In Re Standard Jury Inst.-Criminal Cases

765 So. 2d 692, 2000 WL 329427
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedMarch 30, 2000
DocketSC94788
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 765 So. 2d 692 (In Re Standard Jury Inst.-Criminal Cases) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Standard Jury Inst.-Criminal Cases, 765 So. 2d 692, 2000 WL 329427 (Fla. 2000).

Opinion

765 So.2d 692 (2000)

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL CASES (99-1).

No. SC94788.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 30, 2000.

Honorable Philip J. Padovano, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner.

Honorable Barry M. Cohen, County Court Judge, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Bennett H. Brummer and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, Responding.

PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases has submitted to this Court proposed amendments to the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.985.

The committee published proposed new and revised instructions in the August 15, 1998, edition of The Florida Bar News, and received comments thereon. The committee rejected some of the comments but embraced others and accordingly modified its proposed instructions and submitted same to this Court as follows:

Proposal 1: A Revised Instruction on Williams Rule Evidence
Proposal 2: A New Instruction for the Crime of Felony Battery
Proposal 3: A New Instruction for the Crime of Aggravated Stalking
Proposal 4: A New Instruction for Offenses Involving Contraband in Juvenile Facilities
Proposal 5: A Revised Instruction for the Crime of Driving Under the Influence
Proposal 6: A New Instruction for Taking Deer or Turkey with a Gun and Light
Proposal 7: A New Instruction for the Crime of Using a Self-Defense Weapon
Proposal 8: A New Instruction for Offenses Involving Contraband in Specified Locations
Proposal 9: A New Instruction for the Crime of Voyeurism
Proposal 10: A New Instruction for Eluding an Officer (Fleeing or Failure to Stop)
Proposal 11: A New Instruction for Eluding an Officer (Willful Fleeing/ Siren and Lights)
Proposal 12: A New Instruction for Eluding an Officer (High Speed/ Recklessness)
Proposal 13: A New Instruction for Crimes Motivated by Prejudice

Due to the committee's modifications, this Court ordered republication of the committee's proposed instructions in the March 1, 1999, edition of The Florida Bar *693 News and ultimately received several additional comments (including several from Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit). This Court then requested the committee's feedback regarding the additional comments, which the committee in turn provided, along with several resulting modifications to its proposed instructions. The committee then suggested several additional modifications in response to a letter from this Court expressing several technical concerns. We discuss below only those instances where we have further modified the proposed instructions that the committee ultimately submitted to this Court.

CONTRABAND IN JUVENILE FACILITY

As ultimately submitted to this Court, the committee's proposed instruction regarding contraband in a juvenile facility required the State to prove that the defendant introduced, removed, or possessed contraband in a juvenile detention facility or commitment program, and that he or she "did not do so through regular channels or as authorized by the [facility superintendent] [program director] [manager]." We have stricken the "through regular channels" alternative, as it is not provided in the statute that controls here. See § 985.4046, Fla. Stat. (1997). According to its comment (which we strike in pertinent part as well), the committee appears to have borrowed the "through regular channels" language from the statute and corresponding standard jury instruction that apply in the similar, but by no means identical, context regarding contraband in a county detention facility. See § 951.22(1), Fla. Stat. (1997).

Furthermore, as pointed out by Assistant Public Defender Stanton, the statute that controls in the present context explicitly provides two additional alternatives not reflected in the committee's proposed instruction. Specifically, in addition to being authorized by the facility superintendent, program director, or manager, items regarded as contraband under the statute may also be authorized "through program policy or operating procedure." § 985.4046(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). We have accordingly added these two alternatives to the committee's proposed instruction.

FLEEING TO ELUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

As ultimately submitted to this Court, the committee's proposed instruction regarding fleeing to elude a law enforcement officer under section 316.1935(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) (fleeing/failure to stop), was not explicitly clear that the State must prove the subject defendant's knowledge not only of the order to stop but also of the fact that the person who ordered the stop was a duly authorized law enforcement officer. As urged by Assistant Public Defender Stanton, we have incorporated language from the controlling statute to ensure that these knowledge requirements are accurately reflected in the instruction. See § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). As further urged by Assistant Public Defender Stanton, we have also incorporated these knowledge requirements in the two remaining fleeing-to-elude instructions proposed by the committee under sections 316.1935(2) (willful fleeing/siren and lights) and 316.1935(3) (high speed/ recklessness), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), respectively.

Furthermore, all three of the fleeing-to-elude instructions proposed by the committee originally defined the term "operator" in conformity with the statutory definition of that term as "[a]ny person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the highway, or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle." § 316.003(25), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). Assistant Public Defender Stanton urges that "[i]t is difficult to see how someone steering a towed vehicle could `willfully' flee or elude an officer" in violation of the fleeing-to-elude statute, and the committee *694 acknowledges that "the possibility of such a prosecution is extremely remote." Nevertheless, we are loathe to deviate from the statutory definition of the term "operator" quoted above. We instead incorporate Assistant Public Defender Stanton's suggestion to bracket the clause at issue in the fleeing-to-elude instructions for use in the presumably rare case in which the need arises.

Finally, the committee has identified its three proposed fleeing-to-elude instructions as "new" instructions. However, these three instructions are actually revising and expanding upon an already-existing fleeing-to-elude instruction. We have accordingly treated the three proposed fleeing-to-elude instructions as "revised" instructions in the appendix to this opinion.

CRIMES MOTIVATED BY PREJUDICE

As with the fleeing-to-elude instructions discussed above, the committee has identified its proposed instruction regarding crimes motivated by prejudice as a "new" instruction. However, we note that such an instruction already exists, a fact which more accurately renders the committee's present proposed instruction a "revised" instruction. We have accordingly treated it as such in the appendix to this opinion.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2018-12.
272 So. 3d 243 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2019)
In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2018-09.
262 So. 3d 59 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2019)
In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2018-07.
259 So. 3d 743 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2018)
In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2017-05.
236 So. 3d 244 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2018)
In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report 2016-09
216 So. 3d 497 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2017)
In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—report 2016-04
206 So. 3d 14 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2016)
In Re STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES-REPORT NO. 2013-04
166 So. 3d 161 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2015)
United States v. Smith
772 F.3d 680 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
United States v. Russell M. Johnson, Jr.
570 F. App'x 852 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2012-05
131 So. 3d 755 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2013)
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2010-05
87 So. 3d 679 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2012)
In Re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2011-01
73 So. 3d 136 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
765 So. 2d 692, 2000 WL 329427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-standard-jury-inst-criminal-cases-fla-2000.