In re Summit House

73 Pa. D. & C.2d 752, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 314
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Chester County
DecidedJanuary 20, 1975
Docketno. 448 miscellaneous, 1973
StatusPublished

This text of 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 752 (In re Summit House) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Chester County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Summit House, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 752, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).

Opinion

PITT, J.,

— This is an appeal taken by 106 owners of condominium units at Summit House in East Goshen Township, Chester County, from assessments on said units made by the Chester County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes (“board”). The unit owners appealed to the board for the purpose of reducing their assessments. After hearings, the assessments were lowered. The unit owners now seek further reduction of the assessments and specifically challenge a lack of uniformity in assessments between Summit House and similar apartment buildings.

The parties have stipulated to many facts, among them the following

1. Both apartment buildings owned pursuant to the Pennsylvania Unit Property Act of July 3,1963, P.L. 196, art. 1, secs. 101, et seq., 68 P.S. §§700-101, et seq., such as Summit House, and apartment buildings not owned pursuant to the Pennsylvania Unit Property Act, such as Westtown Mews and Rose Hill, are of similar or identical construction, physical characteristics and cost of construction.

2. Ownership of any property pursuant to the Pennsylvania Unit Property Act does not alter the construction, the physical characteristics, the nature of intensity of use, or the cost of the construction of the buildings thus owned.

3. Despite the similar or identical construction, characteristics and use of condominium and non-condominium apartment units the board has assessed condominium-owned apartment units at a [754]*754higher level than noncondominium-owned apartments.

4. Condominium-owned apartment houses such as Summit House compete on the market with rental apartment units by reason of the fact that the monthly payment to the owner is similar and the only difference is the small down payment required for condominium ownership.

5. Single-family units which are owner occupied are assessed on the same basis as single-family units which are renter occupied.

The statute provides that real property shall be valued for assessment purposes at “. . . the actual value thereof, and at such rates and prices for which the same would separately bona fide sell. In arriving at such value, the price at which any property may actually have been sold shall be considered but shall not be controlling. Instead such selling price, estimated or actual, shall be subject to revision by increase or decrease to accomplish equalization with other similar property within the taxing district.” Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, art. IV, sec. 402, as amended, 72 P.S. §5020-402.

In addition, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides in article VIII, sec. 1:

“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.”

The uniformity standard takes precedence over the fair market value standard and this rule o flaw which is set forth in the statute and in the Pennsylvania Constitution, appears in numerous cases as well: Buerger v. Board of Assessments, Allegheny County, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 561, 149 A. 2d 466 (1959); Hammermill Paper Co. v. City of Erie, 372 [755]*755Pa. 85, 92 A. 2d 422 (1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 940, 73 S. Ct. 831 (1953); Buhl Foundation v. Board of Property Assessments, 407 Pa. 567, 180 A. 2d 900 (1962). Therefore, the question that we must decide is whether apartment type condominia are “similar property” or the “same class of subjects” as apartment buildings for property tax purposes.

It is conceded by the board that the only difference between an apartment type condominium and an apartment building, other than a possible higher market value, is that of ownership. It is the board’s contention that this difference is enough to make a condominium dissimilar property from an apartment building.

The board argues that a condominium is inherently more valuable and, therefore, dissimilar to an apartment building because of the different income tax treatment of owners of condominium units and renters of apartments. However, this dissimilarity rests not with the property but with the situation of the individuals involved. Indeed, the Federal income tax advantage of the owner of a condominium unit is dependent upon his or her percentage tax bracket, and where such a person receives all his or her income as tax free income from municipal bonds, unemployment compensation, public assistance and the like, he or she would not obtain any such tax advantages over one who rents an apartment. Attempting to distinguish a condominium from an apartment building on the basis of the tax advantages to the unit owners, ignores the fact that all such owners are affected differently for tax purposes and some not at all. To be consistent, the Board would have to assess each condominium unit in conjunction with its owner, taking into consideration the value of the tax advantages of ownership to him personally. This would be contrary to [756]*756the scheme of the real estate tax and would also be impractical in that such a reassessment would be required each time ownership of a condominium unit changed or the tax status of the unit owner changed.

For zoning purposes, this court has held that a zoning ordinance failure to provide for condominium uses was not an unconstitutional exclusion because the term “condominium” was but a description of ownership and that the provisions in that ordinance for medium to high density uses such as apartments or townhouses adequately provided for condominiums: Ginter, et al. v. Zoning Hearing Board of West Chester, 22 Chester 359 (1973).

The board also argues that the fact of ownership of a condominium unit is enough to make it dissimilar to an apartment which is rented. However, the board concedes that when assessing a single home, the assessment is unaffected by whether the home is owner occupied or rented by others. This argument seems equally irrelevant upon consideration of condominia and apartment buildings for assessment purposes.

The board cites the Act of July 3, 1963, P.L. 196, art. VII, sec. 701, 68 P.S. §700.701, of the Pennsylvania Unit Property Act, which provides:

“Each unit and its proportionate undivided interest in the common elements as determined by the declaration and any amendments thereof shall be assessed and taxed for all purposes as a separate parcel of real estate entirely independent of the building or property of which the unit is a part. Neither the building, the property nor any of the common elements shall be assessed separately after the declaration and declaration plan are recorded, nor shall the same be subject to assessment [757]*757or taxation, except as units and their proportionate undivided interests in the common elements are assessed and taxed pursuant to the provisions of this section.”

The board argues that this statute is authority to assess condominia at a higher value than comparable apartment buildings. We disagree. This statute merely outlines the manner in which condominia are to be assessed. Each unit and its common elements must be assessed individually. This is so, since each owner of a condominium unit pays taxes only on his unit. Nowhere in the statute is there any mention of valuation. There is no reason to assume that the legislature meant to imply that the sum of the parts of a building is more valuable than the whole.

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Related

Buhl Foundation v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review
180 A.2d 900 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1962)
Hammermill Paper Co. v. Erie
92 A.2d 422 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1952)
Buerger v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review
149 A.2d 466 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
73 Pa. D. & C.2d 752, 1975 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-summit-house-pactcomplcheste-1975.