In Re Stimmel

440 B.R. 782, 64 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1888, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4768, 2010 WL 5392881
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedNovember 23, 2010
Docket19-10600
StatusPublished

This text of 440 B.R. 782 (In Re Stimmel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Stimmel, 440 B.R. 782, 64 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1888, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4768, 2010 WL 5392881 (Ohio 2010).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

RICHARD L. SPEER, Bankruptcy Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on the Motion of the United States Trustee to Dismiss this case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1), § 707(b)(2) and § 707(b)(3). (Doc. No. 13). The Debtor filed a response, objecting to the dismissal of his case. (Doc. No. 26). A Hearing was then held on the matter. (Doc. No. 22). At the conclusion of the Hearing, the Court de *783 ferred ruling on the Motion to Dismiss so as to afford the opportunity to further consider the evidence and arguments submitted by the Parties. The Court has now had this opportunity. Based upon a review of the applicable information, as well as the entire record of this case, the Court finds, for the reasons now explained, that the Motion of the United States Trustee to Dismiss has merit.

FACTS

The Debtor, James Stimmel, is a divorced, middle-aged man. The Debtor presently lives with his two sons, ages 14 and 18. Both of the Debtor’s sons are dependent upon him for their financial support.

On June 14, 2010, the Debtor filed a petition in this Court for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (Doc. No. 1). At the time he filed his petition for bankruptcy relief, the Debtor was employed as production technician with the Ford Motor Company. The Debtor has been with his employer for almost 13 years, and anticipates that he will continue to work in his present occupation for the foreseeable fixture.

From his employment, the Debtor reported that he earns a gross monthly salary of $4,936.53, equating to $59,238.36 annually. From his salary, the Debtor reported that he has $1,250.34 in mandatory, monthly deductions, leaving him with a net monthly income of $3,686.19. The necessary, monthly expenses claimed by the Debtor were comprised of two components: (1) $1,003.51 for taxes and social security; and (2) $246.83 for union dues.

Against his income, the Debtor disclosed that, to support himself and his two dependents, he requires $3,614.75 in necessary, monthly expenses, thus leaving his household budget with a slight surplus of $71.44 per month. As a part of these necessary expenditures, the Debtor included an allocation of $230.00 per month for phone and cable service.

As for his balance sheet, the Debtor disclosed that he has property interests valued at $137,072.99. Of this amount, $72,900.00 constitutes the value assigned to his residence. The Debtor’s remaining property consists of personalty. Of significance, the Debtor reported that he has an exempt retirement account with a value of $45,816.31. The Debtor also reported ownership of two automobiles: a 2009 Ford Focus worth $16,000.00; and a 1994 Ford Aerostar worth $1,000.00.

On the other side of the balance sheet, the Debtor set forth that he has liabilities totaling $154,894.89. Of his liabilities, $85,393.00 constitutes secured debt, with the remaining debt, totaling $69,501.89, being unsecured. The secured obligations are held against the Debtor’s residence and one of his automobiles, the Ford Focus. For his residence, the Debtor disclosed the existence of three mortgages, totaling $67,957.00. In turn, the Debtor set forth that a lien encumbers his Ford Focus in the amount of $17,436.00.

On July 27, 2010, the United States Trustee brought the action now before the Court, alleging that granting relief to the Debtor would be an abuse for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). On September 22, 2010, the Hearing was held on this matter. At the Hearing, the Debtor did not report any serious health concerns, but did disclose that he has a condition which may cause him to again take a medical leave of absence from work.

DISCUSSION

This matter is before the Court on the Motion of the United States Trustee to Dismiss. Matters concerning the dismissal of a case, which affects both the ability of a debtor to receive a discharge and directly affects the creditor-debtor rela *784 tionship, are core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(J)/(O). As a core proceeding, this Court has been conferred with the jurisdictional authority to enter a final order in this matter. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

The Motion of the United States Trustee (“UST”) to Dismiss is brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1), § 707(b)(2) and § 707(b)(3). These sections operate together, with § 707(b)(1) first setting forth the foundational mandate, providing that, where the granting of relief under Chapter 7 would be an abuse, the debtor’s case is to be dismissed. In the specific language of § 707(b)(1):

(b)(1) After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, trustee (or bankruptcy administrator, if any), or any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or, with the debtor’s consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter 11 or 18 of this title, if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter.

This provision serves the purpose of preventing debtors from simply walking away from their legal obligations by limiting Chapter 7 relief to only those debtors truly in “need” of such relief. In re Oot, 368 B.R. 662, 670 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2007).

Sections 707(b)(2) and 707(b)(3) set forth separate methodologies by which a determination of abuse is to be assessed under § 707(b)(1). First, under an objective ‘means test’ formula prescribed by § 707(b)(2), abuse will be presumed to exist when a ‘disposable income’ threshold is exceeded. In the alternative, § 707(b)(3) requires a court to undertake a subjective assessment of a debtor’s financial situation, providing that abuse should be found to be present if it is determined that the debtor filed either their petition in bad faith or when the totality of the circumstances surrounding the debtor’s financial situation demonstrate abuse. If either of the methods set forth in § 707(b)(2) or § 707(b)(3) then result in a finding of abuse, the case becomes ripe for dismissal under § 707(b)(1). In re Longo, 364 B.R. 161, 164 (Bankr.D.Conn.2007).

For the two methodologies prescribed in § 707(b) for assessing abuse, the Court, having reviewed the Debtor’s financial situation, finds that the dismissal of this case is warranted under § 707(b)(3). In full, this provision provides:

(3) In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the presumption in subparagraph (A)(i) of such paragraph does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider—
(A) whether the debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or

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Related

In Re Longo
364 B.R. 161 (D. Connecticut, 2007)
In Re Blankenship
398 B.R. 457 (N.D. Ohio, 2008)
In Re Jordan
428 B.R. 430 (N.D. Ohio, 2010)
In Re Oot
368 B.R. 662 (N.D. Ohio, 2007)
In Re Gonzalez
378 B.R. 168 (N.D. Ohio, 2007)
In Re Briggs
440 B.R. 490 (N.D. Ohio, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
440 B.R. 782, 64 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1888, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4768, 2010 WL 5392881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-stimmel-ohnb-2010.