NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: GREGORY STEPNEY APPEAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OF GREGORY STEPNEY : PENNSYLVANIA :
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: No. 1419 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-MD-0001687-2024
IN RE: GREGORY STEPNEY APPEAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OF GREGORY STEPNEY : PENNSYLVANIA :
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: No. 1549 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-MD-0001688-2024
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 16, 2026 Appellant, Gregory Stepney, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, denying Appellant’s petition for review of the disapproval of two private criminal complaints (“PCCs”). We affirm.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
In 2024, Appellant submitted a PCC to the Dauphin County District Attorney’s Office. In it, Appellant alleged that Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Trevor Skripko had committed perjury, false statements, and fraud. Appellant claimed that Trooper Skripko falsified an affidavit of probable cause, fabricated evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence, and fraudulently obtained a warrant for Appellant’s arrest. Also in 2024, Appellant submitted a second PCC alleging improper conduct on the part of PSP Corporal Jason Groff. Appellant maintained that Corporal Groff had committed perjury, false swearing in official matters, unsworn falsification to authorities, and intimidation of a witness or victim. Appellant alleged that Corporal Groff neglected his duties as the supervisor who reviewed and approved Trooper Skripko’s investigation. The district attorney subsequently disapproved of both PCCs.
On September 5, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se petition for review of the district attorney’s disapproval of the PCCs.1 On December 10, 2024, the district attorney filed his reasons for denying the PCCs. Among other things, the district attorney found that the PCCs failed to provide sufficient evidence to support all elements of some of the claimed offenses. The district attorney also stated that Appellant was alleging tortious conduct on the part of PSP, and Appellant “can seek civil redress.” (Reasons for Denial of PCCs, filed
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1 Appellant submitted his pro se filing, styled as a “letter of appeal,” at two different docket numbers.
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12/10/24, at ¶7). The court conducted a hearing on the matter on August 27, 2025. On September 15, 2025, the court denied Appellant’s pro se petition for review.
Appellant timely filed one pro se notice of appeal, listing each of the underlying docket numbers, on October 13, 2025. On October 22, 2025, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his pro se Rule 1925(b) statement on November 4, 2025. On November 7, 2025, this Court ordered Appellant to file amended notices of appeal, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker, 646 Pa. 456, 185 A.3d 969 (2018). Appellant subsequently complied. Thereafter, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.
Appellant now raises the following issues for our review:
Why wasn’t [Appellant] afforded the courtesy, opportunity or latitude to correct mistakes in either of his complaints and should the initial complaints be allowed to be amended by leave of the court?
Did the [trooper] have probable cause to obtain a warrant to arrest?
Does falsifying an affidavit of probable cause equate to perjury?
Does the Fourth Amendment apply to all warrants or just warrants for search and seizures?
Does the PSP have a duty towards the civilian population?
Is a breach of that duty considered negligence?
Does omission of exculpatory evidence in an investigative report fall within the PSP’s scope of duty in a criminal
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investigation? Is this considered perjury by omission?
Does omission of reports in a criminal investigation fall within PSP’s scope of duty in a criminal investigation? Would this action be in direct violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling on: Brady v. MD, Franks v. Delaware, Giglio v.
United States?
Does falsifying, misrepresentation and the omission of documents and reports fall within the scope of duty for the PSP?
Does a PSP officer have discretion on what evidence to submit to the district attorney?
Does the fact that IAD gave incorrect information about an officer’s discretion, ADA Rickert shelving the criminal complaint for over 100 days, ADA Sprow gave false information about perjury and Brady violations, ADA Farabella not reviewing any evidence, and that DA Chardo did not enforce his Giglio protocol for law enforcement and knew about all of this in addition to also knowing that the officer-initiated contact with Freetown, MA PD and withheld reports, equate to bad faith?
Does falsifying, misrepresentation and the omission of documents and reports fall within the scope of duty for the PSP?
Does initiating contact with outside law enforcement agencies, perjury, misrepresentation of information, reckless disregarding of tangible facts and evidence, and the omission of documents and reports establish (mens rea)
state of mind for negligent malicious specific intent?
Has [Appellant] provided enough evidence to sufficiently establish the state of mind (mens rea) for perjury and does a jury ultimately decide?
Does lying or falsifying an affidavit of probable cause invalidate a warrant to arrest?
Did the Commonwealth employees have probable cause to obtain a warrant to arrest?
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Does a falsified affidavit of probable cause or perjury cause of action give rise to a legitimate cause of action claim of false arrest and U.S.C. Fourth Amendment violation?
Is a reviewing officer of the PSP culpable or complicit in his subordinate’s actions?
Does [Appellant] meet all requirements necessary to pursue a cause of action prima facie for alleged perjury and subordination of perjury?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5-8).
Preliminarily, we observe that appellate briefs must conform in all material respects to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See also Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing specific requirements of each subsection of brief on appeal). Regarding the argument section of an appellate brief, Rule 2119(a) provides:
Rule 2119. Argument
(a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
“[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 703, 940 A.2d 362 (2008) (internal citations
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omitted). If a deficient brief hinders this Court’s ability to address any issue on review, we shall consider the issue waived. See Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding appellant waived appellate issue where he failed to support claim with relevant citations to case law and record). See also In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 618 Pa. 677, 56 A.3d 398 (2012) (holding appellant waived issue where argument portion of appellant’s brief lacked meaningful discussion of, or citation to, relevant legal authority regarding issue). Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon an appellant. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 695, 879 A.2d 782 (2005).
Instantly, Appellant raises nineteen issues in his statement of questions presented. Nevertheless, the argument section of his brief is not divided into separate sections corresponding to each question presented. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Instead, Appellant reraises the claims that were set forth in his PCCs, which are followed by his assertions of malfeasance on the part of the district attorney’s office and the trial court. Appellant also fails to provide any cogent argument regarding reversible error in consideration of the applicable standard of review on appeal. Absent some recognition of the relevant standards governing this Court’s review of the instant claims, we cannot engage in meaningful review, and the claims are waived. See Hardy, supra; Gould, supra.
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Even if Appellant properly preserved his issues on appeal, he would not be entitled to relief. To the extent that we can distill a cognizable argument from the sea of bald assertions in the 104-page brief, Appellant challenges the district attorney’s bases for disapproving the PCCs, as well as the court’s denial of Appellant’s petitions for review. Appellant claims that the district attorney acted as “defense counsel for the Commonwealth’s defendants.” (Appellant’s Brief at 19). Appellant insists that the district attorney did not conduct a proper investigation into the conduct of the PSP, and Appellant maintains that he established a prima facie case for all charges set forth in the PCCs.
Appellant adds that the district attorney and trial court acted in bad faith in this case, which is part of “a culture of protection of rogue police officers” in Dauphin County. (Id. at 82). Specifically, Appellant contends that the assistant district attorneys involved in this matter “shelved the [PCCs] for over 100 days,” and they disapproved the PCCs “without any due diligence,” reviewing of evidence, or discovery. (Id. at 83, 84). Appellant also emphasizes that “[t]he district attorney’s office has never challenged [Appellant’s] assertions” about the purported misconduct. (Id. at 85). Appellant concludes that the court erred when it denied his petitions for review of the disapproval of the PCCs. We disagree.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506 governs the approval of a PCC as follows:
Rule 506. Approval of Private Complaints
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(A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it without unreasonable delay.
(B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:
(1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate this decision on the complaint form and transmit it to the issuing authority;
(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state the reasons on the complaint form and return it to the affiant. Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court of common pleas for review of the decision.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 506. If the district attorney disapproves a PCC, the affiant may petition the Court of Common Pleas for review, pursuant to Rule 506. See In re Private Complaint of Adams, 764 A.2d 577, 580 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2000).
“[A] reviewing court may only overturn a disapproval decision under Rule 506(B)(2) if the private complainant demonstrates that the disapproval decision amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional.” In re Ajaj, 675 Pa. 655, 660, 288 A.3d 94, 97 (2023).
In light of the Ajaj holding and the statements of the Supreme Court therein, … the appellate standard of review for a trial court’s review of a district attorney’s disapproval of a private, criminal complaint is the same as any other sufficiency-of-the-evidence review: de novo. In conducting such a review, this Court must examine all of the evidence admitted at the hearing, together with any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the trial court ruled. Critically, the trial court, as the fact finder, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented in judging the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded the evidence produced. Whether all the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the favor of the party who prevailed below are
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sufficient to prove bad faith, fraud, or unconstitutionality is a pure question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.
In re Private Criminal Complaint Filed by Animal Outlook, 349 A.3d 229, 234 (Pa.Super. 2025), appeal denied, 2026 WL 2236772 (Pa. August 4, 2026) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“[B]ad faith is demonstrated when the prosecutor acted with a fraudulent, dishonest, or corrupt purpose.” In re Ajaj, supra at 681, 288 A.3d at 109. “[T]he foregoing standard of review ensures that a court of common pleas will afford proper deference to the discretionary decision of the prosecutor—a member of the executive branch of the Commonwealth’s government.” Id. at 681, 288 A.3d at 109-10. Moreover,
it is not the function of our courts to direct the day-to-day operations of the district attorney’s office. If the voters in a specific county disagree with the executive decisions of their district attorney, the proper recourse is at the ballot box, not in our courts. Absent affirmative proof of bad faith, fraud, or unconstitutionality, the district attorney is free to prosecute whatever crimes he or she chooses.
In re Private Criminal Complaint Filed by Animal Outlook, supra at 236.
“A private criminal complaint must at the outset set forth a prima facie case of criminal conduct.” In re Miles, 170 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa.Super. 2017). “In deciding whether a prima facie case has been made out, the prosecutor considers both the content of the complaint, and the result of her own investigation of the case.” In re Private Complaint of Adams, supra at 580.
Even if the facts recited in the complaint make out a prima
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facie case, the district attorney cannot blindly bring charges, particularly where an investigation may cause him to question their validity. Forcing the prosecutor to bring charges in every instance where a complaint sets out a prima facie case would compel the district attorney to bring cases he suspects, or has concluded via investigation, are meritless. The public prosecutor is duty bound to bring only those cases that are appropriate for prosecution. This duty continues throughout a criminal proceeding and obligates the district attorney to withdraw charges when he concludes, after investigation, that the prosecution lacks a legal basis.
In re Miles, supra at 535 (internal citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellant’s PCCs were based on his own uncorroborated assertions against Trooper Skripko and Corporal Groff. In denying Appellant’s petition for review, the trial court explained:
Although Appellant has made voluminous filings throughout this case, his filings tend to repeat his conclusions without any evidence that the decision of [the district attorney] was patently discriminatory, arbitrary, or pretextual, and not in the public interest. When he had the hearing before the [c]ourt on August 27, 2025, he spent more than half of his time attempting to persuade this jurist to recuse himself from the instant case, rather than present the merits of his case. Similarly, Appellant’s concise statement of errors complained of on appeal deals primarily with the recusal issue.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/23/26, at 3-4) (internal footnote and record citation omitted).
We have reviewed the record, which includes the PCCs and petition for review. We agree with the court’s conclusion that Appellant’s pro se filings tend to repeat his allegations and conclusions without adequate consideration of the relevant legal standards. Much like his appellate brief, Appellant’s trial
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court filings were devoted to explaining why a prima facie case exists. Appellant has not acknowledged, however, that a district attorney may question the validity of bringing charges, even if a PCC makes out a prima facie case. See In re Miles, supra. Our standard of review now mandates that we consider whether all the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom, in the favor of the party who prevailed below, are sufficient to prove bad faith, fraud, or unconstitutionality. See In re Private Criminal Complaint Filed by Animal Outlook, supra. On this record, we cannot say that Appellant supplied the affirmative proof necessary to satisfy his burden. Accordingly, Appellant’s issues are waived and meritless in any event.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/16/2026