In Re Sugarman

677 A.2d 1049, 1996 D.C. App. LEXIS 116, 1996 WL 324660
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 13, 1996
Docket95-BG-237, 95-BG-529
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 677 A.2d 1049 (In Re Sugarman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Sugarman, 677 A.2d 1049, 1996 D.C. App. LEXIS 116, 1996 WL 324660 (D.C. 1996).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The Board on Professional Responsibility recommends that respondent be disbarred pursuant to D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (1995) in light of his plea of guilty and conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on seventeen counts of embezzlement by a trustee or other officer of the court engaged in administration of a bankruptcy debtor’s estate (18 U.S.C. § 153). 1 We accept the recommendation. We have not previously determined whether 18 U.S.C. § 153 is a crime that inherently involves moral turpitude. Nonetheless, we have repeatedly held that crimes containing an element of fraud or theft involve moral turpitude per se. In re Juron, 649 A.2d 836 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (mail fraud); In re Sluys, 632 A.2d 734 (D.C.1993) (per curiam) (grand larceny); In re Slater, 627 A.2d 508 (D.C.1993) (per curiam) (grand larceny); In re Bond, 519 A.2d 165 (D.C.1986) (per curiam) (mail fraud and wire fraud). As pertinent here, 18 U.S.C. § 153 requires proof that the person convicted knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to his own use property belonging to the estate of a bankrupt that came into the defendant’s charge as an officer of the court. See United States v. Lynch, 180 F.2d 696, 700 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981, 70 S.Ct. 1029, 94 L.Ed. 1385 (1950). We conclude, therefore, that 18 U.S.C. § 153 is a crime inherently involving moral turpitude, and that respondent accordingly must be disbarred. This disposition makes it unnecessary to determine whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed in the wake of respondent’s disbarment by consent by the State of New Jersey following his convictions. See In re Slater, supra.

Respondent is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia effective immediately. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(f) (1996).

So ordered.

1

. 18 U.S.C. § 153 provides in part:

(a) Offense. — A person described in subsection (b) who knowingly and fraudulently appropriates to the person's own use, embezzles, spends, or transfers any property or secretes or destroys any document belonging to the estate of a debtor shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Jackson
980 A.2d 1081 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2009)
In Re Shmuckler
978 A.2d 182 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2009)
In re Standard
788 A.2d 154 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2001)
In Re O'Malley
683 A.2d 464 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1996)
In re Greenspan
683 A.2d 158 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
677 A.2d 1049, 1996 D.C. App. LEXIS 116, 1996 WL 324660, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sugarman-dc-1996.