In Re Sugarek

117 B.R. 271, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2459, 1990 WL 119151
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJune 26, 1990
Docket19-31096
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 117 B.R. 271 (In Re Sugarek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Sugarek, 117 B.R. 271, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2459, 1990 WL 119151 (Tex. 1990).

Opinion

OPINION

RICHARD S. SCHMIDT, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the Objection to Exemption and Opposition to Debtors’ Motion to Avoid Liens. The Debtors, William Bruce Sugarek and Sharon Kay Sugarek, are farmers and filed a joint petition under Chapter 7 on August 7, 1989. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) the Debtors have chosen the federal exemptions and have claimed as exempt implements and tools of trade under § 522(d)(6): one (1) International Harvester Disc, one (1) John Deere Planter, and one (1) 4849 John Deere Tractor. Jointly, the Debtors’ aggregate interest in property under § 522(d)(6) is $1,500. When incorporated with the spillover provision of § 522(d)(5), this amount is raised to $9,800.00. The Objector, State Bank and Trust Company (“State Bank”), holds a first lien security interest on these items in the amount of $248,477.00. Debtors now seek to avoid this lien in the amount of $9,800.00.

11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(B) provides that a Debtor may avoid a nonpossessory, nonpur-chase money lien which impairs an exemption in “implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor ...”. State Bank urges that large items of farm equipment should not be considered “implements” or “tools of the trade” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(B).

Congress did not define “tools of trade.” Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the term should be employed. A review of interpretations of the term from other jurisdictions reveals a split of authority on this issue. Some courts have held that § 522(f)(2)(B) applies only to hand tools and small implements with nominal commercial resale value: In re Sweeney, 7 B.R. 814, 818-819 (Bankr.E.D.Wisc.1980) (lien avoidance subject to value limitation); In re O’Neal, 20 B.R. 13, 15-17 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1982) (“implements” avoidance limited to small implements); In re Yparrea, 16 B.R. 33, 34 (Bankr.D.N.M.1981) (“tools of the trade” and “implements” avoidance in § 522(f)(2) limited to $750 value in § 522(d)(6)). Other courts have allowed tractors and large farm implements to be subject to the avoiding power of § 522(f)(2)(B): Augustine v. United States, 675 F.2d 582 (3d Cir.1982) (Allis-Chalmers tractor valued at $6,500. subject to lien avoidance since Congress aware that such tools are more expensive than ordinary household goods); In re Liming, 797 F.2d 895, 899-901 (10th Cir.1986) (the $750 value limitation on federal implements did not apply to state law exemption, thus a farm tractor worth $30,000 was a protected “implement”); In re Seacord, 7 B.R. 121, 123-124 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1980) (“implements” avoidance in § 522(f)(2) includes large equipment under state law exemption without regard to value); and Middleton v. Farmers State Bank of Fosston, 41 B.R. 953, 955 (D.Minn.1984) (large farm equipment subject to lien avoidance to fulfill express purpose of Bankruptcy Act).

In In re Trainer, 56 B.R. 21 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1985), Chief Judge R.F. Wheless, Jr. considered the avoidability of a bank lien on a 1977 Mack Truck and a 1980 Temple Hopper Trailer and held as follows:

... the essence of this Court’s holding in this case is that the U.S. Congress did not intend to include large trucks and trailers used in the hauling of goods as ‘tools of a trade’ within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). Had the Congress intended the result requested by these debtors, the Congress could, and would, have said so by specific terms and included the means of transportation by name, i.e. ‘truck, trailer or vehicle’ within the terms of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). Trucks and trailers are generic names in their own right which were obviously known to Congress. That Congress did not use this language is persuasive to this Court that the Congress intended to omit such types of paraphernalia from § 522(f). Id. at 23. (emphasis added).

While trucks may be “generic names in their own right,” under any historical or common sense understanding of the term, a tractor is a necessary “implement” of a *273 farmer’s trade. See In re Liming, 797 F.2d 895,901 (10th Cir.1986).

In Trainer, the debtor-trucker elected the § 522(b)(1) federal exemptions and then under § 522(f)(2)(B) sought to avoid a lien on his Mack Truck, claiming it as exempt under § 522(d)(5) & (6) because he used it as a tool of his trade in hauling commercial goods. The language of the corresponding section of the Texas Exemption Statute is essentially identical to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) and although Trainer took the federal exemptions, Judge Wheless was persuaded by the reasoning of the Texas Court of Appeals in McMillan v. Dean, 174 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1943). The state court held that a truck is not a tool or implement of a trade because a “tool or apparatus belonging to a trade” did not extend to articles or things merely useful to a trade or profession. The McMillan court stated further that the state exemption statute was not intended to encompass general commercial pursuits which require no particular skill in the use of the to'ol of apparatus. While a Mack Truck may not be exempt and the lien not avoidable because it was “merely useful” to the trade of the debtor in Trainer, that case does not directly address the issue presented here and is therefore distinguishable. Further, the exemption statute discussed in McMillan provided a specific exemption for “implements of husbandry” which exemption has been interpreted to include tractors. Wollner v. Darnell, 94 S.W.2d 1225 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1936).

Trucks are motor vehicles licensed by the State of Texas under a certificate of title. A federal exemption for one motor vehicle is allowed by § 522(d)(2). In order to preclude creative debtors from avoiding liens on more then one vehicle by bootstrapping motor vehicles in under the “tools of the trade” language, most courts have held that the common usage of the term “implements” and “tools of the trade” should not include motor vehicles. See In re Tofstad, 19 B.R. 34 (Bankr.D.N.D.1982), In re Meyers, 2 B.R. 603 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1980), In re Steele, 8 B.R. 94 (Bankr.D.S.D.1980).

In In re LaFond, 791 F.2d 623, 627 (8th Cir.1986), the 8th Circuit found that lien avoidance is available on large pieces of equipment and not only on goods of little resale value. The Court held that:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Neal
140 B.R. 634 (W.D. Texas, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
117 B.R. 271, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2459, 1990 WL 119151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sugarek-txsb-1990.