In Re Stinson

302 B.R. 828, 51 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1124, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1859, 2003 WL 22940652
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland
DecidedDecember 9, 2003
Docket19-12549
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 302 B.R. 828 (In Re Stinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Stinson, 302 B.R. 828, 51 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1124, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1859, 2003 WL 22940652 (Md. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING TRUSTEE’S MOTION TO MODIFY DEBTORS’ CHAPTER 13 PLAN

E. STEPHEN DERBY, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the court is the Motion to Modify Plan After Confirmation filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee (the “Trustee”), seeking to increase the original plan base from $23,400 to $45,000.

On January 16, 2001, Debtors filed their bankruptcy case, Schedules and Chapter 13 Plan. On Schedule A, Debtors listed the value of their residence at 310 Greengate Court, Westminster, Maryland (the “Property”) as $87,000. On Schedule D, Debtors listed First Horizon Home Loan Corporation (“First Horizon”) as a secured creditor holding a $81,345 lien on the *829 Property. The lien included an arrearage of $6,000. First Horizon filed a secured claim of $88,151.17, including $7,036.71 in arrearages. On Schedule C, Debtors exempted equity in the Property of $1.00.

Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan (the “Plan”) was amended and then confirmed on June 29, 2001. At confirmation, Debtors provided the Trustee with a market analysis that valued the Property at $110,000. The Plan provided for 60 monthly payments of $390 for a total funding of $23,400. It contemplated that Debtors would retain the Property, and it proposed to pay the pre-petition arrears in full through the Plan and post-petition payments outside the Plan. The Plan also provided that First Horizon would retain its lien on the Property. Pursuant to the Order Confirming Plan, property of the estate would not vest in Debtors until discharge or dismissal.

On April 9, 2003, Debtors filed a motion to sell the Property free and clear of liens for $133,900. In the motion to sell, Debtors stated that First Horizon was owed $80,549.32, per its lien on the Property, as of June 1, 2003. The motion proposed that the net proceeds of the sale would be forwarded to the Trustee to prepay the balance of the Plan.

On May 5, 2003, the court entered an order authorizing the sale of the Property. The order provided that the sale would be free and clear of liens “with all such liens to attach to the proceeds of sale in order of priority, and the proceeds of sale to be forwarded directly to the ... Trustee....” The Property was then sold.

The Trustee filed the instant motion on May 14, 2003, requesting the court to enter an order modifying the Plan. The Trustee points out that the contract sale price for the Property is $23,900 more than the market analysis of $110,000 that was provided to the Trustee at the time of confirmation of Debtors. Accordingly, the Trustee proposes that the Plan base be increased from $23,400 to $45,000 (a $21,600 increase) in order to recover “the value of the newly liquidated asset ... for the benefit of [the] unsecured creditors.” In support of her position, the Trustee contends that the Chapter 7 liquidation test of 11 U.S.C. § 1325 is here applicable. 1

Debtors have filed an opposition to the Trustee’s proposed modification. Debtors argue that the Motion should be denied because modification is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In support of their argument, Debtors contend that the Trustee has failed to meet the two prong test used to determine whether plan modification is warranted, namely, whether there is a change in a debtor’s financial condition that is both (1) substantial and (2) unanticipated. See In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.1989).

In Arnold, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that res judicata bars modification of plans “only where there have been no unanticipated, substantial changes” in the debtor’s financial condition. Id. at 243 (citing In re Fitak, 92 B.R. .243, 249-50 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1988)). The debtor’s reported yearly income in Arnold was $80,000. 869 F.2d at 241. Two years after the Chapter 13 payment plan was confirmed, the debt- or’s income had grown to $200,000. Id. An unsecured creditor then moved for a modification to increase the plan base. Id. The bankruptcy court granted the motion. Id.

*830 On appeal, the court noted that a plan could be modified any time after its confirmation, but before the completion of payments. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)). 2 The debtor argued that modification of his payments was barred by res judicata. Id. at 243. The court held that modification was warranted because there was a substantial change in the debtor’s income (from $80,000 to $200,000), which could not have been reasonably anticipated by the Trustee at the time of confirmation because the $120,000 increase had occurred in only two years. Id. In so holding, the court adopted the “objective test” as applied in In re Fitak, 92 B.R. at 249-50, to determine whether the change in the debt- or’s income was unanticipated. Id. at 243.

In Fitak (which is also cited by the Debtors), the debtors sold their residence and the adjoining property for approximately $20,000 more than their appraised value at the time of confirmation. 92 B.R. at 250. The trustee then moved to modify the plan to recover the proceeds. Id. at 248. In determining whether modification was warranted, the court stated that “post-confirmation modification should be ordered pursuant to 1329(a) upon a showing of changed circumstances which affect a debtor’s ability to pay.” Id. at 250. According to the court, however, case law suggested that the scope of a post-confirmation modification was limited by res ju-dicata. Id. The court concluded that modifications should be granted only in situations of unanticipated changed-circumstances. Id.

The Fitak court found that the trustee should have reasonably anticipated the appreciation in value because the sales of the properties were “explicitly provided for by the [pjlan,” which contemplated the sales 57 months from the date of confirmation. Id. Noting that the trustee knew at confirmation that the plan provided “only for the payment of such portion of the proceeds from the sales as was necessary to ‘liquidate ... [the][p]lan,’ ” the court the denied the trustee’s motion for modification to recover the proceeds. Id. at 250-51.

The cases of Arnold and Fitak are factually distinguishable from the case sub judice. As mentioned supra, the Arnold decision involved a debtor whose yearly income increased by 150% two years after plan confirmation. The Fitak holding contemplated a situation in which the plan provided that the proceeds from the sale of the debtors’ properties were to be applied to the plan.

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Bluebook (online)
302 B.R. 828, 51 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1124, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1859, 2003 WL 22940652, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-stinson-mdb-2003.