2025 IL App (1st) 242366-U
FIRST DIVISION September 15, 2025
No. 1-24-2366
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re Su.D. and Sk.D., Minors ) Appeal from the Circuit ) Court of Cook County. (THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 24 JA 484 and ) 24 JA 485 v. ) ) GREGORY D., ) Honorable ) Patrick Murphy, Respondent-Appellant.) ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the circuit court. The State adequately proved its claims that the minors were neglected, and the variance between the allegations in the pleading and the proof at trial does not justify setting aside the trial court’s finding of neglect. The trial court’s finding that an injurious environment existed is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and its description of respondent as “evil” does not constitute reversible error. The trial court had jurisdiction to make the minors wards of the court following a disposition hearing as it had already adjudged the minors neglected following the adjudication hearing.
¶2 Respondent Gregory D. appeals the circuit court’s order finding that his minor children
Su.D. and Sk.D. were neglected under the terms of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et
seq. (West 2022)). Following an adjudication hearing, the trial court found the minors to be 1-24-2366
neglected because their environment was injurious to their welfare. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)
(West 2022). Respondent appeals from the dispositional order arguing that: (1) the State failed to
prove the allegations set forth in the petitions for adjudications of wardship; (2) the trial court
erred when it found respondent created an injurious environment; and (3) the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to make the minors wards of the court because the adjudication petition did not
give him adequate notice or there was insufficient evidence to sustain the adjudication finding.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Respondent Gregory D. is the father of Su.D. and Sk.D. Su.D. was born on April 15,
2023, and Sk.D. was born on May 20, 2024. The children’s mother, Jene’a C., has five other
children, whose fathers are not respondent: Zealiyah R., who was 19 years old at the time
relevant to this case, J.R. (age 14), D.V. (age 10), P.V. (age 7), and J.H. (age 4).
¶5 On July 6, 2024, when Su.D. was one year old and Sk.D. was two months old, police
were called to the residence where respondent, Jene’a C., and the minor children lived. When
police arrived, J.R., D.V., and P.V. were hiding in the bushes outside the home. The children told
the responding officer that respondent and their mother were in a fight and respondent was
swinging a knife around, smashing and breaking things in the home, and threatening the children
saying “which one of you wants to die tonight.” J.R., D.V., and P.V. fled the home and went to a
neighbor’s house. The neighbor kept the children for a period of time and then sent them home,
but the children did not go home and instead hid in the bushes. The neighbor called the police.
¶6 When the responding officer arrived, he found the children hiding in the bushes and
spoke to them. The children informed the officer that there was a domestic incident occurring at
the home and they felt unsafe and they were hungry, so they went to the neighbor’s house to eat
-2- 1-24-2366
and find refuge. The officer noticed that the children were afraid, upset, and were wearing dirty
clothes. They were visibly nervous and were shaking. The children would not look at the officer
but were instead preoccupied with looking in the direction of the home.
¶7 When the responding officer approached the residence, there was music blasting, so he
had difficulty making contact with respondent and the children’s mother. The officer observed
that, outside of the home, there were very tall weeds and debris was strewn about. When Jene’a
C. answered the door, the officer observed that the residence was dirty and unkempt. There were
roaches present on the walls and the floors, and dirty dishes were piled up in the kitchen. The
officer asked Jene’a C. if she knew where the children were, but she initially stated that she did
not know, even though it was 9:30 p.m. The neighbor joined the conversation and Jene’a C. then
stated that the children had gone to the neighbor’s house for dinner and the neighbor had picked
them up. The neighbor disputed this version of events, and an argument ensued. Respondent
came to the door at this time.
¶8 The officer spoke to respondent who was unable to tell the officer where the children
were. Respondent denied any involvement in a domestic violence incident. The officer decided
to take protective custody of J.R., D.V., and P.V and he brought them to the police station. The
officer returned to the home the following day, July 7, 2024, and took Su.D. and Sk.D. into
protective custody as well.
¶9 On July 9, 2024, the State filed petitions for adjudications of wardship for Su.D. and
Sk.D. In the petitions, the State claimed that both children were neglected and abused in that
their environment was injurious to their welfare. The State alleged that there was an ongoing
issue of domestic violence between the parents while the children were present. The State cited
the July 6, 2024 incident where respondent and the children’s mother were involved in a physical
-3- 1-24-2366
altercation. The State also pointed out that respondent was in possession of a knife during that
incident and he threatened to harm Su.D. and Sk.D.’s siblings. The State noted that Su.D. and
Sk.D.’s siblings are fearful of respondent. The State claimed in the petitions that both children
were also at a substantial risk of physical injury based on the same allegations.
¶ 10 Also on July 9, 2024, the State filed motions for temporary custody of Su.D. and Sk.D.
The State claimed in the motions that there was an immediate and urgent necessity to take the
children into temporary custody for the same reasons the State sought to have the children
adjudged wards of the court. The State’s motions for temporary custody were granted and Su.D.
and Sk.D. were ordered to be removed from the home.
¶ 11 The case subsequently proceeded to the adjudication hearing on September 24, 2024. The
State first called Zealiyah R. to testify. Zealiyah R. was 19 years old at the time of the events
relevant to this case and she would sometimes stay at her mother’s house and sometimes stay
elsewhere. Zealiyah testified about an incident that occurred on June 17, 2024 that is not
discussed in the petitions for adjudication of wardship. On June 17th, Zealiyah was in the living
room of her mother’s home with two of her other siblings, J.R. (age 14) and J.H. (age 4).
Zealiyah heard her mother and respondent begin to argue in the kitchen. Thereafter, Zealiyah
witnessed respondent begin to walk around the house and break things while yelling about her
and her siblings. Zealiyah testified that respondent said he was going to shoot her and her
siblings and that their grandmother could not save them. Jene’a C. went to the bedroom and was
with Su.D. and Sk.D. while respondent was breaking things and making threats against the other
children.
¶ 12 Zealiyah testified that J.R. became nervous after respondent knocked over a large dresser,
and J.R. fled the house. Zealiyah went out to look for J.R., called her grandmother, and then
-4- 1-24-2366
called the police. According to Zealiyah, this was the first time respondent had threatened to kill
her and her siblings, but J.R., D.V., and P.V. told her about other incidents like this one that had
happened before. A few weeks earlier, J.R. had told Zealiyah about an incident where their
mother and respondent were fighting and they broke things in the house while they argued.
Zealiyah did not testify about the July 6, 2024 incident because after the incident on June 17th,
she left the home and has not since returned.
¶ 13 The State then called DCFS Child Protection Investigator Christina Ferguson as a
witness. Ferguson testified that she interviewed Jene’a C. and the children at their home on June
18, 2024, following the incident Zealiyah testified about on the prior day where the police were
called to the home. The children denied that anything happened. Jene’a C. told Ferguson that
respondent and Zealiyah had merely gotten into an argument. Respondent denied any
involvement.
¶ 14 Sauk Village Police Officer Gary Luke testified about the events on July 6, 2024. He
testified about being called to the home and finding three of the children hiding in the bushes.
The children told Officer Luke about the fight between respondent and their mom, and that
respondent had been breaking things in the house, damaging furniture, and threatening the
children. They told the officer that respondent asked them “which one of them wanted to die
today.” The children felt unsafe and they were hungry, so they went to the neighbor’s house.
Officer Luke also testified about the unsanitary conditions at the home. The officer stated that as
he was standing on the front porch talking to respondent and Jene’a C., he was surrounded by
roaches and there were roaches on the floors and the walls of the home. He testified that when he
spoke to respondent, respondent denied any involvement in a domestic violence incident.
-5- 1-24-2366
¶ 15 The State called DCFS Child Protection Investigator Halema Townsend who was
assigned to investigate following the July 6th incident where the police were called. On July 7,
2024, Townsend met with J.D., D.V., and P.V. while they were at the Sauk Village Police
station. Townsend observed the children to be trembling, withdrawn, and nervous. The children
had an unkempt appearance, and they were visibly scared.
¶ 16 Fourteen-year-old J.D. told Townsend that they fled the home because respondent
threatened to kill them. J.D. told her that respondent drinks alcohol, yells a lot, and he had
previously witnessed respondent and his mother fight physically. J.D. did not report this
information to the previous DCFS investigator because he was scared. Ten-year-old D.V. told
Townsend that she and her siblings fled the home because respondent threatened them and they
were afraid. D.V. stated that respondent was threatening to kill all of the children and leave just
one of them alive. Six-year-old P.V. told Townsend that respondent and her mother were
arguing. P.V. stated that she was afraid of respondent.
¶ 17 After speaking with J.D., D.V., and P.V., Townsend asked the police to bring Jene’a C.,
respondent, and the other children to the police station. Jene’a C. denied that she and respondent
had been in any argument the day before. Respondent also denied any fighting or arguing on that
date, telling Townsend that it was instead “one of the most peaceful days the family had had.”
Respondent stated that a neighbor had come over to the house around noon on July 6th and asked
if she could take the children. Respondent told Townsend that J.D., D.V., and P.V. are known to
lie and they often went out into the community begging for food.
¶ 18 Townsend testified that neither Su.D. or Sk.D. showed any signs of abuse or neglect, but
she believed the young girls were nevertheless at risk in that injurious environment. The State
rested its case.
-6- 1-24-2366
¶ 19 Respondent testified that on July 6, 2024 he was at home cleaning and barbecuing with
Jene’a C. and the children. Respondent did not see J.D., D.V., and P.V. after 11:30 a.m. that day
because he was busy. Respondent testified that the children were upset that day because they
were supposed to go to a pool party, but their aunt who was supposed to take them there
cancelled. Respondent denied that he and Jene’a C. were arguing and instead testified that
everything was peaceful.
¶ 20 On cross-examination, respondent admitted that he has 10 children and does not have
custody of any of them. He admitted that DCFS in Will County had removed his other children
from his care in a child protection case. Respondent rested his case following his testimony.
¶ 21 The State argued in closing that the minors’ environment was injurious to their welfare
and created a substantial risk of physical injury because they were exposed to domestic violence
at home. The State highlighted the threats respondent made to Su.D. and Sk.D.’s siblings, noting
that respondent specifically and repeatedly threatened to kill the children. The guardian ad litem
argued that Su.D. and Sk.D. were part of a neglectful and harmful environment, but they could
not verbalize it because they were not old enough yet to speak.
¶ 22 During DCFS Investigator Townsend’s testimony and during the State’s closing
argument, the trial court interjected to ask if respondent could maybe be viewed as just the evil
stepfather, in that he treated J.D., D.V., and P.V. badly, but that he treated his own kids Su.D.
and Sk.D better. The trial court asked the State during its closing if maybe respondent said he
was going to kill the children, but did not really mean it, and the court asked if the State was
arguing Su.D. and Sk.D. were neglected simply because respondent was “an evil stepfather” to
the other three children.
-7- 1-24-2366
¶ 23 Respondent argued in closing that Su.D. and Sk.D. showed no signs of abuse or neglect.
Respondent contended that J.D., D.V., and P.V. were upset that they did not get to go to the pool
party they were supposed to attend. Respondent argued that the State did not meet its burden as
there was only one alleged threatening statement over the course of four years and no signs that
the children had ever been physically abused.
¶ 24 The trial court found Su.D. and Sk.D. were neglected due to an environment injurious to
their welfare based on the totality of the evidence. The trial court noted that sometimes people
might say “I’m going to kill you” and not mean it, but when “a parent who has been an evil
parent says ‘I’m going to kill you,’ you take it seriously.” The trial court found respondent to be
“out of control” and made a finding of neglect based on an environment injurious to the
children’s welfare.
¶ 25 After Su.D. and Sk.D. were adjudged to be neglected, the case proceeded to a disposition
hearing. The trial court received exhibits into evidence and heard testimony about the children’s
placement with relatives. The court received updates on the children’s wellbeing and on Jene’a
C. and respondent’s activity since the children had been taken from the home. The DCFS
caseworker, Bessie Miles, testified the agency recommended that Su.D. and Sk.D. be made
wards of the court and placed in DCFS custody with the goal of the children returning home in
12 months.
¶ 26 The trial court agreed with DCFS’s recommendation and ordered Su.D. and Sk.D. to be
wards of the court. The trial court granted DCFS custody as the children’s guardian with the
right to place the children in a suitable home setting. Respondent filed this appeal of the trial
court’s adjudication and disposition findings and orders.
-8- 1-24-2366
¶ 27 ANALYSIS
¶ 28 First, respondent argues that the State failed to prove the allegations set forth in the
petitions for adjudications of wardship. Second, respondent argues that the trial court erred when
it found respondent created an injurious environment in his capacity as an “evil” person who
threatened to kill the minors’ siblings as there was no evidence presented that respondent is
“evil.” Third, respondent argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine the
disposition of the minors and make them wards of the court because there was insufficient
evidence they were abused or neglected.
¶ 29 I. Failure to Prove Allegations in Petitions for Adjudication of Wardship
¶ 30 Respondent argues that the State failed to prove its claims that Su.D. and Sk.D. were
abused or neglected because there was no evidence offered at trial to support the specific factual
allegations set forth in the petitions for adjudication of wardship. Specifically, in the petitions
seeking adjudications of wardship for Su.D. and Sk.D. the State made two claims: (1) that the
minors were neglected under section 405/2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-
3(1)(b) (West 2022)); and (2) that the minors were abused under section 405/2-3(2)(ii) of the
Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2022)). The factual basis provided by the
State to support both claims was the same.
“There is an ongoing issue of domestic violence between the parents while the
children are present. On or about June 6, 2024 [sic], parents were involved in a
physical altercation with each other. [Respondent] had a knife during this
incident. [Respondent] threatened to harm [the minors]’ siblings during this
altercation. [Minors’] siblings state that they are fearful of [respondent]. Mother
and [respondent] reside together. ***”
-9- 1-24-2366
¶ 31 Under section 405/2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act a minor is deemed neglected when
the court finds that her “environment is injurious to the minor’s welfare.” 705 ILCS 405/2-
3(1)(b) (West 2022). Under section 405/2-3(2)(ii) a minor is deemed to be abused when the
minor’s parent or another person responsible for the minor’s welfare “creates a substantial risk of
physical injury to such minor by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause
death, disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily
function.” 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2022).
¶ 32 Respondent argues that the State was required to prove the specific allegations set forth in
the petitions for adjudication. He argues, however, that the State failed to produce evidence at the
adjudication hearing that the minors’ parents engaged in any physical altercation, “let alone that
[respondent] wielded a knife while doing so and while threatening to harm the minors’ siblings.”
Respondent points out that the “knife-wielding altercation” was not at all referenced or discussed
during the adjudication hearing. According to respondent, because the State failed to prove the
allegations in the petitions, the trial court was required to dismiss the petitions (citing In re
Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 464 (2004)). Respondent argues that the trial court erred where it went
on to find the minors to be neglected based on evidence that respondent told the minors’ other
siblings in an isolated incident that he was going to kill them, but not while wielding a knife.
Respondent points out that the trial court recognized respondent’s statement could be a harmless
expression under certain circumstances.
¶ 33 Respondent argues that the trial court’s finding of neglect should be reversed because the
State failed to prove the allegations actually set forth in the adjudication petitions and because
respondent was not given proper notice of the allegations eventually used to find the minors to be
neglected. Respondent points out that the State never moved to amend the petitions either before
- 10 - 1-24-2366
or after the adjudication hearing to perhaps make the pleadings conform to the proof in order to
ameliorate the error and save the deficient pleading.
¶ 34 Both the State and the minors’ through their guardian ad litem argue that respondent
waived any challenge to the variance between the pleadings and the proof by failing to raise the
issue in the trial court. The State argues that “[a]ll defects in pleading, either in form or
substance, not objected to in the trial court are waived” (citing 735 ILCS 5/2-612(c) (West
2022)). The Juvenile Court Act permits an adjudication petition to be amended to conform with
the evidence “at any time prior to ruling.” 705 ILCS 405/2-13(5) (West 2022). According to the
State, “[h]ad respondent brought the discrepancy to the attention of the juvenile court, the matter
could have easily been corrected,” but his untimely objection made for the first time on appeal is
statutorily prohibited and impedes the prompt, just, and final resolution of the minors’ case.
¶ 35 The parties’ arguments on appeal reveal that there are two real areas of contention with
regard to the variance between the pleadings and the proof. The first issue is that the adjudication
petitions described one of the alleged events of neglect or abuse as occurring on June 6, 2024.
There is no real dispute that the recitation of this date was a clerical error as the alleged event of
neglect or abuse occurred on July 6, 2024.
¶ 36 To the extent respondent’s challenge to the trial court’s finding of neglect is based on the
State’s failure to prove any neglectful act on June 6, 2024, we find the argument to be waived.
See 735 ILCS 5/2-612(c) (West 2022) (“all defects in pleadings, either in form or substance, not
objected to in the trial court are waived.”). At the adjudication hearing, the parties all proceeded
with knowledge that the relevant incident occurred on July 6, 2024. Respondent himself
introduced evidence about the circumstances of the day on July 6th and none of the parties ever
discussed June 6th. The State filed a motion for temporary custody of the minors at the same
- 11 - 1-24-2366
time it filed its petitions for adjudication of wardship and the motion for temporary custody
contains the correct date. This discrepancy is one that could have easily been corrected if it was
brought to the attention of the trial court or the State and it had no effect on respondent’s
substantive rights. With regard to the date discrepancy, respondent’s argument is procedurally
barred, and we reject it. See In re J.F., 325 Ill. App. 3d 812, 818 (2001) (respondent’s failure to
object to a clerical error that caused a variance between the pleadings and the proof was waived
where it was raised for the first time on appeal).
¶ 37 The second issue concerning the pleadings and the proof is that, setting aside the date
discrepancy, the State did not prove the substantive allegations of the petition and instead
produced testimony about unpleaded events to prove Su.D. and Sk.D. were neglected. The State
frames the issue as purely procedural—it is a challenge to the variance between the pleadings
and proof that respondent was required to raise in the trial court. Respondent frames the issue a
bit differently. Respondent’s contention is that there is not any issue with the pleading itself per
se. He acknowledges the petition states a cause of action, appropriately identifies the statutes
relied upon, appropriately identifies the remedy sought, and alleges sufficient facts.
Respondent’s challenge is not to the pleading itself, but rather to the fact that the State did not
prove the allegations in its petition. According to respondent, the State did not prove at the
hearing that he threatened Su.D. and Sk.D.’s siblings with physical harm during a physical
altercation with their mother while wielding a knife—the factual basis upon which the State
brought the petition to claim the minors were neglected. According to respondent, it is a failure
of evidence not a failure of pleading that warrants setting aside the trial court’s finding of
neglect.
¶ 38 We agree with respondent that this issue is not waived for review. He is challenging
- 12 - 1-24-2366
whether the State met its burden of proving the allegations in the adjudication petition.
Respondent argued during the hearing that the State did not meet its burden, and he has not
waived his right to challenge the supposed lack of proof on appeal. See In re Arthur H., 212 Ill.
2d 441, 477-78 (2004) (emphasizing that the State must be held to its burden of proof and, where
the State fails to produce evidence to support the allegations in its adjudication petition, the
finding of neglect cannot stand and the petition must be dismissed). A litigant does not forfeit the
ability to argue on appeal that the other party failed to prove its case, even if the issue is not
raised in the trial court.
¶ 39 These proceedings are considered to be civil in nature and are governed by civil appellate
rules. In the Interest of Christenberry, 69 Ill. App. 3d 565, 567 (1979). In civil, non-jury cases,
“the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment is subject to review without formal
action to preserve the question.” Ill. S. Ct. R 366(b)(3)(i); see also City of Chicago v. Abdullah,
76 Ill. App. 3d 325, 329 (1979) (failure to raise the issue that there was insufficient evidence to
support the judgment did not preclude review on appeal); People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470
(2005) (“when a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim
is not subject to the waiver rule and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal.”).
Accordingly, we address respondent’s argument that he is entitled to relief based on a failure of
proof.
¶ 40 In the adjudication petition in this case, the State alleged that Su.D. and Sk.D. were
neglected under section 405/2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act because the minors were in an
environment injurious to their welfare. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022). The State
alleged that the minors were in such an injurious environment because “there is an ongoing issue
of domestic violence between the parents while the children are present.” The State continued by
- 13 - 1-24-2366
specifically alleging that, “[o]n or about June 6, 2024 [sic], parents were involved in a physical
altercation with each other [, respondent] had a knife during this incident [, and respondent]
threatened to harm [the minors]’ siblings during this altercation.” The State concluded by
alleging that [the minors’] siblings state that they are fearful of [respondent, and] Mother and
[respondent] reside together. ***”
¶ 41 The State presented testimony from Sauk Village Police Officer Gary Lukes and DCFS
Investigator Halema Townsend who both testified that respondent made threats to the children’s
lives while also engaging in a fight with the children’s mother. The State introduced evidence
during the adjudication hearing that respondent and the children’s mother engaged in multiple
domestic altercations while the children were present and that respondent threatened to harm the
minors’ siblings during an altercation with Jene’a C. on July 6, 2024 which made the minors’
siblings feel afraid. There was evidence respondent threatened the lives and safety of the minors’
siblings on both June 17, 2024 and July 6, 2024.
¶ 42 The evidence shows Su.D. and Sk.D. were living in an environment of ongoing domestic
violence in their home. The evidence showed more than just one isolated incident as claimed by
respondent: there was evidence of multiple domestic disputes between respondent and Jene’a C.
along with evidence of respondent’s history as DCFS had removed other children from his care
for purposes of child protection. We have previously explained that “living in an atmosphere of
domestic violence is undoubtedly injurious to a child’s welfare.” Plowman v. Department of
Children & Family Services, 2017 IL App (1st) 160860, ¶ 22.
¶ 43 Moreover, there was evidence of respondent making threats to kill Zealiyah R., J.D.,
D.V., and P.V. The evidence showed respondent made threats to kill one or more of the children
on multiple occasions in close temporal proximity. The children expressed real fear following the
- 14 - 1-24-2366
threats. The threatening words were accompanied by respondent yelling, damaging furniture, and
breaking things in the home. J.D., D.V., and P.V. elected to flee the home on July 6, 2024 out of
fear and they took refuge with a neighbor before hiding in the bushes. Su.D. and Sk.D. were
inside the home on both of these occasions. The Juvenile Court Act provides that proof of the
neglect of one child is admissible to prove the neglect of any other children for whom the parent
is responsible. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2022). Su.D. and Sk.D. lived in the same home as
J.R., D.V., and P.V., and, thus, they were in the same injurious environment that the court
deemed injurious for the older children.
¶ 44 The State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Su.D. and Sk.D. were in an
injurious environment and could be adjudged neglected under the Juvenile Court Act. See 705
ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022). The trial court’s finding was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence as the totality of the evidence does not establish that the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident. See In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 241, 261 (2008). The State was not required to prove
its allegation that respondent was armed with a knife in order to meet its burden of proving an
injurious environment. Indeed, to meet its burden, the State is not required to prove each factual
allegation in the petition. In re Jeh. R., 2023 IL App (1st) 230006, ¶ 62.
¶ 45 Respondent suggests that his due process rights were violated because the allegations of
the petition were not the same as the evidence that supported the trial court’s finding of neglect.
The essential test of the sufficiency of a State's petition is whether it reasonably informs a
respondent of a valid claim against him. In re Dominique W., 347 Ill. App. 3d 557, 565 (2004).
Here, respondent had sufficient notice of the allegations of neglect and ample opportunity to
investigate and present evidence in defense to those allegations. Respondent was advised by the
pleading that the State was claiming an injurious environment based on, among other things, an
- 15 - 1-24-2366
ongoing issue of domestic violence, respondent’s threats to harm the minors’ siblings, and the
fact that the minors’ siblings were fearful of him. The pleading was sufficient to apprise
respondent of what he was called to answer and to adequately prepare for the hearing. See In re
Harpman, 146 Ill. App. 3d 504, 512 (1986); In re Z.L., 2021 IL 126931, ¶¶ 89-91.
¶ 46 Accordingly, we reject respondent’s argument that the adjudication petition should have
been dismissed or that the State failed to meet its burden of proving neglect as set forth in the
petitions for adjudication of wardship.
¶ 47 II. Finding an Injurious Environment, Particularly Based on Respondent Being “Evil”
¶ 48 Respondent argues that the trial court erred by characterizing him as “evil.” He contends
that there was no evidence offered at the hearing tending to show that he was “evil.” Respondent
suggests that the evidence adduced at the adjudication hearing is very much to the contrary of
showing him to be a habitually aggressive or violent person.
¶ 49 Respondent argues that there was evidence of just two incidents to show the neglect or
his evil qualities. For the first incident, related by the testimony of Zealiyah R., respondent
suggests that the testimony should not be accorded much weight because she admitted it was the
first time respondent had said anything like that, and the other children disclaimed any threat
being made when they spoke to the DCFS investigator shortly after the incident and they told the
investigator they “felt safe.” For the second incident, related by the testimony of Officer Luke
and DCFS Investigator Townsend, respondent suggests the testimony should be disregarded
because it was all hearsay and was not corroborated.
¶ 50 Respondent acknowledges that hearsay is permitted in cases dealing with abused,
neglected, or dependent minors but he argues that the statements were not corroborated as
required. Under section 405/2-18 of the Juvenile Court Act, “[p]revious statements made by the
- 16 - 1-24-2366
minor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence.” 705 ILCS
405/2-18(4)(c) (West 2022). However, “no such statement, if uncorroborated and not subject to
cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.” Id.
¶ 51 Respondent tacitly acknowledges that he did not preserve this evidentiary error for
review, and he invokes the plain error doctrine to save his forfeiture. In re Jeanette L., 2017 IL
App (1st) 161944, ¶ 16 (a party’s failure to raise an issue in the trial court results in a forfeiture
of the issue for appeal). Respondent states that he “invokes the plain-error rule in seeking this
Court’s review of the issue,” but he does not make any specific plain-error argument. A party
forfeits plain error review when he fails to explain how the plain-error rule is satisfied. People v.
Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 61.
¶ 52 Even if we were to set aside respondent’s forfeiture, the hearsay statements introduced in
the testimony of the police officer and DCFS investigator had various forms of corroboration.
The hearsay statements were corroborated by the police officer and DCFS investigator’s own
observations of the children. See In re Walter B., 227 Ill. App. 3d 746, 757 (1992) (an officer’s
observation of a minor crying after the event he described in the out-of-court statement is
corroboration of the hearsay). Both witnesses testified about receiving the minor children’s
statements, but they also testified about the outward signs of fear they observed from those
children as a result of the threats. The minors’ hearsay statements were also corroborated by the
other minors’ statements which were all consistent. The minors’ statements were further
corroborated by their neighbor who spoke to Officer Luke and contradicted Jene’a C.’s
explanation of the children’s absence from the home at the time the police arrived. The hearsay
statements were also corroborated by the testimony of Zealiyah R. In her testimony, Zealiyah
described a similar incident where respondent was threatening her and her siblings with harm
- 17 - 1-24-2366
just a few weeks prior to the July 6, 2024 incident described in the minors’ hearsay statements.
All of the above factors added weight or credibility to the minors’ out-of-court statements and
rendered the statements admissible for these proceedings. In re Z.C., 2022 IL App (1st) 211399,
¶ 51.
¶ 53 Respondent highlights that he denied in his testimony that he ever threatened to kill Su.D.
and Sk.D.’s minor siblings. He points out that the other evidence in the case supported his
testimony that he never hit or otherwise physically abused the minor children during the four
years he lived with them. Indeed, there was no evidence that respondent had ever physically
abused any of the children. Respondent asserts that the instances where verbal threats such as
“I’m going to kill you” have found to be sufficient to support a finding of neglect, the verbal
statements have been coupled with a larger pattern of physical abuse. He contends that the
evidence here only shows an isolated threat that had never been made before and could be
construed to simply convey the intensity of his anger rather than an actual intent to kill or inflict
bodily harm.
¶ 54 The argument respondent makes here is really a challenge to the trial court’s fact finding
after it heard the witnesses’ testimony in a hearing. On appeal, we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn therefrom. Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350
(2006). The trial court found the testimony about the threats respondent made to be credible
while finding respondent’s denials incredible. We cannot second guess the trial court’s findings
to conclude that respondent was merely expressing anger when he threatened to kill the children
rather than that his threats were serious.
¶ 55 There is no requirement that threatening statements such as the ones here must be
- 18 - 1-24-2366
coupled with other instances of physical abuse in order to demonstrate an injurious environment
for the children. “[O]ur courts have made clear that we need not wait until a child becomes a
victim of physical abuse or permanent emotional damage before such a finding [of abuse or
neglect] may be upheld.” In re Jordyn L., 2016 IL App (1st) 150956, ¶ 39. The trial court found
the statements to be serious leading to an injurious environment for the minors. The statements
made by respondent were also more specific than simply “I’m going to kill you” as the evidence
showed respondent said he would “kill all of them and leave one alive,” asked the children on a
different day “which one of them wanted to die today,” and discussed shooting them in the face.
The children understood these statements to be serious as evidenced by their reactions of fleeing
the home, showing fear when the police arrived, and expressing to the DCFS investigator that
they were scared of respondent. Moreover, there was evidence introduced at the hearing that
respondent became angry on multiple occasions and began destroying things inside the home
while making threats against the children. There was evidence introduced through DCFS
Investigator Townsend that respondent drinks alcohol, that he and the children’s mother would
fight physically, and that the children were scared of him as a result of witnessing these displays
of behavior. That evidence supports the conclusion that respondent’s threats to kill the children
were not baseless but a real possibility. The threat of violent acts occurring extended to all
children in the home.
¶ 56 The trial court’s characterization of respondent’s conduct as evil or even if the trial
court’s statement could be construed as an insinuation that respondent himself is evil does not
justify setting aside the finding of neglect. It appears the trial court’s characterization was simply
its way of expressing that respondent’s threats were to be taken seriously rather than being taken
as just an expression of frustration. Our task is to review the trial court’s decision, not its
- 19 - 1-24-2366
reasoning, and we may affirm on any basis in the record, regardless of whether the trial court
relied on that basis or its reasoning was correct. In re Zoey L., 2021 IL App (1st) 210063, ¶ 34.
Here, the State proved neglect stemming from an injurious environment by a preponderance of
the evidence and respondent provides no basis for disturbing the trial court’s finding of neglect.
¶ 57 III. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Make the Minors Wards of the Court
¶ 58 Respondent argues that, if we find he was not sufficiently apprised of the allegations
against him or the evidence at the hearing was insufficient, then we should find the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to make the minors wards of the court (citing Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464
(citing 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1)) (“A finding of abuse, neglect or dependence is jurisdictional,
‘without [which] the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to an adjudication of wardship’ ”)).
However, as described above, we reject respondent’s arguments that either the allegations or the
evidence was insufficient. See supra ¶¶ 41-43, 45-46.
¶ 59 Section 2-21(2) of the Juvenile Court Act provides that, if the court determines that the
minor is either neglected or abused, a dispositional hearing shall be held to determine whether it
is consistent with the health, safety, and best interest of the minor that the minor be made a ward
of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2022). Without a finding of abuse, neglect, or
dependence, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to adjudge a minor a ward of the court.
Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464. Here, the trial court adjudged the minors neglected and because
respondent has failed to establish that the trial court’s finding of neglect should be set aside, he
cannot show that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its subsequent disposition order.
¶ 60 CONCLUSION
¶ 61 Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 62 Affirmed.
- 20 -