In Re Stroud

219 B.R. 388, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1160, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2248, 1997 WL 875708
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina
DecidedNovember 20, 1997
Docket14-50300
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 219 B.R. 388 (In Re Stroud) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Stroud, 219 B.R. 388, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1160, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2248, 1997 WL 875708 (N.C. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER CONDITIONALLY AVOIDING LIEN OF GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

CATHARINE R. CARRUTHERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

THIS MATTER came on for hearing October 7, 1997 before the undersigned bank *389 ruptcy judge upon the Debtors’ Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien which impairs an exemption of the Debtor, said Motion being filed on September 3,1997; and appearing before the court were David Weber, counsel for the Debtor, John Logan, counsel for General Motors Acceptance Corporation; and Richard M. Hutson, Chapter 13 Standing Trustee. All interested parties were noticed and General Motors Acceptance Corporation [hereinafter “GMAC”] timely filed a written objection to the Motion. The Court, after hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing submitted briefs and relevant case law, finds as follows:

1. The Debtors filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 11, 1996. A Plan of Reorganization was confirmed on December 2, 1996. When the Debtors filed their petition they were and are the record owners of real property located at 12429 Whartons Way, Raleigh, North Carolina [hereinafter the “Property”]

2. On February 1, 1996 a judgment was entered in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation against the Debtors for $3,741.42 plus interest at the rate of 17.95% per annum from July 21, 1995, until the date of judgment, and at the North Carolina legal rate thereafter, and recorded in the Wake County Book of Judgments, Book 294, at Page 299.

3. Such lien constitutes a judicial lien on Debtors’ real property.

4. GMAC’s lien was not listed as secured in Debtors’ Plan of Reorganization. Accordingly, said lien is to be paid as an unsecured claim.

5. On January 1,1997, the Trustee filed a Notice with the Wake County Register of Deeds that Debtors were not to convey, assign, transfer or further encumber said property.

6. On September 4, 1997, the Debtors filed a Motion to Avoid the Judicial Lien of GMAC. Attached to said Motion was a Settlement Statement outlining a proposed sale of said property, although no approval by this Court was sought. Said Motion argues that Debtors should be permitted to avoid and cancel GMAC’s lien prior to discharge in their Chapter 13 case and should be allowed to retain the net proceeds from the sale.

7. On September 19, 1997, GMAC filed a Response to Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien, objecting to any avoidance or cancellation of their lien prior to an order of discharge

8. On October 7, 1997, this Court heard argument from counsel for Debtors and GMAC. Thereafter, counsel for Debtors and GMAC requested permission to submit briefs on the matter.

Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes the following conclusions of law:

The issue in this case is whether the Debtors should be entitled to avoid and cancel a judicial lien pursuant to § 522(f)(1)(A) prior to completing their Chapter 13 Plan and receiving a discharge. Section § 522(f)(1)(A) states, in relevant part:

the debtor may avoid the fixing'of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been enti- • tied ... if such- lien is (A) a judicial lien, other than a judicial lien that secures a debt.

GMAC’s judicial lien impairs the Debtors’ entitlement to a homestead exeihption. However, the Court must determine whether the Debtors are entitled to such an avoidance of GMAC’s judicial lien prior to receiving their discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328 [hereinafter “ § 1328”]: Section 1328(a) provides, in part, “[a]s soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan ... the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan____” The difficulty arises where-' in a Debtor is granted the avoidance of a judicial lien prior to the discharge, inasmuch as circumstances could arise in which the Debtor’s bankruptcy is dismissed. Upon dismissal, “any transfer avoided under section 522, 544,-545, 547, 548,-549, or 724(a) ...” is reinstated. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Although a creditor is entitled to have its lien reinstated, the reinstatement becomes meaningless if the Debtor has sold the property to a third party.

*390 Counsel for Debtors contends that the Debtors are entitled to take the -full value of their homestead exemption even though a discharge had not yet been granted. Conversely, counsel for General Motors Acceptance Corporation argues that such a holding would be improper. This Court has reviewed briefs submitted by counsel as well as case law relevant to the matter and determined that Debtors must complete their confirmed Chapter 13 plan and a discharge must be granted prior to the avoidance of a judicial lien. Any other such holding could lead to inequitable results.

Orders avoiding liens in Chapter 13 are predicated upon the Debtor receiving a discharge in their underlying bankruptcy. Lien avoidance is not available until the Debtor receives a discharge. See In re Simmons, 86 B.R. 160 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1988), In re Hunerdosse, 85 B.R. 999, 1008 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1988), In re Lantz, 7 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1980). Lien avoidance must be conditioned upon Debtor’s completion of the Chapter 13 Plan and granting of the discharge in order to ensure that creditors’ interests are protected. In re Bell, 194 B.R. 192, 198-99 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1996). As counsel for GMAC noted, Debtors are entitled to a fresh start, but only once they complete their Plan and receive a discharge.

In an analogous situation, courts have also held that upon the destruction of collateral, even once a creditor’s crammed down claim has been paid in full, the Debtor’s entitlement to any proceeds should be premised upon the Debtor’s completion of their Chapter 13 plan. The court in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Feher (In re Feher) noted that since upon any dismissal or a Debtor’s failure to complete their Chapter 13 Plan a creditor’s lien would be reinstated, it is proper for the Trustee to hold the proceeds pending successful completion of Debtor’s bankruptcy. 202 B.R. 966, 972 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1996). See also In re Gibbons, 164 B.R. 207, 208 (Bankr.D.N.H.1993) (voiding of lien following bifurcation into secured .and unsecured shall not occur until Debtors fully complete plan).

While 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B) does mandate that a judicial lien be reinstated upon the failure of Debtors to complete their plan, GMAC could withstand irreversible harm in that it could be difficult to reattach the lien or GMAC could be left with no security in which to satisfy their claim upon a failure of the Debtors to complete their Chapter 13 Plan. See Sands v. Blazer Fin’l Serv. (In re Sands), 15 B.R. 563 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.1981). The court in Sands

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Bluebook (online)
219 B.R. 388, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1160, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2248, 1997 WL 875708, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-stroud-ncmb-1997.