In Re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided June 24, 2025·No. 15-25-00109-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00109-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/24/2025 3:08 PM No. 15-25-00109-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK In the Court of Appeals 15th COURT FILED IN OF APPEALS for the Fifteenth Judicial District AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/24/2025 3:08:49 PM Austin, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

IN RE STORABLE, INC.; REDNOVA LABS, INC. (D/B/A STOREDGE); SITELINK SOFTWARE, LLC; EASY STORAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC; BADER CO.; AND PROPERTY FIRST GROUP, LP, RELATORS.

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Third Division of the Texas Business Court

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RELATORS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY

JUDD E. STONE II State Bar No. 24076720 CHRISTOPHER D. HILTON MICHAL R. ABRAMS CODY C. COLL ALEXANDER M. DVORSCAK STONE HILTON PLLC 600 Congress Ave., Suite 2350 Austin, Texas 78701 judd@stonehilton.com (737) 465-7248

Counsel for Real Party in Interest SafeLease Insurance Services, LLC T ABLE OF C ONTENTS

Table of Contents ......................................................................................... i Index of Authorities ....................................................................................ii Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 Argument .................................................................................................... 2 I. The parties do not compete for these customers. ............................. 2 II. Under the Business Court’s protective order, only outside counsel can view the customer list. ............................................................... 2 III. Storable’s willingness to produce the list to others shows that its concerns are empty. ........................................................................... 3 IV. SafeLease will be prejudiced by a stay because the list is needed to oppose Storable’s pending summary judgment motion. .................. 4 V. In any event, the customer list is not a trade secret. ...................... 5 Prayer .......................................................................................................... 6 Certificate of Service .................................................................................. 7

i I NDEX OF A UTHORITIES

Cases

Kana Energy Servs., Inc. v. Jiangsu Jinshi Mach. Grp. Co., 565 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ......... 6 Rsch. Equip. Co., Inc. v. C.H. Galloway & Sci. Cages, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.—Waco 1972, no writ).................................. 5 SCM Corp. v. Triplett Co., 399 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1966, no writ) .................. 5, 6

ii I NTRODUCTION

Storable’s alleged trade secret is not at risk, so a stay is not needed

to preserve it while the Court considers Storable’s mandamus petition.

That petition challenges the Business Court’s order compelling Storable

to produce the list of customers using its facility management software

(FMS) and depends primarily on whether the list is a trade secret. It is

not. But even if it were, Storable’s worries that the secret will be lost

forever if produced are unfounded. SafeLease is not Storable’s FMS

competitor, and the list will be adequately shielded from improper

disclosure by the protective order that Storable helped draft and agreed

to. Indeed, no one within SafeLease will be able to view the list—only its

outside attorneys. And Storable’s admitted willingness to share the list

with others—just not SafeLease’s outside attorneys—shows that its

worries are without cause. A stay therefore is not needed to preserve the

alleged trade secret.

Moreover, SafeLease will be prejudiced by a stay. Storable is

seeking summary judgment on SafeLease’s attempted monopolization

claim while refusing production of evidence needed to oppose that motion.

Storable’s attempts to game discovery should not be rewarded.

1 There is no bell here that cannot be unrung. Storable’s motion to

stay should be denied.

A RGUMENT

I. The parties do not compete for these customers.

Storable tries to manufacture urgency by misleadingly stating that

it and SafeLease are competitors. Mot. at 2, 3, 4. But as the Business

Court recognized when it ordered Storable to produce the list, “the

customer list at issue is for Storable’s FMS customers. SafeLease does

not compete in the FMS market.” 16MR291. Rather, Storable and

SafeLease compete in the separate tenant-insurance market.

Storable is therefore wrong to complain that a stay is needed to

keep its alleged trade secret from being put “in the hands of a

competitor.” Mot. at 3. Storable and SafeLease do not compete for FMS

customers, so no such threat to Storable’s alleged trade secret exists.

II. Under the Business Court’s protective order, only outside counsel can view the customer list.

Storable’s alleged trade secret is not at risk because it will be fully

protected from improper disclosure. The Business Court entered an

agreed protective order—that Storable helped draft—that includes an

Outside Counsel’s Eyes Only designation. 6MR109. That designation

2 includes “trade secrets,” which “may not be disclosed to any party or

employee, representative, or affiliate of a party, except by agreement or

a subsequent Order by this Court.” Id. Storable therefore anticipated the

disclosure of trade secrets and agreed to appropriate safeguards for when

they are produced.

Only SafeLease’s outside attorneys will have access to this list. No

one within SafeLease’s business will be able to see it. Indeed, just

yesterday the Business Court tried to mollify Storable’s concern about

inadvertent disclosure by taking an extra precaution—excluding one of

SafeLease’s long-time attorneys, Mr. Locke, from viewing the list.

32MR1077 (but noting that the “precaution in no way reflects on the

integrity or professionalism of Mr. Locke, which the Court does not

question”). The alleged trade secret will therefore remain protected under

the safeguards to which Storable agreed even after production. Thus, no

stay is needed to preserve it.

III. Storable’s willingness to produce the list to others shows that its concerns are empty.

Storable admits that it is willing to disclose its alleged trade secret

to others, just not to SafeLease’s outside attorneys. Mot. at 3; 15MR285.

That admission reveals the hollowness of Storable’s concerns. Storable’s

3 willingness to allow SafeLease’s expert to view the list—under the same

protective order that applies to SafeLease’s outside attorneys—and to

allow a non-party to view it shows that Storable understands two

important facts it tries to deny. First, that the agreed protective order

here adequately protects its alleged trade secret, and second, that

producing its alleged trade secret in this litigation will not irrevocably

lose or compromise the information.

All is not lost forever simply because a party produces a trade secret

in litigation, especially where there are adequate protections in place, as

here. Storable’s admission shows that it knows this.

IV.

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In Re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

In Re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas (In Re Storable, Inc.; RedNova Labs, Inc. (d/B/A storEDGE); SitelinkSoftware, LLC; Easy Storage Solutions, LLC; Bader Co.; And Property First Group, LP v. the State of Texas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Research Equip. Co. v. Galloway & Scientific Cages
485 S.W.2d 953 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1972)
SCM Corporation v. Triplett Company
399 S.W.2d 583 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1966)