyds and Chit-tenden. 2 Trustee’s application pleads for the preservation and protection of Debtors' physical property. Pertinent terms of the application include:

[Trustee’s] obligations to Lenders [Lloyds and Chittenden] under the Borrowing Arrangement shall have priority in payment over any other obligations now in existence or hereafter incurred by
[Trustee] and over all administrative expenses or charges against property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 3 506(c), 4 507(a) and 507(b), 5 except for the statutory fees of the United States Trustee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a).
As security for all of [Trustee’s] obligations to Lenders under the Borrowing Arrangement, the Lenders will be granted a first security interest in all of the now existing or hereafter acquired property or assets of the [Debtors’] Estates, subject to avoidance by [Trustee].

Trustee’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Application, pp. 2-3.

Grano, Debtors’ post-petition Chapter 11 operating lender, and one of Debtors’ principals, objects to Trustee’s application on the ground it “derogates from the rights vested in [Grano],” under the following provision of Debtors’ Chapter 11 “Fifth Order for Authority to Borrow Operating Funds.”

*480 To secure said borrowings, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 364(c)(1), (2) and (3), 6 [Grano] shall be, and hereby is, granted (a) a first lien on all property of the Debtors’ estates which is not otherwise subject to a lien; together with a junior lien on all property of the Debtors’ estates that is subject to a lien and (b) priority over any and all administrative expenses of the kind specified in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) or § 507(b).

Debtors’ Fifth Borrowing Order (footnote ours). Grano claims the advances are deemed perfected for all purposes under Debtors’ Fifth Borrowing Order.

Because of the undisputed and obvious need for immediate cash, we granted Trustee’s application, on April 19, 1991. We ordered, however, our approval of the application was subject to resolution of the conflict between the Chapter 11 priority and liens granted to Grano under § 364(e) and: (1) the priority afforded to superseding Chapter 7 administrative expenses under 'll U.S.C. § 726(b); 7 and, (2) the surcharge against liened property that Trustee seeks.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

1. Pre- and Post-Conversion Administrative Expenses.

Trustee reminds us Grano holds a first lien on Debtors’ property, not otherwise subject to a lien and a junior lien. Trustee’s application, if approved, will give Lenders a first security interest in all of the now existing or hereafter acquired property or assets of Debtors, subject only to the valid liens on Debtors’ assets, not subject to Trustee’s avoidance powers.

Trustee says Grano’s rights granted under Debtors’ Fifth Borrowing Order will not be derogated by its application because superpriority Chapter 7 claims take precedent over superpriority Chapter 11 claims under 11 U.S.C. § 726(b).

Grano acknowledges that § 726(b) gives Chapter 7 administrative expenses priority over Chapter 11 administrative expenses; however, “a superpriority granted for funds advanced under section 364(c)(1) should be given priority over all section 503(b) administrative expenses and over all section 507(b) superpriority expenses irrespective of whether they arise in a Chapter 11 or superseding Chapter 7 case.” Gra-no’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Interim Trustee’s Application, pg. 5 (underscore in original).

Grano says a § 364(c) superpriority will prime a superpriority obtained under § 507(b), “as well as superceding Chapter 7 administrative expenses arising under section 503(b) to the extent section 726(b) gives them priority over Chapter 11 administrative expenses.” Id., at pg. 6.

Moreover, Grano argues Debtors’ Fifth Borrowing Order granted a perfected secured status on advances that this Court should continue to honor irrespective of pre- or post-conversion administrative expenses. Otherwise, says Grano, “it is unlikely that lenders would have any greater incentive to lend under either sections *481 364(c) or (d) if their loans could then be primed by any claims other than those meeting the stringent standards of section 506(c) or 364(d).” Id., at pg. 8.

2. Section 506(c).

Trustee says the contemplated Chapter 7 borrowing from Lenders fulfills its duty to preserve Debtors’ property. 8 If Trustee had funds on hand and did not need to borrow from Lenders, Trustee could expend such funds and then surcharge Debtors’ property under § 506(c), subject to the liens granted Grano under Debtors’ Fifth Borrowing Order.

Trustee also argues its application does not affect Grano’s rights because the “liens to be received by [Lenders] neither prime nor dilute the liens granted under the Fifth [Borrowing] Order.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
135 B.R. 478, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1877, 1991 WL 279831, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-summit-ventures-inc-vtb-1991.