J-S02030-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: S.S.F., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: A.O., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 2598 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2024-A9065
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2025
Appellant, A.O. (“Mother”) appeals from the September 12, 2024 order
entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas that terminated her
parental rights to her now-2-year-old child, S.S.F. (“Child”). 1 Mother’s
counsel, Katrina Ihrer, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and
an Anders brief,2 to which Mother has not filed a response. Upon review, we
grant Attorney Ihrer’s petition to withdraw and affirm.
A.
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1 Child’s birth certificate does not identify a father, but Mother has identified
T.F., II, as Child’s father (“Putative Father”). The Agency sought termination of the parental rights of Mother, Putative Father, and John Doe, Child’s biological father. The court ultimately terminated the parental rights of Putative Father, who is not a party to this appeal, and John Doe.
2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). J-S02030-25
We glean the relevant factual and procedural history from the trial court
opinion and the certified record. The Bucks County Children and Youth Social
Services Agency (“the Agency”) first became involved with the family of
Mother and Putative Father in May 2014 due to concerns regarding their
substance abuse. Child was born in November of 2022. On December 1,
2022, the Agency received a referral reporting that Mother had tested positive
for benzodiazepine, cocaine, fentanyl, and methadone, and that Child had
tested positive for cocaine and methadone at birth. Child required treatment
for withdrawal symptoms due to Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome.
On December 5, 2022, the Agency received a report that Mother
admitted to using heroin in the hospital that was brought by Putative Father.
The hospital subsequently banned Putative Father from the hospital after
determining that he was also the source of unprescribed Percocet found in
Mother’s hospital room. Mother tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl again
on December 19, 2022, after leaving the hospital.
On December 21, 2022, the court granted emergency custody of Child
to the Agency. On February 6, 2023, the court adjudicated Child dependent,
and the court ordered Child to remain in the agency’s custody with a goal of
reunification.
“Through[out] the life of the case,” the Agency created the following
objectives for Mother: to maintain sobriety, address her outstanding criminal
cases, obtain employment and suitable housing, and participate in a parenting
program. N.T. Hr’g, 9/10/24, at 14-15.
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On February 1, 2023, Mother once again tested positive for cocaine and
fentanyl. Mother was then incarcerated at the Bucks County Correctional
Facility (“BCCF”) from February 6 to March 22, 2023. Following her release,
the Agency did not know Mother’s whereabouts.
On June 30, 2023, the court placed Child in her current foster home. In
July 2023, the Agency learned that Mother was incarcerated at the
Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center (“PICC”), then again at BCCF from
July 31 to November 14, 2023. All of Mother’s incarcerations involved drug-
related charges.
Following her release, Mother began inpatient drug and alcohol
treatment at Malvern Treatment Center-Willow Grove. On December 6, 2023,
Mother reported to the Agency that she was successfully discharged from
treatment and planned to live with her mother. However, Mother’s
whereabouts were unknown until March 14, 2024, when the Agency learned
that Mother was incarcerated at BCCF again for probation violations.
Mother has “mostly been uninvolved and out of the Child’s life, whether
she was incarcerated or not.” Trial Ct. Op., 10/31/24, at 9. The trial court
found that Mother did attend all but one biweekly visit with Child while
incarcerated, but she “only attended one visit in the community with the rest
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of her visits being while she was incarcerated or in an inpatient treatment
facility.”3 Id.
On April 4, 2024, following a hearing, the court changed Child’s
permanency goal from Reunification to Adoption. On June 28, 2024, the
Agency filed the instant Petition for the Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights for Mother, Putative Father, and John Doe. Mother was incarcerated at
BCCF when the Agency filed the petition.
The parties proceeded to a hearing on September 10, 2024, when Child
was almost 2 years old. Attorney Ihrer represented Mother, who was
present.4 Emily Ward, Esq., served as both Child’s counsel and Guardian ad
Litem (“GAL”) after the court determined there was no conflict in counsel
serving in the dual role. N.T. Hr’g at 11. The Agency presented testimony
from Permanency Supervisor Janeen Overberger and Case Aide Amanda
Kinsgdorf, and Mother testified on her own behalf.
Ms. Overberger and Ms. Kinsgdorf testified consistently with the above
facts. In addition, Ms. Kingsdorf testified that Child would cry when Mother
entered the room for their visits at BCCF. Ms. Overberger testified that Child
is currently with a pre-adoptive foster family, that she is doing “wonderful[ly]”
there, that her foster family keeps in contact with Mother’s relatives, and that ____________________________________________
3 Per the testimony of Permanency Supervisor Janeen Overberger, Mother has
only attended three total visits outside of BCCF. N.T. Hr’g at 19. Accordingly, it appears that one of these three visits occurred in the community, while the other two occurred while she was in inpatient treatment.
4 Putative Father failed to appear.
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Child is bonded to her foster family. Id. at 20-23. She opined that adoption
was in Child’s best interest and that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if
the court terminated Mother’s parental rights because she does not have a
bond with Child.
In addition, the GAL testified that she was in favor of termination. She
explained that Child gets along well with foster siblings, is growing well, and
has been receiving all necessary medical care. Id. at 63-64. Finally, she
explained that Child has “essentially been in limbo her entire life at this point
and she absolutely deserves permanency. I think for that reason alone the
Agency’s petition serves her best and legal interest.” Id. at 64.
Mother also testified that she has maintained sobriety while incarcerated
and that she planned to live with friends in Royersford, Pennsylvania, following
her incarceration while she remained on a waitlist for housing through a Bucks
County Opportunity Council program. Finally, she testified that her recent
incarcerations in Bucks County were for drug paraphernalia and that she had
pending charges in Philadelphia as well. 5
Following the hearing, the court issued the decree terminating the
parties’ parental rights.
B.
5 In questioning Mother, the court noted that it read in the Pre-Hearing Statement that Mother’s Philadelphia case was for Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance. N.T. Hr’g at 50.
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Mother timely appealed. Both Mother and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On December 2, 2024, Attorney Ihrer filed an Anders brief indicating
that, upon review, Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Mother did not
respond.
In the Anders brief, Attorney Ihrer indicated that Mother wished to raise
the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily terminating A.O.’s parental rights?
Anders Br. at 3.
C.
As a preliminary matter, we address appellate counsel’s request to
withdraw as counsel. “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may
not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the
request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.
Super. 2010). To withdraw from an appeal pursuant to Anders, our Supreme
Court has determined that counsel must meet the following requirements:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
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Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).
Attorney Ihrer has complied with the mandated procedure for
withdrawal. Additionally, she confirms that she sent Mother a copy of the
Anders brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a letter explaining to Mother
that she has the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and to raise any
additional points. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751-52
(Pa. Super. 2005) (describing notice requirements).
Because counsel has satisfied the above requirements, we will address
the substantive issue raised in the Anders brief. We must “make a full
examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide
whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355
n.5 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190,
1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (noting Anders requires the reviewing court
to “review ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record with consideration first
of issues raised by counsel”).
D.
In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, our
review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion is
supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580,
591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings
of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports
them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings
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are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse
of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial
court's decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). We may not reverse “merely because
the record would support a different result.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give
great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.,
855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
It is axiomatic that “[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make
decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot
be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent
and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an
undeniable importance in a child’s relationship with a biological parent.”
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n
recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the
moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as
to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 592 (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
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Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs
termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d
1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As discussed above, “[t]he
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated
in Section 2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). If the court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, the court
then engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree
with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). We concentrate our analysis in this
case on Section 2511(a)(2).
Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of parental rights where the
petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by
the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,
827 (Pa. 2012). The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
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2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative
misconduct; “those grounds may [also] include acts of refusal as well as
incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d
1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds
by In re K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023). “Parents are required to make
diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
duties.” In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019). Notably, a
“parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding
the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely
or disingenuous.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted).
With respect to incarcerated parents, our Supreme Court has held that
“incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be determinative of
the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing essential parental
care, control, or subsistence.” S.P., 47 A.3d at 830 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[I]ncarceration alone is not sufficient to support
termination under any subsection[,]” but “incarceration will certainly impact a
parent’s capability of performing parental duties, and may render a parent
incapable of performing parental duties under subsection (a)(2)[.]” In re
E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82-83 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis omitted).
Finally, “sincere efforts to perform parental duties” may still be
insufficient to remedy an incapacity. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (citation
omitted). This is because subsection (a)(2) “emphasizes the child’s present
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and future need for essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being[,]” especially “where disruption of the
family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting
it.” Id. (citation omitted).
*
The trial court found that Mother’s actions have caused Child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence essentially since birth.
Trial Ct. Op. at 7-9. Specifically, the court determined that
since [Child] became known to the Agency, Mother has undergone multiple periods of incarceration. The record shows that Mother’s repeated incarcerations and continued failure to be present for [Child] caused [Child] to be without essential care and subsistence for almost her entire life. Even during periods when Mother was released from incarceration, she has failed to take the opportunities the Agency had provided to her to make any effort in reunification with [Child].
Id. at 8. Furthermore, the court found that Agency showed by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother has been unable to remedy the issues that
led to the removal of Child from her care. Id. Specifically, Mother has “not
addressed [her] substance abuse issues, continued to test positive for illicit
substances on [her] drug tests, failed to meet regularly with the Agency
caseworker, and failed to engage in any resources or services that the Agency
sought for [her].” Id. at 9. Mother has also “never demonstrated stable
housing nor stable sources of income[,]” and “has an extensive criminal
history of multiple drug-related offenses[,]” including an active case in
Philadelphia. Id.
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In addition, the court noted that it “is not certain how much credit to
give Mother” for her sobriety during incarceration because, although
“controlled substances find their way into prisons,” it “generally. . .should not
be difficult” to remain sober in custody. Id. at 11. Finally, the court noted
that Mother “suggested repeatedly in the proceeding that she ‘intends’ to be
a good parent to her daughter upon her release.” Id.
Based on our review, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised
its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights. The record indicates that
Mother has struggled with substance abuse throughout Child’s life, that she
has incurred multiple drug-related cases, that she has spent significant time
incarcerated, and that she lacks stable housing. Furthermore, Mother
attended visits with Child while incarcerated, but when not incarcerated,
Mother attended few visits with Child and did not make her whereabouts
known to the Agency. Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s
findings that Mother refused to provide essential parental care for Child. Thus,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s termination of Mother's
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
E.
Regarding Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that
terminating the parental bond will have on the child. We review “whether
termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991
A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that “[i]ntangibles such as
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love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and
welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).
“One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the
nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close
attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 2018)
(citation omitted). The fact that a child has a bond with a parent “does not
preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897
(Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, the trial court must examine the depth of the bond
to determine whether the bond is so meaningful to the child that its
termination “would destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial
relationship.” Id. at 898 (citation omitted). Moreover, the trial court may
consider “intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the [adoptive resource].” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95,
103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). Ultimately, the concern is the needs
and welfare of the child. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “Finally, in cases where
there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable
to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore,
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re
Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 243 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and internal quotation
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The trial court concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights is
in Child’s best interest. Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14. It found that
The evidence supports a finding that Mother has failed to provide [Child] with adequate means of support and care. While some of these instances were due to Mother’s incarceration, Mother has also failed to provide [Child] with adequate means of support and care when she was not incarcerated. The record demonstrates that [Child’s] needs are properly cared for in her foster parent’s home. Furthermore, the evidence heard before the [c]ourt demonstrates the bond between Mother and [Child] was nearly nonexistent. As mentioned supra, Mother was incarcerated throughout [Child’s] life and has made little to no effort to reconnect and bond with [Child,] despite numerous attempts by the Agency at reconciliation. Any potential harm of severing the bond between [Child] and Mother is heavily outweighed by the benefit of permanency and stability for [Child]. As a result, this [c]ourt finds that termination would not destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship.
Id. at 13.
The record supports the trial court’s findings. The court heard
undisputed testimony that Child has a secure bond with her pre-adoptive
foster parents, who meet all her needs, and that it would not be detrimental
to Child if Mother's parental rights were terminated. N.T. Hr’g at 20-23, 36,
63-64. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion.
F.
Following our review of the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief, we
agree with counsel that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
terminating Mother’s parental rights. In addition, our independent review of
the proceedings reveals there are no issues of arguable merit to be raised on
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appeal. Accordingly, we grant Attorney Ihrer’s petition to withdraw as counsel
and affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.
Date: 3/18/2025
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