In Re Struggs

71 B.R. 96, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 239
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 27, 1987
Docket19-40138
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 71 B.R. 96 (In Re Struggs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Struggs, 71 B.R. 96, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 239 (Mich. 1987).

Opinion

*97 MEMORANDUM OPINION REGARDING DISMISSAL UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)

STEVEN W. RHODES, Bankruptcy Judge.

I.

Because the Court was concerned that granting bankruptcy relief to the debtor, George C. Struggs, would be a substantial abuse of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court entered an order to appear and notice of hearing pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that the petition should be dismissed.

The debtor’s petition lists no priority creditors, and four secured debts. The debtor’s credit union is owed $16,094 on a 1985 Cadillac Fleetwood automobile valued at $17,000, and $16,126 on a motor home valued at $26,000. First Federal Bank is owed $18,000 on a residence valued at $28,-000. Chrysler Credit is owed $8,200 on a 1985 Lebaron automobile valued at $6,000. 1

The debtor’s petition lists $8,544 in unsecured debts.

11 U.S.C. § 707(b) provides:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq.] whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq.]. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.

Thus under this statute, two issues are presented — whether the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of Chapter 7, and whether the debtor’s debts are primarily consumer debts.

II.

This Court has previously addressed the standards for determining substantial abuse. In In re Bell, 56 B.R. 637, 641 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1986) (Bell I), on remand 65 B.R. 575 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1986) (Bell II), this Court held:

This Court concludes that the primary, if not exclusive, factor to be considered in determining whether a debtor’s petition constitutes a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy Code under Section 707(b) is whether the debtor will have sufficient income to repay a meaningful part of his or her debts, within the context of either Chapter 11 of Chapter 13.

Specifically, the Court applied the following tests:

Thus, the Court concludes that the first issue to be addressed is the amount of the debtor’s disposable income. The second issue is then whether use of this disposable income in a plan would result in repayment of a meaningful part of the debts. These judgments are obviously somewhat subjective, but can be guided by the Court’s sense of equity and by balancing the effects on the various parties in interest of granting a discharge or alternatively dismissing the petition. See In re White, [49 B.R. 869 (Bankr.W. D.N.C.1985)] supra. In any case, the presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor, as stated in Section 707(b), must be abided. Id. at 641-42.

Therefore, if the debtor can repay a meaningful part of his unsecured debt of $8,544 in a Chapter 13 plan, his Chapter 7 petition should be dismissed.

III.

A.

The debtor’s disposable income is calculated from his income and his expenses which are reasonably necessary for his maintenance and support and that of *98 his dependents. Bell I at 642. See also: 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).

The debtor has worked as an accountant for a labor organization since 1976, specializing in property accounting. He received his bachelor’s degree in accounting in 1972. According to his W-2 form (Exhibit 2), his total income in 1986 was $59,030, or $4,919 per month, and he testified that he expected this salary to continue for the foreseeable future. 2

With respect to the debtor’s expenses, the Court finds that the following monthly expenses, as reflected in the debtor’s Schedule of Current Income and Expenses and in the evidence, are reasonably necessary for his maintenance and support, and that of his dependents:

Rent 280
Utilities 170
Food 250
Clothes 60
Laundry 45
Newspapers 12
Business meals 3 80
Recreation 50
Dues 12
Child support 680
Total per month $1,639

In addition, the debtor incurs the following yearly expenses for taxes, according to his 1986 W-2 form (Exhibit 2):

Federal income tax $11,808
FICA 3,003
State income tax CO CO ^ OÍ
City income tax o OO CO rH
$18,954 Total taxes per year
$ 1,580 Total taxes per month

B.

The debtor incurs three other categories of expenses which are of substantial concern. The first is an expense of $598 per month on a secured loan to his credit union for a motor home. At the hearing the debtor testified that in his recent divorce he was awarded this motor home and the concurrent obligation to pay for it. He further indicated that he had not decided whether to keep it, although he appeared to recognize prudence of surrendering it. 4 In any event, it appears to the Court that the motor home is a luxury item; the Court finds that the expenses for it are not reasonably necessary for the debtor and his dependents. In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1986) In fact, the expenses saved from surrendering this asset alone will allow the debtor to pay his unsecured debt in full in 16 months.

The second group of expenses which are of concern are the debtor’s automobile expenses. The debtor owns a 1985 Cadillac Fleetwood for which he pays $775 per month to the credit union, 5 plus $93 per month for insurance, $166 per month for gasoline for business travel, 6 and $134 per month for gasoline for personal travel.

In Bell I

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Bluebook (online)
71 B.R. 96, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 239, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-struggs-mieb-1987.